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The primary focus of this thesis is on representations of Germany and 
Germans in the sports pages of English newspapers from the mid-1950s to the 
mid-1990s, when EURO 96 generated press coverage that prompted much 
comment and criticism, both in England and in Germany. Studies focusing on 
media representations from the mid 1990s onwards, such as those by Maguire, 
Poulton and Possamai (1999), Garland and Rowe (1999) and Garland (2004) have 
been helpful in deconstructing the language used by football journalists and in 
identifying negative national stereotyping. More recently, however, Ramsden 
(2007) and Young (2007) have developed our understanding of Anglo-German 
cultural relations and how they have changed since 1945.  In the light of these 
recent developments this thesis seeks, firstly, to analyse the discourses embedded 
within the ‘Two World Wars and One World Cup’ meta-narrative which has 
characterized press coverage of Anglo-German football since international 
fixtures between the two countries were resumed in 1954 and, secondly, to 
contextualize them in the broader history of Anglo-German cultural relations and 
how they developed over the forty years or so that followed.   
 
Though drawing on some insights from both cultural and media studies the 
methodology employed is essential historical. This does not mean, however, that 
press reports and comment are regarded as unproblematic primary sources. Recent 
methodological approaches the history of sport, notably by Booth (2005) and Hill 
(2006), have pointed to the importance of viewing such sources as texts which are 
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thus open to deconstruction. A complementary emphasis on historical context is 
nevertheless justified, principally because it is important to explain variations that 
have occurred over time. Though there were some similarities in the way that 
Anglo-German football was covered in 1954 and 1996 – and at various points in 
between - there are also striking differences which it is argued here are primarily 
explained by conditions prevailing at the particular historical junctures at which 
representations were generated. The relationship which existed between Britain 
and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s was significantly different to that which existed between Britain and re-
unified Germany in the 1990s. This was an important contingent factor and helps 
to explain variations in the deployment of journalistic discourses over the years. 
Thus this thesis breaks new ground in that it emphasizes the historical 
contextualization of representations over a long period and seeks to counter any 
tendency to look backwards from the viewpoint of the mid 1990s.  
 
The discussion proceeds chronologically from the 1950s to the 1990s in 
order to demonstrate variations in the way that discourses were deployed over the 
years. Thus the representations generated provide a way of reading the state of 
underlying Anglo-German cultural relations at any given point. One chapter is 
devoted to representations of the 1966 World Cup Final on account of its 
significance in press discourses relating to Anglo-German football and in what in 
is popularly referred to in England as the ‘thirty/forty years of hurt’ that followed.  
Whereas academic attention in relation to football-related representations has 
previously concentrated on the downmarket tabloid press, this study is equally 
concerned with quality and middlemarket titles. Thus The Times and the Daily 
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Express are considered alongside the Daily Mirror and the Sun. Finally – and in 
contrast to previous accounts which have considered the English press in isolation 
– a chapter on German newspaper coverage (principally Bild, Die Welt and 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) has been included to allow some comparisons to 
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This glossary does not intend to decipher all positions on the football pitch 
or any rules, however there are some terms used in the text or the footnotes that 
need clarification. The acronym FIFA stands for Federations International des 
Football Federations; the European continental federation, UEFA is a Union 
Européens des Football Associations. On the national level, the FA – The 
Football Association – represents the English game while the DFB or Deutscher 
Fussballbund is the largest single sports association in the world with more 6 
million members who all play football in Germany. The competitions FA-Cup and 
DFB-Pokal describe the national cup competitions in England and Germany. The 
World Cup describes the premier tournament that is staged every four years by 
FIFA and should correctly be called: FIFA World Cup. The European Nations’ 
Championship is UEFA’s continental competition for national teams, also in 
football, also held every four years. Its shortened name was UEFA or Euro – 
followed by the corresponding year: UEFA ‘88 or EURO ‘96. Another term used 
frequently in this thesis for it is European Championship. There are a number of 
club competitions organized by UEFA; namely the European Champion Clubs 
Cup or the European Cup or the Champions League since 1992. The success of 
the European Cup led to another competition introduced in 1960: The UEFA Cup 
Winners’ Cup; it was abolished in 1999. The UEFA-Cup was initiated as the 




At some point in this thesis, British and German television channels are 
mentioned. The BBC is the British Broadcasting Corporation; ARD is the largest 
German association of German television channels. It is short for Allgemeine 
Rundfunkanstalten Deutschlands. Germany’s second channel, ZDF caries its fate 
in the name: Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen. 
Terminology 
In the course of this thesis several terms will be used frequently and some 
explanations are necessary to highlight their usage in their respective ways. This 
concerns geo-political entities such as England, Britain, the UK and Germany. 
 
There is a widespread misconception in Germany which equates Britain 
with England. While many English would not see a problem with this, other 
nations of the United Kingdom would certainly highlight their representative 
nationality. For the English, England is largely Britain. In football however, this 
is not the case. There is no British football team competing for the World Cup or 
the European Championship, but there are four home nations trying to qualify for 
each major tournament. Therefore, when England is mentioned in this thesis, it is 
the England football national team that is being written about, not Britain. 
Conversely, any political background that is given throughout this thesis refers to 
Britain. That is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
 
Throughout this study, the term West Germany is used to describe the West 
German football national team as well as the country West Germany. This applies 
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to the period before October 3, 1990. Other terms to describe West Germany that 
may be used frequently are Federal Republic of Germany or FRG. The German 
Democratic Republic or the GDR will be labelled East Germany when it is 
mentioned specifically. 
Notes on Translations 
This thesis draws on a rich well of German primary and secondary sources. 
The translations necessary have been carried out by me. The German newspaper 
articles are listed in the bibliography at the end of thesis with the original 
headline. Any assistance translating came from an ordinary dictionary
1
 as well as 
the website leo.dict.org, which acts as dictionary but also acts a community to 
discuss phrases that cannot be translated verbatim.
2
 
                                                 
1
  Pearsall, J.; Hanks, P., The New Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998) 
 






In September 2001, roughly two weeks after the Munich debacle of the 
German national team against England, I arrived in Bath in order to spend a year 
at an English university as an Erasmus student. The first month was difficult as I 
tried to grasp the language and settle in a foreign country. After a few weeks my 
life in Bath became structured and I began looking for a student job as this would 
help to improve my English. Outside an employment agency I saw a sign offering 
such positions. Little did I know what to expect. The person greeting me and 
asking me for which post I was applying soon spotted an accent. It was not 
difficult then as I believe that even now my German accent is recognizable. He 
asked me where I was from and once he got the appropriate answer, he could not 
help but smile and mention THE score of THAT game: ‘5-1, eh, matey!’, he said, 
or something along those lines. My reaction was stereotypically German: I turned 
on my heels and left. I was left speechless by a remark that I now realise was in 
no way meant as an offence. I offer this recollection in acknowledgement of the 
importance of reflexivity ‘a heightened state of self-awareness’, when writing 
history. At the very least, to adapt the opening words of Douglas Booth’s The 
Field, in the hope that ‘[some] knowledge about the origins of, and influences on 




Was my response symptomatic of Germany or Germans more generally? 
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Did my reaction simply confirm stereotypical British views of Germany and the 
people living there? It is often said in Britain that the Germans do not have a sense 
of humour and that therefore any joke or friendly banter is entirely lost to them. I 
would argue that is certainly not the case. Germans like a laugh; they have a sense 
of humour, though it is embedded in their own national culture and experience 
and is, therefore, rather different to that of the English. However, cross-cultural 
communication is a difficult matter and more often than not what may be regarded 
as humorous banter, such as the reference to the scoreline in Munich, is not 
perceived as such and thus not received in the way that it was intended. As Chris 
Young has noted: ‘Banter is unnatural for many non-English, particularly 
Germans […] Yet, this does not deter the English from using it as their natural 
mode of expression in cross-cultural communication.’
4
 The English enjoy their 
humour and the Germans enjoy theirs, without necessarily understanding each 
other, though this was not always so. John Cleese of Monty Python was glad to 
hear a German addressing him in Hamburg with a famous line from his iconic 
television comedy of the 1970s Fawlty Towers: ‘Hey, Mr. Cleese, don’t mention 
zee war!’ This delighted him and confirmed that a German audience fully 





                                                 
4  Young, C., ‘Two World Wars and One World Cup: Humour, Trauma and the 
Asymmetric Relationship in Anglo-German Football’, Sport in History, 27 (1), (2007), 10. 
 
5  Ramsden, J., Don’t mention the war: The British and the Germans since 1890 (London: 




‘Humour, as Young notes, is ‘one of the trickiest cultural transfers.’
6
 
However, the difficulties surrounding this particular cultural transfer are not the 
only sources of confusion and misunderstandings. Besides German bafflement 
regarding English humour, there is also consternation regarding what is seen as an 
unhealthy obsession with war, especially the Nazi period of German history 
(1933-1945) and World War II generally; and also with football, especially 
‘1966’, when England won the World Cup for the first and only time, by beating 
West Germany in the final at Wembley. These obsessions are manifested most 
obviously in the media. The schedules for The UK’s ‘Yesterday’ channel, are 
indicative, being heavily dependent on re-runs of documentaries such as ‘The 
World at War’ series and ‘The Nazis: a Warning from History’. Much press 
coverage of football matches between English and German teams over the years 
has been characterized by battlefield metaphors. At one level this is 
understandable: descriptions of sporting contests are inherently loaded with 
militaristic terms in both languages: Attack – Angriff, Defence – Verteidigung, to 
mention just two. However, references in the English press, as we shall see, are 
often specifically located in the context of the two wars against Germany. As for 
Wembley 1966, as James Walvin has noted, it was impossible for the English to 
forget, ‘not least because the media recycled the whole affair whenever it seemed 
appropriate – that is, as often as possible.’
7
 The way in which English sports 
journalists make use of the past, and particularly how they make the connections 
between ‘the war’ and football leaves many German observers baffled. However, 
as we shall see, the extent to which this has been evident has varied over time and 
                                                 
6  Young, ‘Two world wars’, 11. 




it would be misleading to assume that what was typical in the late 1990s and early 
2000s was typical of the whole post-war period. One of the main aims of this 
thesis is to explain why this might be so. 
Britain and Germany since 1945 
The histories of Britain and Germany could not be more different. Britain 
experienced its last invasion in 1066 while Germany, at the heart of Europe 
suffered centuries of war, invasion and destruction. As a consequence of the 
Second World War it was effectively occupied and divided. However, in some 
respects the histories of Britain and the Federal Republic in the post-war period 
from 1945 through to the early 1970s were similar. Both countries experienced 
austerity in the immediate aftermath of the war, though this was more intense in 
Germany given the extent to which its economic infrastructure had been damaged. 
However, both countries recovered during ‘the long boom’ which lasted from the 
mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, a period of sustained economic expansion for the 
world economy, which saw most developed industrial countries achieve high rates 
of growth and their peoples enjoy unprecedented levels of affluence.
8
 This was 
very much what happened in England where, in 1957, Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan was able to claim with some justification that ‘Most of our people 
have never had it so good.’
9
 At the same time, it was noticeable that British 
growth rates were slower than those of most of industrial countries, especially 
                                                 
8  Hobsbawm, E.J., Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day (London: 
Penguin, 1999), 230–255. 
 
9  See Porter, D., ‘Never-Never Land: Britain under the Conservatives 1951-1964’, in N. 
Tiratsoo (ed), From Blitz to Blair: A New History of Britain since 1939 (London: Phoenix, 1998), 




West Germany and Japan, over whom military victory had been achieved in 1945. 
Thus while the British grew more prosperous in this period, they did not 
experience the equivalent of the German ‘economic miracle’. As its people 
became more affluent, the British lost ground in relative terms when compared to 
its major competitors. 
 
The problem of a comparatively weak economic performance, especially as 
it was happening at a time when the British Empire was diminishing year by year 
as former colonies achieved independence and when Britain’s global political 
influence was shrinking, eventually forced decline to the forefront of public 
debate. Tony Judt has pointed out that the discussion of decline in post-war 
Britain had an ambivalent character. The British had fought and won a war against 
Germany (the ‘mortal enemy’) within the living memory of most of its people, 
‘yet cultural commentators were absorbed by intimations of failure and 
deterioration.’
10
 Other historians of post-war Britain have argued similarly. For 
the economic historian Barry Supple, writing in 1997, there was ‘an assumption 
that things are going from bad to worse when things are actually getting better.’
11
 
Later, reflecting on the prevalence of this state of mind in twentieth century 
Britain, Peter Hennessy described ‘declinism’ as ‘almost a disease of the mind.’
12
 
Perhaps the strength of its hold on public and academic opinion owed something 
to its long history. Jim Tomlinson observed that the idea that Britain was a nation 
                                                 




Supple, B., ‘Fear of Failing: economic history and the decline of Britain’, in P.F. Clarke 
and C. Trebilcock, (eds), Understanding Decline: perceptions and realities of Britain’s economic 




Hennessy, P., Having it so good: Britain in the Fifties (London: Penguin, 2007), 28. 
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in decline had been an issue since the 1870s when ‘the first industrial nation’, 
having achieved dominance of the world economy, found itself challenged by 
newly-industrializing nations, with Germany prominent among them. As relative 
economic decline inevitably set in the discussion was prolonged and intensified.
13
 
In particular, in the post-Second World War era the British tended to compare 
themselves unfavourably with the Germans. Britain was standing still, noted 
economist Donald Macrae in 1963, using a significant metaphor, ‘as the 




West Germany’s economic performance was not entirely unproblematic. 
The mid-1960s saw a temporary pause and a jolt to confidence which led to the 
resignation of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, the successor of Konrad Adenauer, and 
the person most closely associated with the ‘economic miracle’ in West Germany. 
At about the same time Britain’s relatively weak economic performance began to 
impact on the value of its currency, leading to the devaluation of the pound 
sterling in 1967. When Prime Minister Harold Wilson appeared at Wembley to 
watch the England-West Germany final in 1966, he had just returned from talks 
with the President Lyndon Johnson in Washington on ‘among other things, the 
growing economic crisis in Britain.’
15
 Despite some similarities in the experience 
of the two countries, however, two contrasting narratives came to dominate 
                                                 
13  Tomlinson, J. ‘Thrice denied: “Declinism” as a recurrent theme in British history in the 
long twentieth century (2009), Twentieth Century British History, 20 (2), (2009), 227-251. 
 
14  Cited in Porter, D., ‘Downhill all the way: thirteen Tory years 1951-64’, in R. Coopey, S. 
Fielding and N. Tiratsoo, (eds), The Wilson Governments 1964-1970 (London: Pinter, 1993), 25. 
 





historical writing. West German historians are obsessed with the economic 
miracle just as British historians were with decline. The reality of the economic 
miracle was important for the young democratic Federal Republic in that it helped 
to popularize a new state with a form of government that aimed to prevent the 
excesses of the past. When the long boom ended with the oil crisis of 1973 there 
were consequences for both countries. In West Germany, the protracted economic 
miracle had generated an expectation of ever-increasing levels of prosperity.
16
 In 
Britain, the new economic climate, as Hobsbawm has pointed out, made it 
‘impossible any longer to overlook the seriousness of the British economy’s 
problems.’
17
 In the 1970s and 1980s it was West Germany that appeared to adapt 
more successfully to the new conditions, while Britain entered a period of 
economic and social crisis that led some to label it ‘the sick man of Europe’. In 
this situation the complexities of Britain’s long-standing ‘love-hate’ relationship 
with West Germany were intensified. Whereas there were aspects of the West 




Anglo-German Relations: the wider context 
Several works serve as a starting point for this research. Anglo-German 
relations for much of the twentieth century were at best uneasy and at times were 
characterized by outright hostility. The origins of this uneasy and often unhappy 
                                                 
16
 14
 Wehler, H.-U., Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Bundesrepublik und DDR (Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2010), 63. 
 
17  Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 253–254. 
 




relationship may be traced to the antagonism generated by the growth of German 
economic power and political influence after 1870, to German militarism leading 
to the First World War, and to its continuing aggression in the 1930s. This put 
Germany on a collision path with Britain as the interests of the two states were so 
often opposed to each other. One consequence in terms of how Germany and 
Germans have been viewed in England is that much of the published historical 
literature, whether aimed at an academic or a popular readership, has focused on 
the First World War and especially on the Third Reich and the Second World 
War. Arguably, the particular concentration on the 1930s and 1940s has helped to 
underpin certain negative stereotypes. Thomas Matussek, the German ambassador 
to Britain, during a state visit of then chancellor Gerhard Schröder in 2000 
referred to the ‘nazification of history’, claiming that English media and public 
were imprisoned by Germany’s Nazi past.
19
 This is problematic as the German 
history to which the English public has become most familiar has been reduced to 
the period of twelve disastrous years between 1933 and 1945. They remain largely 
unaware of Germany’s medieval and early modern history as a Central European 
power and, crucially, have been left largely in ignorance as to the course of 
German history since 1945. Patrick Major argues that large sections of the British 
media are still in denial of the changes in Germany since 1945.
20
 In Germany, 
where there has been a corresponding emphasis on the ‘de-nazification’ of history, 
the British are not assigned the same burden of residual war guilt. Thus 
stereotypes of the British in Germany tend to be underpinned by the experience of 
war and occupation but to revolve around English eccentricities – obsession with 
                                                 
19  Ramsden, Don’t mention the war, 392. 
 
20  Major, ‘Britain and Germany’, 468. 
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the weather, strange-tasting food and, of course, their peculiar sense of humour. 
Albert Einstein once remarked that it is much harder to crack a prejudice than an 
atom. These stereotypes have become firmly established over time and have 
provided a prism through which football between the national teams of England 
and Germany has been viewed, helping to shape the language in which they have 
been described. 
 
However, it is important to view the Anglo-German relationship as dynamic 
rather than static, as subject to change over time and shaped by contingent 
circumstances. This is very evident from the work of John Ramsden who has 
taken the long view, surveying the relationship between England and Germany 
since the 1890s. His monograph provides an invaluable starting point for this 
discussion in that it includes an important chapter on football since the Second 
World War in which he argues that high-profile international matches between 
England and West Germany generated little in the way of antagonism in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, despite the war being very recent history and fresh in the 
memories of the British and German people. Ramsden uses the example of the 
English response to Bert Trautmann, captured while serving in the German armed 
forces and taken to England as a prisoner of war, to illustrate the relatively benign 
aspect of the Anglo-German relationship at this time. The story, as we shall see 
later, is complex but in the end Manchester City’s supporters were prepared to be 
persuaded by Trautmann’s exceptional ability and his heroics in the 1956 FA Cup 





 The warm glow surrounding Trautmann by the end of the 1950s 
was enhanced by the reception accorded by Manchester United fans to Professor 
Georg Maurer and the medical team that attended the victims of the Munich air 
crash in 1958. Invited to a match at Old Trafford, ‘the doctors and nurses of the 
Munich hospital received a reception from over 63,000 people such as is unlikely 
to have been the lot of any medical staff before’, reported the Manchester 
Guardian. One of the few positive outcomes of the disaster, it was noted, was that 




Trautmann and Maurer supplied the English press with human interest 
stories which could be used to keep the underlying tensions of Anglo-German 
relations at a safe distance in the 1950s and 1960s. It was not unusual for politics 
to influence the way in which international matches were covered in this period. 
Before England played Hungary at Wembley in 1953, Peter Wilson, previewing 
the match for the Daily Mirror, expressed the fervent hope that England would 
win, ‘because I have visited Hungary and I know how they, like other totalitarian 
states that I have seen, regard a sporting triumph as a justification of their 
“superior” way of life.’
23
 It is possible that the Cold War dimension of 
international sporting relations in the 1950s and 1960s may have brought England 
and West Germany closer together and inhibited expressions of hostility or 
                                                 
21  Ramsden, Don’t mention the war, 325-340. 
 
22  Manchester Guardian, 10 March 1958; 12 April 1958; see also Ramsden, Don’t mention 
the war, 342-344. 
 
23  Daily Mirror, 24 November 1953, cited in Kowalski, R. and Porter, D., ‘England’s world 





prejudices inherited from the war. It is important to contextualize sport within the 
broader context of international politics. For   Sabine Lee the Cold War, the 
partition of Germany and the development of the European Union have all helped 
to define and shape of post-1945 Anglo-German relations. Her starting point is 
VE Day, as it is known in Britain, or Stunde Null as it is known in Germany. In 
comparing the different paths taken by Britain and Germany from that point 
onwards she notes that whereas Germany was forced to reinvent itself as a peace-
loving nation, the British had no pressing imperative to change their ways seeking 
instead to capitalize on Great Britain’s status a country that had emerged 
victorious from the war and still had an empire to govern. Lee points out that 
whereas the Germans managed to re-invent themselves after the war, the British 
did not, preferring to cultivate their glorious past. ‘Whenever post-war Britain 
built a new museum, Germany built a new factory,’ she argues.
24
 Though this is 
something of a caricature and underestimates the extent to which Britain has 
modernized its economy in the post-war era, there is an underlying insight which 
points to the importance of differing national historical contexts in framing 
English attitudes to Germany and German attitudes to England, whether expressed 
on the sports pages or elsewhere. 
 
After 1945, as Germany struggled to shake off its Nazi past, outward 
expressions of nationalistic fervour were seen as problematic and sometimes 
actively discouraged. John Ardagh observed that the celebrations following West 
Germany’s World Cup win in 1990, ‘were probably less fervent than they would 
                                                 





have been in many countries, such as Britain’.
25
 It is perhaps understandable, 
therefore, that Thomas Kielinger, writing from a German viewpoint, should have 
focused largely on the cultural restraints that have ensured that the Anglo-German 
relationship has survived intact, despite persistent difficulties. He emphasized 
what the British and the Germans have in common, concluding that: 
 
‘… there is little likelihood of the German and British cousins 
becoming identical twins. They are extremely compatible, 
without being interchangeable and derive their particularly close 




Here the idea that a re-invented Germany was bound by a certain affinity towards 
Britain and voluntarily subjected itself to various constraints is an important factor 
in explaining how the Anglo-German relationship remained intact throughout the 
post-war years. It helps to explain why the various crossroads and roundabouts 
encountered along the way were successfully negotiated. Chris Young has also 
argued that the English, at least as represented by their sporting press, were happy 
for many years to comment and report on Anglo-German football matches 
without resorting to the sensationalism that later characterized tabloid coverage in 
particular. Up to 1966 – and even in 1966 – as Chris Young notes, English 
newspapers ‘though letting through the odd war reference, remained largely free 
                                                 
25  Ardagh, J., Germany and the Germans: the United Germany in the mid-1990s (London: 
Penguin, 1995), 577. 
 
26  Kielinger, T., Cross Roads and Roundabouts: Junctions in German-British Relations 






 It was only to be expected that the representatives of the 
Federal Republic should be met with some distrust after two atrocious wars but, 
until the 1970s at least, there were good reasons to keep this in check. At the same 
time, there was an undercurrent of envy, growing stronger in the last two decades 
of the twentieth century, when the economic miracle left ‘declining’ Britain 
behind in relative terms. 
Anglo-German Football Rivalry: recent work surveyed 
Charting the course of the international football rivalry between England 
and Germany is, at one level relatively straightforward. As might have been 
expected, England, where the association game was first developed, enjoyed early 
superiority winning 11 of the 12 matches played between 1899 and the World 
Cup Final of 1966. Not surprisingly, English football was held in high regard by 
Germans in this period. England’s World Cup Final victory of 1966, however, 
may be seen in retrospect as a turning point. Thereafter, Munich 2001 aside, 
Germany has been largely dominant. The more aggressive tone in the English 
press that becomes increasingly apparent in the period after 1966 may be partly 
explained simply by what has happened on the field of play. However, it is 
important to remember that Anglo-German football matches have been weighted 
with a political significance that went beyond mere sporting rivalry since at least 
the inter-war period. The match in Berlin in 1930 was regarded as an important 
step towards the re-integration of Germany into the world of international sport. 
The outcome – an honourable draw – seemed appropriate as both sides had reason 
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to claim a moral victory. The German amateurs came within ten minutes of 
beating a team of English professionals who, nevertheless, could draw some 
satisfaction from a draw achieved when playing with only ten men due to an 
injury.
28
 While the 1930 match was played under the banner of reconciliation, the 
games in 1935 and 1938 took place under very different circumstances. Sport 
became increasingly important to the Nazi leadership for propaganda purposes 
and was subject to political exploitation; the idea that sportsmen representing 
Germany could be politically neutral became ‘unthinkable’. It has to be said that 
the English FA went more than half way to meet the requirements of their hosts. 
The game in 1938 became notorious when the England team saluted the Führer’s 
box with their right arms outstretched. In this way English football made its 
contribution to the pre-war appeasement policy while the fixture was intended to 




It may or may not still be the case that historians of sport struggle to be 
taken seriously by historians working in more traditional areas who have viewed 
sport as ‘an irrelevant sideshow’.
30
 That what some may consider irrelevant is 
indeed relevant has been argued by Peter Beck who locates the Anglo-German 
football rivalry in the context of international relations. He argues that even 
though diplomatic relations between Britain and Germany, both members of the 
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European Union, were generally amicable, this does not tell the full story and that 
what Ramsden calls the ‘people to people’ relationship may be rather different. 
This is more likely to be accessible to historians through studying in Anglo-
German cultural exchanges involving sport and the arts, areas once considered 
‘irrelevant’ by historians of international relations but which are capable of deeper 
insights into a nation’s cultural framework than traditional archive-based research 
into the making of foreign policy, for example.
31
 Chris Young’s article ‘Two 
World Wars and One World Cup’ marks a significant shift in this direction setting 
his analysis of the Anglo-German relationship within the context of cultural 
misunderstandings relating to humour. Too much emphasis, he argues, has been 
given to the political and xenophobic aspects of media coverage of Anglo-German 
football. Instead, he sketches a model in which humour plays a much more 
prominent role. He argues that much of the English press coverage is best 
understood as a modern manifestation of the pantomime tradition in its purest and 
finest form in which the stereotypical heroes and villains are cheered and booed 
respectively by a knowing audience. Corny jokes reminding readers that the 
match kicks off at 1945 (‘Time for Victory!’) are ‘the journalistic equivalent of 
running up behind the pantomime villain and sticking your tongue out for the 
audiences amusement.’ However, Young admits that this kind of humour is often 
misunderstood by those at whom it is directed and this leads to a good deal of 
uncomfortable friction. Tabloid newspaper editors excuse themselves by pointing 
out that their excesses were meant to be funny but how are Germans, who are 
popularly believed in Britain to have no sense of humour, to make sense of all 
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 Although humour was used to explain what some critics regarded as crass 
populism, it remains an open question whether the editor of the Daily Mirror was 
seriously trying to be funny during EURO 96 or whether he simply overstretched 
limits that he considered elastic. 
 
As much of what follows, while remaining sensitive to the particularities of 
context and contingency, is an attempt to interpret and deconstruct the ways in 
which Anglo-German football matches have been represented in the press of both 
countries, the research undertaken by Maguire, Poulton and Possamai has been 
especially useful. Their article on ‘The War of the Words’,  published three years 
after the event, examines English and German coverage of the EURO ’96 
tournament in five English (The Times/Sunday Times, Daily Telegraph/Sunday 
Telegraph, Guardian/Observer, Daily Mirror/Sunday Mirror and The Sun/News 
of the World  and two German papers (Die Welt and Sueddeutsche Zeitung). Their 
findings were that the English press, with some exceptions, tended to approach the 
event differently to its German counterpart. There was evidence of anti-
Europeanism, or at least a suspicion of ‘Europe’ that was not evident in Germany, 
much of it focused on the so-called ‘Beef War’, after exports of British beef had 
been suspended on account of ‘Mad Cow’ disease (BSE). This provided a space in 
which latent anti-German sentiment could be expressed, albeit indirectly. When 
focusing specifically on football the English press tended to look backwards to 
previous encounters with their opponents while the German press focused on the 
present and rejoiced in Germany’s current position. There was a hint of 
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Schadenfreude in the German press towards Britain/England as a country that had 




This was reinforced in a second article by the same authors focusing 
specifically on the coverage of the England-Germany semi-final at the same 
tournament and on the role of sport as mediated for mass consumption in 
‘perpetuating national habitus’. Maguire et al built their findings on the theoretical 
platform provided by Norbert Elias’ concepts of sleeping memories, imagined 
charisma and fantasy shields, applying them to provide insights into Anglo-
German cultural relations. Whereas the tensions between the English and the 
Germans had once been expressed in warfare, they were now being expressed 
politically and also through sport. Thus, in terms of the confirmation of national 
identity, EURO 96 was a ‘potent occasion’, which the media represented 
accordingly. The English press used nostalgia and ethnic assertiveness to deflect 
attention from Britain’s present condition while the German press seized the 
moral high ground, claiming to be ‘dismayed by the warmongering’ and seeking  
‘symbolic ascendancy over the English’ by referring to the BSE crisis and ‘the 




Garland and Rowe were similarly concerned with what the press coverage 
of the tournament revealed about English identity. Utilising George Orwell’s 
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famous contention that international sport could best be characterized as ‘war 
minus the shooting’, they pointed to confused attempts to reclaim Englishness via 
journalism based on positive stereotypes of the English (‘bulldogs on steroids’) 
and negative stereotypes of foreigners, notably the ‘Führers of thuggery’. The 
confusion was caused by a longing for glories from years long past as well as an 
attempt to put ‘the Great back into Britain.’ They concluded that the press was not 
solely responsible for the excessive display of xenophobia during the tournament, 
rather ‘it is important to recognize the broader social implications in the press 
coverage.’
35
 The deconstruction of the press reports on which these analyses 
rested was then refined by Liz Crolley and David Hand who noted the emphasis 
on stereotypes of Englishness based on references to ‘the bulldog spirit’. The 
combination of ‘the tenacious and pugnacious qualities’ of that particular breed 
with the ‘patriotic and belligerent spirit of the British’ featured routinely in 
descriptions of English football and footballers and, in addition, ‘the lion roar[ed] 
regally in the pages of this island’s football writing.’ Stereotypes of foreign 
players were also commonplace in the English press and were readily applied to 
those plying their trade in the Premiership. Italians had style and flair, but were 
also ‘white-booted fairies.’ Germans were associated with all things militaristic 
but were praised for their efficiency.
36
 These insights were useful but were largely 
derived from the specific context of Anglo-German football rivalry at the very end 
of the twentieth century. It remains to be seen whether they are helpful in 
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shedding light on the preceding decades, from the 1950s onwards, when 
circumstances were very different. 
Methods and Sources 
The central sources for this thesis are newspapers from England and West 
Germany. These have been accessed through various channels: notably the British 
Newspaper Library at Colindale (now relocated), the French National Library in 
Paris and the Prussian National Library in Berlin, the online press archive 
ukpressonline.com and the Institute for Newspaper Research in Dortmund. By 
suggesting that newspapers help to shape our view of the world, Jeffrey Hill has 
argued that they are an essential source for historians seeking to understand 
modern sport. He notes that the sub-discipline of sports history has developed 
largely thanks to the press. Yet he also warns of an overreliance on newspapers 
alone and urges sports historians to use them with discrimination; too often they 
have been regarded as ‘an unblemished source of plain fact’.
37
 These arguments 
were further developed by Douglas Booth. ‘It is not too much of an exaggeration 
to say that sport history rests on newspapers as historical sources’, he noted. He 
was, however, critical of sports historians who, in their efforts to ‘reconstruct’ the 
sporting past, used them in an uncritical way. ‘It is probably fair to conclude that 
few sports historians pay enough attention to interrogating newspaper sources’. 
On one level newspapers, constitute a source of useful, verifiable ‘facts’. The facts 
in this thesis are a number of football results, details of the teams selected, and the 
size of the crowds that attended matches. They are drawn from a number of 
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English and German daily newspapers and their Sunday equivalents. Beyond that, 
however, it is important to recognise that newspapers are complex sources which 
require careful interpretation. Booth cites Leonard Koppett, a sports journalist, 
who pointed out that ‘every story starts with a perspective’. Thus, for example, 
when a team representing England beats one representing Germany, an English 
reporter will write about England’s ‘victory’ while a German journalist will write 
about Germany’s ‘loss’. In these circumstances it becomes possible to argue that 
football, as played between England and Germany, is effectively a mediated text 
‘given that most people experience sport indirectly via the media’.
38
 The 
discussion that follows seeks to interrogate newspaper reports and comments with 
this in mind. 
 
It is important to recognise that there are differences between the national 
press in England and in Germany that may have impacted on the way in which 
football has been reported. Tabloid newspapers have a stronger presence in 
England; currently there are five daily tabloids (The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily 
Express, Daily Mail and Daily Star), whereas in Germany only Bild-Zeitung is 
published in this format. This contrast is also evident in the Sunday papers. 
Whereas England has ten national Sunday newspapers (four ‘quality’ and six 
tabloids), Germany has only three – Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung 
(quality), Welt am Sonntag (middlemarket) and Bild am Sonntag (tabloid). Esser 
contends that British/English journalism has a stronger tendency towards 
sensationalist stories, while the Germans prefer thoughtful analysis. One reason 
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for the prevalence of rather sober journalism is the high percentage of newspaper 
subscriptions and home delivery in Germany which in the 1990s accounted for 
between 75 and 90 per cent of all sales. By contrast, British newspapers were 
mainly sold at newsagents or by street vendors in the period under consideration. 
Arguably, this meant that it was imperative to grasp the attention of readers with 
their front pages and headlines in order to sell copies.
39
 There may be other 
reasons, notably the intensely competitive market conditions that have influenced 
the way in which news has been presented, especially by middlemarket and 
downmarket newspapers in Britain over a long period. As Kevin Williams has 
pointed out, ‘The roots of “junk journalism”… had been set down long before the 
arrival of the Sun, in the newspaper wars of the 1930s.’  Since the Sun first 
appeared in tabloid form in 1969, however, competition has tended to promote 
sensationalism and ‘the steady erosion of popular journalism as papers moved 




The newspapers relied on most heavily in this thesis have been chosen to 
represent each segment of the English and German markets. The English quality 
section is represented principally by The Times and Sunday Times. As a self-
styled ‘newspaper of record’ with a high opinion of itself, The Times represents 
the upper market segment, drawing most of its readers from the well-off and the 
well-educated. For many years it was considered the voice of Britain’s 
‘Establishment’. The Daily Express and Sunday Express were popular and 
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successful papers during the 1950s and 1960s covering the middle of the market. 
During the period covered by this thesis the Daily Mail gradually achieved victory 
over the Express in the battle for readers in this sector. The Daily Mirror and 
Sunday Mirror represent the tabloid section throughout this thesis. These titles 
have drawn most of their readers from the skilled and unskilled working class.
41
 
The German newspapers focused on here are principally Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, (FAZ) Die Welt and Bild-Zeitung. The FAZ, one of Germany’s most 
respected and influential newspapers, represents the quality segment of the 
market; its Sunday edition is the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung (FAS). 
Not only is this paper one of the best in Germany, it is also one of the oldest, 
established in 1949. In its first issue the paper expressed aspirations to be 
‘Germany’s foreign secretary’.  There was no such position within the German 
government at the time and, in the editors’ view, it was necessary to give the 
Federal Republic a voice.
42
  Originally conceived as a competitor for the FAZ, Die 
Welt, published since 1946, was selected to represent the middlemarket in 
Germany, while Bild represents the downmarket tabloid section. Here Bild 
operates alone, unlike its English counterparts. Both, Die Welt and Bild are 
published by Springer, Germany’s biggest newspaper publishing company, Axel 
Springer AG, which has been essentially – and sometimes controversially – a 
conservative influence in post-war German politics.
43
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One more striking difference between the English and German press needs 
to be pointed out. The British national press is based in London.  Historically, 
they were all located in Fleet Street, making this area the press centre of Britain. 
Although some papers had local editions, the heartbeat of the British Press was 
Fleet Street. Interestingly, once Rupert Murdoch successfully moved his 
newspapers to Wapping, the rest of the British press followed suit. The situation 
in Germany is again very different in comparison to England. Even before 1945 
the press was not concentrated in one city like it was in Britain but instead there 
was a strong regional and local focus due to Germany’s federal nature. There were 
papers published in Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Frankfurt and Munich to name the 
most important cities. Largely this stayed the same after 1945 and helped to avoid 
press concentration in one locale and under the control of a few conglomerates. 
Berlin no longer had its own paper. Though Springer had a publishing house in 
Berlin after 1966 there was no paper of importance in the western part of the city. 
The East German paper Neues Deutschland was the paper of the Socialist Unity 
Party produced in East Berlin. Despite its name suggesting a local paper, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is a national paper published in a city with a long 
newspaper tradition – even before 1933. 
 
As Colin Seymour-Ure has pointed out, the ownership of English 
newspapers has often been highly significant in determining what appears on the 
page. The press ‘barons’, he notes, ‘were often supreme egotists: flamboyant, 





 Roy Greenslade, in his insider’s history of the British press, suggests 
that Lord Thomson was unusual in giving his editors ‘an entirely free hand as long 
as they didn’t come out against God or the monarchy.’
45
 In Germany, however, as 
Harry Pross has argued, the editorial content of newspapers was more likely to be 
subject to official intervention from the state and other agencies. After 1945, for 
example, newspapers were subject to a licensing system introduced by the 
occupying powers as part of the de-nazification and re-education programmes, 
with the aim of ensuring that editors and journalists who had been closely 
connected to the NSDAP or any organisation controlled by the national socialists 
were denied positions of influence in the press. It proved, however, difficult in 
practice to fulfil this policy completely and the principles underlying it were 




Comparative studies of the British and German press are rare and two works 
stand out. First is Frank Esser’s Die Kräfte hinter den Schlagzeilen in which he 
compares English and German journalism in depth.  Esser highlights three major 
issues: firstly, he compares the field of activity of journalists in Britain and 
Germany and the factors influencing it; secondly, he aims to highlight what 
journalism in Britain could eventually learn from its German counterpart and vice 
versa; and lastly, he identifies the elements that give journalism its particular 
national and cultural identity in Britain and Germany respectively. This includes 
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the relation between the state and the press and the freedom of the press more 
generally. Susanne Höke’s work focuses on the tabloid papers. In her study “Sun 
vs. Bild”, she concludes that, despite the very different histories of the English 
and German press, the similarities between the two tabloids are striking. Both use 
simplified language and try to engage their readers’ emotions: moreover, both 




In addition to newspaper accounts of Anglo-German football, the principal 
primary sources used are published books by sports journalists and other 
commentators who were close to the events described here or who have made 
their own contribution to the history of football, such as David Goldblatt, 
Jonathan Wilson and Uli Hesse, who has written the only book on the history of 
German football in the English language.
48
 Other published sources consulted 
include journalists’ memoirs which often provide reflective comment on 
journalism in general.  For example, Brian Glanville’s memoirs are rather more 
than a rehearsal of matchesreported and personalities encountered while working 
for quality newspapers, such as the Observer and the Sunday Times, as well as for 
the Sunday tabloid, The People.  It provides an opportunity to reflect on the nature 
of sports journalism and, in particular, on ‘British sports writing, with its quality-
popular dichotomy’. In the quality press, Glanville argued, the journalist was free 
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to write what he wanted about football and other popular sports, because he was 
addressing a minority audience; in the tabloids, however, ‘he was rigidly confined 
to a highly stylised, ultimately patronising form of journalism, which treated its 
readership with implicit contempt.’
49
 The (usually ‘ghosted’) autobiographies of 
players and managers have been used carefully with reference to the period in 
which they were written as well as the recollections of events which they contain. 
Sometimes, as different editions of the same memoirs indicate, views change over 
time. The work of Joyce Woolridge, who has traced the evolution of ghosted 
football memoirs as a genre, has opened up ways of reading these texts, which 




The time frame of the thesis, 1954–1996, requires some explanation. This 
42-year-period covers all matches played between English and West German 
(later German) national teams. After defeat in the Second World War, Germany 
was not allowed to participate in international sporting events until 1950. It was 
another four years before a friendly between England and West-Germany was 
played in December 1954. Thus this match marks the resumption of the Anglo-
German football rivalry after the hiatus of 1939-1945. In roughly the first half of 
the period under consideration, especially before 1966, references to the darker 
side of the Anglo-German relationship are conspicuous for their absence. 
However, by the end of the period under consideration this had changed 
considerably and the Anglo-German wars of the twentieth century wars were 
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frequently referenced, especially in the English tabloids. My decision to conclude 
with the coverage of EURO 1996 was determined primarily by the idea that it was 
a significant juncture in terms of press representations. The Daily Mirror seems to 
have crossed a line in its coverage of that event – it was much criticised at the 
time for its bad taste – and has not been inclined to do so since. Another reason is 
the advent of the internet. The late 1990s saw the World Wide Web spread but 
EURO 96 was probably the last major tournament not covered by online media. 
The papers examined had existing websites at the time but these resembled static 
pages and were scarcely updated as the main reader traffic was generated in the 
print versions of the papers. With the arrival of the web 2.0 in the early years of 
the new millennium football writing has mushroomed. As Jonathan Wilson has 
observed: ‘We live in a golden age. There has never been so much football 
journalism of such high standard as there is now.’
51
 Research beyond 1996 would 
have necessarily involved not just the websites produced by the various 
newspapers but also social networks such as twitter, facebook and google+ and 
many more. Only an online repository will suffice to cover all this material 
sufficiently. 
 
The methods applied to draw conclusions from a vast amount of newspaper 
reports and comments might best be described as discourse analysis embedded in 
an awareness of historical context. Formal techniques of content analysis, 
requiring some form of quantitative measurement of articles related to Anglo-
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German international football matches appearing in English and German daily and 
Sunday newspapers have not been systematically applied though, where the extent 
of coverage or its position in the newspaper appears important, this has been 
noted. For example, it is clearly significant to observe that coverage of England’s 
World Cup victory in 1966 appeared prominently on the front pages of the Sunday 
Express on the day after the match as well as on the back page and that it included 
a special four-page supplement especially designed to commemorate the ‘historic’ 
occasion. The match also featured on the front page of The Times on the Monday 
morning where sport did not often feature (see pp.121-123). To note that this was 
so simply underlines the importance assigned to the event at the time and its place 
related to the other stories comprising the news agenda.  Conversely, the relatively 
sparse coverage of England’s 3-1 victory over West Germany in Mexico City in 
1985 – a match played largely to allow players to gain experience of playing in 
the conditions they could expect to meet in the World Cup finals a year later – 
reflects growing indifference to non-competitive  ‘friendlies’ to which less 
importance was attached in the 1980s than the 1950s. Unlike the 1966 final this 
match was in no way ‘historic’ and this is reflected in the paucity of the coverage.  
Significantly, however, as we shall see, even within the limited space allowed to 
cover this match, the Daily Express, found a pretext to represent Germany in a 
negative fashion (p.213). 
 
However, it is important to dig a little deeper. As Jeffery Hill has pointed 
out, historians of sport should be aware when analysing match reports and other 
comment appearing in the press that they are essentially texts.  Moreover, though 
40 
 
they are important sources of evidence through which it may be possible to reach 
tentative conclusions about what may or may not have happened on the field of 
play, they are texts in which certain discourses are embedded.
52
  Thus, as far as 
this thesis is concerned, the emphasis is on discourse analysis rather than content 
analysis. Systematic reading of the texts generated by newspapers in response to 
Anglo-German football encounters over a long period from the mid 1950s to the 
mid 1990s makes it possible to identify, firstly, overarching tendencies in the way 
in which England and German were represented and, secondly, particular 
discourses or meta-narratives that were transmitted via the banalities of match 
reports. Heinz Bonfadelli has argued that the aim of discourse analysis is to unveil 
ideologies embedded in the text which exist to maintain the status quo. While this 
indicates an intention to analyse texts from a Marxist position, it is not intended 
here to politicize the football coverage in English and German newspapers but 
rather to identify and explain the discourses that are present and they way in 
which they have been deployed at particular times.
53
 Thus, through systematic 
reading of press coverage on and around the dates of each senior international 
fixture between 1954 and 1996, it has been possible to identify a general tendency 
in the English press over the period to locate Anglo-German football rivalry 
within a continuous meta-narrative embracing ‘two World Wars and one World 
Cup’.  It is also clear that this meta-narrative embodies various discourses 
involving representations of Germans as militaristic, arrogant, untrustworthy, 
lacking a sense of humour, inclined to cheat or to complain and – more positively 
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– as technically efficient and successful modernizers.  
 
It is important, however, to contextualize the meta-narrative and the 
discourses associated with it within the history of Anglo-German relations as they 
have developed since the end of the Second World War in order to explain how 
and why they have been applied in different circumstances.  The aim here is to 
provide a historically informed discourse analysis which acknowledges the 
importance of explaining why things happened in a particular way at a particular 
time.  For example, in 1966, as Helmut Schön’s team progressed towards the final 
at Wembley and were increasingly regarded as a threat to England’s chances of 
winning the tournament, negative representations of Germany and Germans 
predominated, especially after their semi-final against the Soviet Union.  These 
comprised references to the Second World War, reminders of German militarism 
and accusations that they had cheated by provoking opponents in order to get 
them sent off. After the final – and England’s victory – the tone of press coverage 
quite was different. It was then safe to represent Schön’s team as ‘good Germans’, 
heroic and worthy opponents, not least because this reflected so well on the 
English team that had beaten them. More generally, it is suggested here that there 
were underlying conditions, fluctuations in Anglo-German cultural relations, 
which explain the varying intensity with which negative discourses were 
consciously or sub-consciously applied. Thus it is important to recognize that 
conditions in the 1950s, with both sides anxious for various reasons to put the 
recent experience of the war behind them, were very different from the 1990s 
when deep-seated English anxieties regarding German re-unification after 1990 
42 
 
supplied a context which the tabloid press could indulge in a kind of pantomime 
warfare against Germany in which discourses built on negative stereotyping were 
very much to the fore.  
Thesis structure and chapter summary 
Set in the context of two brutal and destructive wars the state of relations 
between Britain and Germany now appears relatively healthy, whatever 
differences exist regarding issues relating to the European Union. However, 
though leading politicians, such as Tony Blair, fifty years on from ‘VE Day’, 
could claim that Anglo-German relations had ‘never been better’, a perusal of the 
sports pages suggests that what has been called ‘a people to people’ problem has 
been a persistent undercurrent throughout the second half of the twentieth century 
and into the twenty-first.
54
 This thesis surveys the course of Anglo-German 
football relations over a long period as represented indirectly on the sports pages 
of newspapers. Much of the research recently has been based on discourse 
analysis of coverage relating to particular tournaments from 1996 onwards. This 
tends to obscure the extent to which the characteristics of coverage have changed 
over time in response to specific historical circumstances. This thesis seeks to 
correct this imbalance and also to provide some kind of framework in which a 
comparative perspective might be developed. 
 
Chapter One focuses largely on the first two international matches in the 
post-war sequence, played in 1954 and 1956, and on the way that they were 
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reported. These matches represented an important step in normalising relations 
between Britain and West Germany, especially as England had not played 
Germany since 1938, an occasion long associated in the minds of the English 
public with its players giving the Nazi salute before kick-off, a gesture that 
signified appeasement and the failures of foreign policy in the 1930s. With the 
Second World War fresh in people’s memories and Germany morally discredited 
after committing crimes against humanity, there was reason to anticipate some 
hostility in the British press. It was especially ironic, given the two defeats that 
had been inflicted on Germany in 1918 and 1945, that its national team came to 
Wembley in 1954 as world champions, even though the importance of FIFA’s 
premier competition did not resonate as powerfully then with the English public 
as it does now, such was the overwhelming interest in domestic, rather than 
international football. Yet, the response to these matches was generally 
characterised by restraint, despite the fact that only a few years had passed since 
the English and the Germans had been at war. 
 
The World Cup Final of 1966 provides the main focus for Chapter Two. In 
football terms the match was a turning point. It occurred at a point when, in terms 
of the playing strength of the two national teams, a delicate balance had been 
reached. ‘What the statistics show is that the 1966 World Cup final was the 
fulcrum between two very different periods: England dominant until 1966 but 
Germany afterwards’, as Ramsden pointed out.
55
 Whereas the matches in the 
1950s were largely overshadowed by the Second World War, the two encounters 
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that preceded the Wembley final, ‘friendlies’ played in 1965 and 1966, and all the 
matches that followed, were overshadowed by the prospect and reality of what 
happened at Wembley on 30 July 1966. As it happened there were also other 
important matches at club level, especially two finals of the Cup Winners Cup 
competition in 1965 and 1966, that underlined the theme of Anglo-German 
rivalry. Sports journalism, moreover, was changing in this period so that it was 
not just the extent but the content of the coverage that differed from the 1950s. As 
coverage, especially in the middle-market and downmarket newspapers became 
more gossipy and personality-centred it was possible to underestimate the 
technical advances being made by the German team, especially in the light of 
what has been described as England’s ‘fatal victory’ of 1966, which reinforced, 
for a time, a sense of complacency in and around English football. 
 
The following chapter surveys representations of Anglo-German football in 
the late 1960s and 1970s when German superiority was becoming apparent: 
England was beaten four times by Germany in this period, with only one draw and 
one victory. There was some compensation at club level with English clubs 
dominating in the European Cup competition, though this tended to emphasise the 
underlying tension between the interest of club and country, a power struggle 
which has often been said to hamper the progress of the English national team. 
Press coverage in this period tended to see the Germans in a different light to the 
1960s. The valiant losers of 1966 admired for their machine-like efficiency in 
1966 became stylish opponents to be admired for their flair and for their ability to 
discard outdated methods. This tended to reflect the British pre-occupation that 
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they were a nation in decline, especially as events on the field seemed to reflect 
what was happening to Britain’s economy which provided a dismal contrast to 
West Germany’s post-war ‘economic miracle’. 
 
Chapter Four focuses on the 1980s and the early 1990s when press coverage 
of Anglo-German football expanded enormously and changed radically. The tone 
in the English press now became increasingly chauvinistic, not just towards 
Germany but towards foreigners in general. This observation applied not just to 
the sports pages but to editorial content more generally, especially in newspapers 
that were politically aligned to the right. English football was now subject to its 
negative association with hooliganism, a major concern for the media and the 
football public. The Falklands War of 1982 saw jingoism reintroduced as an 
element of British popular journalism and this overspilled onto the sports pages, 
especially in the tabloid press, where it remained a prominent feature until after 
EURO 96. The end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany may have 
helped to refocus residual anxieties about German domination of Europe, though 
it is just as likely that the tabloid excesses on the sports pages in 1996 were a 
consequence of the circulation war between the Daily Mirror and the Sun at the 
lower end of the daily newspaper market. Football coverage continued to be 
indicative of a persistent undercurrent of hostility in Anglo-German cultural 
relations. The question that needs answering is why the tone of reporting was now 
so different to the immediate post-war period? 
 
The final chapter surveys sports journalism in Germany as it has developed 
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between 1966 and 1996. Of the fifteen matches played in this period, five have 
been selected for special consideration: the World Cup Final of 1966, the 
European Championship quarter-finals of 1972, the World Cup semi-final (won 
by Germany on penalties) in 1990 and the semi-final in EURO 96. The intention 
here is to supply some basis for comparative work on the English and German 
coverage in the future. It will indicate that representation of Anglo-German 
football in the German press has followed a different path, especially in relation to 
the prevalence of stereotyping, which became very much the stock-in-trade of the 
English tabloid press in the 1990s. Football might appear to be an ‘irrelevance’, as 
Beck has argued.’
56
 [sentence deleted here] A grasp of these issues, however, is 
clearly relevant if we seek a fuller understanding of Anglo-German cultural 
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CHAPTER ONE: Post-War: Anglo-German 
Football in the 1950s 
It is important to establish the broader context in which Anglo-German 
football relations have taken place. The history of armed conflict between the two 
nation-states was, of course, a very important factor. Sports writers often reach for 
military metaphors to describe the ‘battles’ that take place on the field and the 
First and Second World Wars supplied a limitless source of references of which 
they were to make good use, helping them to frame each match in the context of 
recent Anglo-German history. War had seen hardship, suffering and loss inflicted 
by Germany on Britain and by Britain on Germany. Many on both sides found it 
difficult to forgive and forget. The idea that Britain/England was in decline was 
also very important, especially as Germany – or West Germany at least – was 
seen to be more successful, in terms of economic performance. This became 
evident after the Suez crisis of 1956 had exposed the idea that Britain was still one 
of the world’s great powers as an illusion, though it really took hold in the 1970s 
and 1980s, leading to a prevailing intellectual climate of ‘declinism’, described by 
Hennessy as ‘almost a disease of the mind’.
57
 It did not seem to matter that the 
British people had ‘never had it so good’, as Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, 
famously stated in 1957, or that its economy was growing – albeit at a slower rate 
than that experienced by many of its rivals. It was the impression that Germany 
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was moving ahead more quickly that seemed to count. The title of a BBC 
Television documentary broadcast in December 1960 asked Why are we falling 
behind? and reflected on the comparative performance post-1945 and what it 
signalled for the future. The programme’s producer observed: 
 
‘In less than ten years’ time the people of Western Germany will 
be enjoying a standard of living twice as high as they have 
today. Yet it will be over thirty years before we double our 




These perceptions and the hard facts underlying them helped to make football 
matches between England and Germany more important than most. 
 
Tony Judt has pointed out that the discussion of decline in Britain had an 
ambivalent character: The country had just fought and won a second war against 
its ‘mortal enemy … yet cultural commentators were absorbed by intimations of 
failure and deterioration.’ He cited a pessimistic comment from the poet and critic 
T.S. Eliot who had noted decline everywhere around him in the 1950s: ‘that our 
own period is one of decline, that standards of culture are lower than they were 50 
years ago, and that the evidences of this decline are evident in every department of 
human activity.’
59
 The idea of decline was deeply lodged in the British/English 
psyche and was often evident even when there was evidence that suggested that 
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those fears were ill-founded and exaggerated. According to economic historian 
Jim Tomlinson, ‘declinism’ –  at least as far as the economy was concerned – had 
a long history. It had been a recurring theme for over a hundred years dating from 
the period when Britain’s industrial supremacy peaked around 1870 and other 
countries, especially Germany, began to undermine the lead it had established as 
the ‘First Industrial Nation’.
60
 It was true, as economic historian Barry Supple has 
pointed out, that Britain’s major industrial rivals were experiencing higher 
average annual growth rates after the Second World War. Between 1950 and 
1983, for example, Japan’s annual growth rate was 7.9%, while Germany’s was 
4.5% and Britain’s only 2.4%. What this indicated, however, was relative rather 
than actual decline. Also much depended on the perspective from which it was 
viewed. During the period 1951 to 1973, for example, essentially the period of the 
great post-war boom in the world economy that was brought to an end by the oil 
crisis of the mid 1970s, the British economy grew at 3% annually on average.
61
 
What most British people experienced over this period were the benefits of a 
period of sustained full employment, along with greatly improved provision in 
areas such as education and health and growing affluence. Indeed, it has been 
argued that decline ‘simply did not happen, that post-1945 growth rates were 
higher than at any previous period in the life of the British Isles and that the life of 
those who lived upon them, were dramatically richer and better in consequence.’
62
 
This may have reduced the potential for Anglo-German hostility in the 1950s and 
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early 1960s despite growing awareness that the Federal Republic was forging 
ahead. 
 
This is not to deny that some major adjustments were required to come to 
terms with the new circumstances in which the British found themselves in the 
first twenty years after the end of the Second World War. Eric Hobsbawm is one 
of many historians who have pointed to deep-seated problems in this respect. 
 
‘Clearly, the British did not adapt to new circumstances. They 
could have done so. There is no reason why British technical 
and scientific education should have remained negligible (…) It 
was no doubt inevitable that British pioneer industries should 
lose ground relatively as the rest of the world industrialized, and 
that their rate of expansion should rise; but this purely statistical 
phenomenon need not have been accompanied by a genuine loss 
of impetus and efficiency. (…) Britain then failed to adapt to 
new conditions, not because she could not, but because she did 
not wish to. (…) [T]he British capitalist aimed at eventual 
absorption into the socially more respected and higher stratum 
of the “gentlemen” or even the aristocrats, and when he 
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However, in the 1950s and early 1960s, declinism, was more likely to be 
prompted by signs that the sun had set on the British Empire and that Britannia no 
longer ‘ruled the waves’. By the end of the 1940s India, the largest territory under 
British rule had achieved independence. By the end of the sixties, the Empire had 
been completely replaced by the Commonwealth of Nations. When Britain and 
France, two old imperial powers, had flexed their muscles and invaded Egypt after 
its government had announced that the Suez Canal would be nationalised they 
were rebuked by the USSR, the United States and the United Nations and forced 
to withdraw. There was an angry response to this humiliation in some quarters, 
especially from those who remembered when Britain had been more powerful. 
‘Let the Russians just start something that’s all’, was a said an old man in a 
Gloucestershire pub, ‘and then they’ll have us to face. Like Hitler did (…) and the 
bloody Kaiser.’
64
 But, though this suggested that the English working class had 
long memories as far as Germany was concerned, the old enemy could not be 
blamed directly for these post-imperial problems. 
 
For this study, the comparative condition and performance of Germany in 
the same period is of particular interest. While some in England were beginning to 
show concern about decline in the early 1950s, the picture in the Federal Republic 
was very different. In the late 1940s, following defeat in war and with a prevailing 
‘culture of shame’, its future had seemed particularly bleak. However, even as 
early as 1953, Germany’s post-war recovery was attracting considerable attention 
                                                 
64  As overheard by Dennis Potter and recorded in his book The Changing Forest (1962), 
cited in Porter, D., ‘Never-Never Land: Britain under the Conservatives 1951-1964’, in N. 
Tiratsoo, (ed), From Blitz to Blair: A New History of Britain since 1939 (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1997), 115. 
52 
 
in Britain. Prompted by the German challenge to British trade in Asia, a continent 
where British influence was clearly diminishing after India had won independence 
in 1947, the Daily Mirror, in December 1953, headlined an article by its star 
columnist ‘Cassandra’ under the headline ‘Lookout! There is a German close 
behind!’ The article traced the economic progress made by England’s former 
enemy since the war under the further sub-headings ‘1945: How are the Mighty 
Fallen!’ and ‘1953: How Mighty are the Fallen!’
65
 A few months earlier, in the 
same newspaper, Paul Whitcomb had reported from St Pauli, Hamburg, making 
the same point in a different way when he compared St. Pauli with New York’s 
Broadway. The comparison was misleading – St. Pauli is a notorious red light 
district in Hamburg – Broadway the centre of American theatre – but the point 
was that the Germans were making progress. Whitcomb was also surprised that he 
met so few former Nazis. This was hardly surprising as it was unlikely that any 
German would have admitted this to an English journalist just eight years after the 
war.
66
 In this respect what Whitcomb probably experienced was a collective 
denial of their recent past and as such was symptomatic of the so called ‘Great 
Silence’ that characterised the Germans at this time.
67
 In some ways this may have 
been easier for the English to deal with than the underlying realities. The 
anonymity allowed by an opinion poll in October 1951 which asked Germans to 
state in which period of the recent past they had fared best saw 42% opt for the 
era of National Socialism, with only 2% favouring democracy as the best model 
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for welfare and security. It was only after ten more years had passed that, when 





Allied efforts to re-educate and de-nazify only succeeded up to a point. The 
USA had actively prosecuted German war criminals between 1945 and 1949 with 
5,000 put on trial, 4,000 successful prosecutions and 806 death penalties. The 
German prosecution service followed a different policy. An amnesty throughout 
the decade led to the release of many of those previously imprisoned. In addition, 
article 131 of the Grundgesetz allowed the re-employment of public servants who 
had been employed by the National Socialists before May 8, 1945.  Moreover, any 
collective guilt was refuted.
69
 Rudolf Großkopff, a German journalist, has 
described the 1950s as a decade of ‘conflicts, cultural plurality, joie de vivre and 
dramatic developments.’
70
 Yet the Nazi past, the war and its dire consequences 
were hard to shake off. Germany in the 1950s was still an occupied country 
divided between East and West. West Germany only just beginning to gain 
recognition in its own right by the mid 1950s.  
 
This meant that Anglo-German relations after 1945 were difficult at best. 
Britain had fought against Germany in both world wars from the first day to the 
last and its people had become accustomed to regarding Germans as enemies. 
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Memories and recent experience underpinned attitudes that made it difficult for 
politicians on both sides to move forward in unity, despite common antipathy to 
the Soviet Union after the start of the Cold War. While politically it was difficult, 
on a personal level there were problems, too. Konrad Adenauer, the Federal 
Republic’s first Chancellor, was no friend of the British because he had been 
removed from his office of mayor of Cologne by British Forces in 1945. 
Adenauer was, ‘alienated by the attitude displayed’ and ‘irritated by the inherent 
self-confidence of the British political class.’
71
 Ernest Bevin, British foreign 
secretary between 1945 and 1951 felt uncomfortable in the company of Germans, 
once admitting: ‘I tries ‘ard … but I ‘ates ‘em.’ As late as 1967, Harold 
Macmillan, Prime Minister from 1957 until 1963, observed while observing the 




British sport and international competition in the 1950s 
As Martin Polley has suggested in relation to sport in post-war Britain, 
‘Defeats on the playing field … represented … a kind of litmus test for the 
nation’s decline.
73
 In reality, there was no logical connection between sport and 
the end of empire or an underperforming British economy but in a climate in 
which declinism was beginning to establish a foothold, the connection was often 
made. International football played a part in this process simply because the game 
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itself was so popular. As Ross McKibbin has noted, it had originated in England 
and was played and watched by more English people than any other sport; at the 
same time it was ‘the world sport, and that enhanced its status, even if the English 
half-despised the foreigners who played it’.
74
 Moreover, because the eleven men 
in white shirts represented England, the national team was often seen as a 
metaphor for the nation and for the qualities popularly attributed to Englishness. 
All this was assisted by the fact that most people – unless they attended matches 
at Wembley – experienced only a mediated version of international football. Thus, 
as Dilwyn Porter has suggested, ‘international football, as experienced by 
newspaper readers, radio listeners and television viewers, provided a point of 




However, just as it is important not to overstate the failings of the British 
economy in the early 1950s or the extent to which the English sensed that they 
were a nation in decline, it is important not to exaggerate the role of sport at this 
particular juncture. The British in general and the English in particular had much 
to be cheerful about. There was full employment, the end of food rationing and a 
heady air of optimism about the ‘New Elizabethan Age’, heralded by the 
Coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953. This was very much to the fore in what Peter 
Hennessy describes as ‘the fleeting having-it-so-good patch between the 
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Coronation [1953] and Suez [1956]’.
76
 Though it soon evaporated, there was 
enough evidence of success on the sporting scene to convince the doubters that all 
was well. Indeed, sport delivered a great decade of British successes in the 1950s. 
In cricket, still considered by many to be England’s ‘national game’, the Ashes 
were won back from the Australians in 1953 and retained in 1954-55 and 1956. In 
rugby union England won the Five Nations tournament four times in 1953, 1954 
(jointly with France and Wales), 1957 and 1958. A British and Commonwealth 
expedition succeeded in climbing Everest, reaching the summit on the eve of the 
Coronation, and Roger Bannister famously became the first man to run a sub-four 
minute mile in 1954. ‘AT LAST –THE 4-MINUTE MILE!’, ran the Daily 
Express headline, followed by the sub-heading, ‘English victory beats world’.
77
 In 
this context defeats on the football field, like the one inflicted on England at 
Wembley by the Hungary in November 1953 could be regarded as setbacks rather 
than national disasters. Moreover, in the mediated world of sport symbolic defeats 
could be relatively easily reversed. When Wolverhampton Wanderers, the English 
champions, defeated Honved of Budapest in December 1954, there were press 




There were, however, clear indications of a crisis in English football at this 
time. The domestic game in the 1950s was afflicted by the problem of falling 
attendances after the boom of the immediate post-war years and this became 
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worse as consumers became more affluent in the 1950s and found new ways of 
spending their leisure time. Rising admission prices probably did not help. 
Attendances at English football League matches fell by a total of 11.25 million in 
the period between 1949 and 1962. Like most spectator sports, professional 
football found that it could no longer rely on the cloth-capped fan to turn up week 
in and week out, especially as television, outings in the family car and home 
improvement (‘Do-It-Yourself’) now provided alternatives to spending a cold 
Saturday afternoon on the terraces. ‘Many people … had both a better home 
environment and a higher level commitment to the domestic space’, as Dave 
Russell has explained.
79
 For the 92 full-time professional clubs which relied 
heavily on gate money this was a problem especially as they were often identified 
as part of the problem when it came to disappointing English performances in 
international competition. As Richard Holt later observed: 
 
‘English football was too self-absorbed to give itself whole-
heartedly to the national cause. Club loyalties were too strong 
and the League programme too exhausting. Moreover, the 
rulers of the game did not encourage it. English football 
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Witness to this stance was the decision by the Football League in 1955 to deny 
Chelsea, who had won the First Division, the chance to participate in the newly-
established European Cup. In track and field athletics Roger Bannister had 
achieved success by combining ‘old British habits with new scientific pacing 
methods and training’; he had even taken advice from a Hungarian coach.
81
 
English football preferred to adhere to its old habits. As Stanley Matthews, 
England’s most famous footballer of the period later reflected, having 
encountered resistance to the idea that the ball should be used more in training,  
‘…the people who ran our game regarded anything new with suspicion … the 
hierarchy of English football clung on to the old methods, still believing we were 




If Britain had to undergo re-adjustment politically in the post-war period, 
this was paralleled on the football pitch, especially by the England national team. 
England had left FIFA in 1928, returning only in 1946. This meant that England 
missed the first three World Cups and did not enter the competition until 1950, 
qualifying for the final stages in Brazil by winning the Home International 
tournament. According to the Swedish football journalist Seve Linde, writing 
before the start of the competition, the FA’s decision to end England’s isolation 
made the 1950 finals ‘the most important event in international football history’. 
He described the decision as ‘courageous’ because it meant that England was 
prepared ‘to test her strength in a fight for football world supremacy, [having] 
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always claimed to be the first’.
83
 England’s preparations, however, suggested that 
the FA had no conception of the importance of the occasion. Squad member Eddie 
Baily later recalled that the England party had travelled to Brazil without a doctor: 
‘It was typical,’ he commented ‘… we were going off to a strange country of 
which we know very little and there wasn’t anyone we could turn to if we were 
sick or injured. Backward wasn’t the word for it.’ In the event England failed to 
qualify for the knock-out stages having suffered a shock defeat to the USA – ‘a 
mongrel team of no-hopers’ according to Jonathan Wilson – when they had 
fielded a side picked not by the manager, Walter Winterbottom, but by Arthur 
Drewry, a senior FA committee-man. Reaction to this defeat was surprisingly 
muted, however, with no television or radio coverage and little interest in the 
press. It was thus possible to discount the defeat at Belo Horizonte as ‘a freakish 
result at a distant South American venue.’
84 
Stanley Matthews later claimed that 
the FA’s response was simply to ‘bury their heads in the sand’. To them, the 




One of the reasons why Linde had described the decision to play in Brazil as 
‘courageous’ was that he was convinced that England’s claim to world football 
supremacy was already an illusion. However, the shock had to be delivered closer 
to home – where England remained undefeated by foreign opposition - to have 
any effect. A match between England and a FIFA XI at Wembley in October 
                                                 
83  Cited in Wilson, J., The anatomy of England: a history in ten matches (London: Orion, 
2010), 70-71. 
 
84  Kynaston, David: Austerity Britain, 1945-1951 (London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 514–515; 
Porter, ‘Your boys took one hell of a beating’, 38. 
 
85  Matthews, The way it was, 337. 
60 
 
1953, organised to celebrate the 90
th
 anniversary of the FA, indicated the shape of 
things to come. England was to escape with a draw thanks to a late penalty 
converted by Alf Ramsey. A month later, they took on Hungary, the reigning 
Olympic champions, and were beaten 6-3. As George Robb, who gained his only 
England cap on this occasion, later recalled: ‘We weren’t the governors 
anymore.’
86
 This is possibly the second-most researched and written about match 
in English soccer history, after the World Cup Final 1966 yet why it had taken so 
long for the illusion of English supremacy to be shattered remains a mystery.  In 
reality, Wilson argues, England had not been the ‘masters of football’ since 1929 
when they had been beaten by Spain using a deep-lying centre-forward. England’s 
adherence to a 2-3-5 formation meant that they had struggled to pick him up and 
the same weakness had been exposed by the Austrian Wunderteam when narrowly 
defeated at Stamford Bridge in 1932. More than twenty years later the same 
tactical flaw was exploited mercilessly by Hidegkuti, used by Hungary in the 
same withdrawn role, both at Wembley and a few months later in Budapest when 
England were beaten 7-1.
87
 The grandly-titled ‘Association Football 
Correspondent’ of The Times, Geoffrey Green, thought that the Hungarians had 
re-invented the game. Drawing on his match report of twenty years earlier, Green 
later recalled: 
 
‘Now came the game which has a place of its own in every book 
about football: England 3 Hungary 6. It showed 100,000 people 
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at Wembley, and millions of TV watchers, a new concept of 
football 
 … With a wonderful understanding of the basic principles of 
the game, the Hungarians combined long and short passing, 




The post-match headlines in the English press made readers aware that a 
significant event had occurred with references to ‘England’s world turned upside 
down’ and the ‘twilight of the soccer gods.’
89
 That the defeat had been inflicted 
by a team representing a Communist state seemed especially significant in the 
context of the Cold War. ‘Sport was one manifestation of the “Cultural Olympics” 




Germany had been excluded from all international sports competitions in the 
immediate post-war years including the London Olympics of 1948 and the World 
Cup of 1950. Later that same year the German football national team began to 
play international matches again; the first game was against Switzerland in 
November 1950. At the Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952 Germany achieved a 
respectable fourth place in the football tournament while Great Britain’s amateurs 
were embarrassingly eliminated by Luxemburg in a preliminary round. Having 
entered the World Cup, the national team progressed in what would later be 
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recognised a ‘typical’ German manner, qualifying for the final stages of the 1954 
competition in Switzerland. ‘Typical’ as their displays against Norway and Die 
Saar were anything but promising. Commentators stated that Rahn’s place in the 
side had become ‘untenable’, that Kohlmeyer was ‘a hopeless case’ and that 
Turek was ‘too heavy.’
91
 Eventually, all three were to play in the final, Helmut 
Rahn scoring twice. If the World Cup Final of 1966 has become the most 
researched and written about in England, the final of 1954 is its German 
counterpart. Yet this is a relatively recent phenomenon as much of the research 
dates from the period after unification when East and West were seeking common 
sites of memory which could be celebrated. The so-called ‘Miracle of Berne’, a 
reference to Germany’s 3-2 surprise win in the final against Hungary, thus came 
to serve a very useful cultural purpose.
92
 What mattered more in 1954, however, 
as England and Germany prepared to resume their long-standing football rivalry 
was that Germany, as Geoffrey Green explained to readers of The Times, ‘come to 
Wembley wearing the crown of world champions – a hard-won success which 
was certainly given some political overtones in the excitement when it happened, 
by some Germans.’
93
 The spontaneous celebrations after the ‘Miracle of Berne’ 
had seen German supporters singing the first verse of their national anthem 
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instead of the less provocative third verse and an ill-judged speech by DFB 





Wembley Stadium, London, 1 December 1954 
England and Germany were about to meet on the football pitch for the first 
time since 1938. Since the last encounter, much had changed in both countries. 
However, whether or not the game could be regarded as a measure as to how the 
English felt towards Germany remained to be seen. Writing before the match in 
The Times Geoffrey Green’s tone was conciliatory, though his assumption, that in 
Britain, sport and politics were unconnected, now seems a little naïve. 
 
‘The appearance of Germany’s international football side at 
Wembley Stadium this afternoon adds its bit to Anglo-German 
relations. It is true that sport in these islands – though not by any 
means always overseas – holds no political significance, but 
there could be no more appropriate guest of honour at this 
particular match than the Foreign Secretary [Anthony Eden]. If 
the presence of 12,000 or more Germans transplanted across the 
Channel to the Wembley terraces, may have no particular 
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Given the history of Anglo-German relations generally and the fact that 
memories of the Second World War were still fresh, it seems reasonable to ask 
whether this would have reverberations on the pitch, at the stadium and in the 
newspapers. Would the English let their emotions show at a football match? 
Would the German national team be treated with sporting respect and fairness? 
Could England and Germany set the past aside and start a new chapter? 
 
Though the Germans were world champions, the signs were not promising. 
The form which had won them the World Cup earlier in the year had slipped and 
they had recently been defeated by Belgium and France. More than half the team 
that had played in Berne was unavailable due to injuries or sickness; only three of 
the championship winning team – Posipal, Kohlmeyer and Liebrich – were to play 
at Wembley. The English press conceded that Germany would not be at full 
strength: Green noting that ‘England to be sure would rather have had it 
otherwise’.
96
 In the middlemarket Daily Express and the downmarket Daily 
Mirror, however, this was regarded with suspicion. Desmond Hackett in the 
Express, opened his match preview by suggesting that ‘Germany have already 
organised their excuses … sickness, injuries and all that … in the event of defeat at 
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Wembley this afternoon and, make no mistake England will beat the World Soccer 
champions.’
97
 Bob Ferrier, writing in the Mirror, took a similar line: 
 
‘Poor old England! They never seem to be given a fair and 
square chance. If it isn’t one thing it’s the other. Here they are 
today, going in against West Germany at Wembley and in 
footballer’s language they are on a hiding to nothing. 
For if England beat Germany they have “merely beaten a team 
with eight reserves”. And if England fail to beat Germany, why, 




Ferrier, however, was less hostile than Desmond Hackett who picked up on a 
story in the Daily Herald which had linked the fact that so many of Germany’s 
unavailable players were suffering from jaundice to rumours that the world 
champions’ performances had been drug-assisted.
99
 Hackett, interviewing 
manager Sepp Herberger at the pre-match reception, asked directly if the team 
would be given ‘pep injections as they did before the World Cup final with 
Hungary’, only to be told ‘brusquely’ that this was entirely a matter for the 
German team and officials. This was enough for Hackett to label him as ‘the old 
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 To be fair to the Express, Hackett’s suspicious attitude was 
balanced to some extent by a human interest story in an adjacent column reporting 
a kind gesture by Herr Eberhard Wittig of Berlin who had asked them to pass on 





Hackett’s aggressive questioning of Herberger typified his approach to 
football journalism. Brian Glanville, in his memoirs, describes him as ‘the jaunty, 
shameless Desmond Hackett of the Daily Express.’ He aimed to sensationalise and 
liked nothing better than to put himself at the centre of a story.
102
 His questions to 
Herberger on the eve of the match were part of a bullish campaign that he and 
fellow Express football correspondent Bob Pennington had been waging for a few 
days. Having travelled to the German training camp he complained that ‘Herr 
Hush Hush’ had tried to have him removed. The underlying message was that the 
Germans were secretive and unfriendly, though he managed to get a quote from 
Herberger praising English football - (‘I must still regard England as the teachers 
of Soccer’) - which justified the use of the headline ‘Herr Hush Hush admits … 
England are the masters.’
103
 A day later, he revealed that Herberger was planning 
to use substitutes, described in the headline as a ‘switch trick’. This was ‘the 
Continental method’ and therefore highly suspicious. ‘So when Herr Herberger 
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starts his team shuffle it does not mean that a player is injured if he is taken off,’ 
he explained, implying that there was something unsportsmanlike about such 
tactics. In the same article he described Herberger as Germany’s ‘Football Fuhrer’, 
with its obvious negative connotations. This appeared on the same page as a 
picture of the German team departing for England with a caption reading ‘Rolling 
along to the invasion port’ and an article by Pennington, commenting on England’s 
team selection and urging the players to ‘shut their ears to the tear-jerking yarns 
about Germany’s catastrophic list of casualties.’ He stressed the importance of the 
occasion and the opposition. ‘They must say: “We are playing for England against 
Germany. That is enough – we must fight until we drop.’
104
 Hackett kept the 
pressure on until match-day, referred to as ‘Der Tag’ on the Express sports page. 
After reporting that the two teams had met amicably at pre-match receptions he 
hoped ‘that this fraternity will now end and that England will come out fighting 




There could be no doubt that England took this friendly very seriously. After 
the disastrous defeats by Hungary and another disappointing World Cup campaign 
in 1954, there were signs that some lessons had been learned.
106
 England’s 
selection committee had been reduced from nine to just three, one of whom was 
the team manager, Walter Winterbottom. ‘This approaches more closely the 
effective direction to be found in Hungary, Germany, Austria, Sweden and 
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elsewhere’, The Times explained. The England team was also better prepared with 
‘periods of training and tactical planning together, of longer duration than ever 
before.’
107
 It was Winterbottom’s intention to take the long view by driving 
through necessary reforms, building a team for the future by including more under-
23s in the senior squad.
108
 However, on this occasion, the approach was more 
pragmatic. As Pennington observed in the Express, ‘England are taking no chances 
by putting experience before youth; form before future promise.’
109
 From a 
twenty-first century perspective, with international friendly matches having been 
somewhat devalued in status, this match appears to have offered opportunities to 
experiment. It is a mark of the importance with which the match was regarded by 
the FA that England picked a team with the idea of winning comfortably against an 
obviously weakened and inexperienced German side. The radical new departure 
that Winterbottom might have wished for was deferred.
110
 Thus the experienced 
Bert Williams and Tom Finney were brought back into the side at the expense of 
younger players. Stanley Matthews, 38 years old, who had first played for England 
against Germany in 1935, was also included. As The Times pointed out, Uwe 
Seeler, the German centre-forward in 1954, had not been born at the time.
111
 The 
average age of the England team for this match was almost 30. 
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It was hardly necessary for the match reports to remind readers of the most 
recent Anglo-German conflict. A few days earlier Sir Winston Churchill had 
celebrated his 80
th
 birthday and the press – with the populist, right-wing Daily 
Express to the fore – wallowed in nostalgia as they paid tribute to the man who had 
led Britain to victory over Germany in 1945. Even the left-of-centre Daily Mirror 





On the day after the match the Express published five photographs on its 
front page featuring near misses by the England forwards to back up the claim that 
England should have scored nine. The headline (‘England win 3-1 but it should 
have been 9-1’) was in smaller type than the main story on the front page which 
concerned a dispute between Churchill and Field Marshall Montgomery 
concerning an order that had been issued during wartime to stockpile captured 
German armaments for possible use against the Soviet Union.
113
 Indirectly, of 
course, it served to remind readers that the Federal Republic was now a Cold War 
ally.
114
 However, though it seemed impossible for the Express not to mention the 
war, coverage of the match was generally more limited and more restrained than it 
would become in later years. The Express’s front page pictures were unusual in 
that sport rarely featured on the front page. The Times in 1954 still used its front 
page for small advertisements as if the nineteenth century had never ended; 
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Green’s match report appeared with other items of sports news on an inside page, 
taking up the best part of two columns out of a total of eight. Most of the 
remaining six columns were filled with reports of middle-class sports in which 
Times readers might have been expected to take an interest, such as rowing and 
squash, though the ongoing test match between Australia and England in Brisbane 
also received its due share of attention. Even in the Mirror, the match at Wembley 
was confined to the sports section towards the back of the paper. 
 
The language of the match reports, at least in the Mirror and The Times, was 
generally mild, with few battle metaphors or war references. Peter Wilson’s report 
in the Mirror was headed ‘Massacre Match: But why didn’t we finish them off’ 
but in terms of content his main focus was that England should have done better. 
Why hadn’t England scored more? According to Wilson it was ‘because we were 
what some people would call too gentlemanly. What I would call too dam swollen-
headed, pig-headed, complacent, smug – what you will.’ Green in The Times, a 
broadsheet, had the space to make a more measured assessment. England’s 
performance had been impressive: ‘All they truly failed in was the reaping of a 
fuller harvest of goals to which much of their delicate approach play entitled 
them’. He made a point of praising the Germans, particularly goalkeeper 
Herkenrath and defender Liebrich. At times the German defence had been ‘a 
vertitable Siegfried Line’, he observed, but the reference was intended as a 
compliment. Germany were ‘full of youthful determination, speed and spirit’; 
‘they produced many a cleverly angled and quick triangular movement in mid-
field.’ England’s win pleased him but he remained realistic. Acknowledging that 
71 
 
Germany had been forced by injuries to field an under-strength side, he observed 
that England’s triumph ‘does not by any means elevate us to the topmost heights 
among the nations.’
115
 Inevitably, Hackett’s match report struck a slightly different 
tone, praising Stanley Matthews for his ‘one-man blitzkrieg against Germany’ and 
abandoning almost all restraint in celebrating England’s victory. 
 
‘Cheer this England side because we at least did win. We did 
beat the World Champions. Forget about the tearful German 
plea that they have lost all their players. They had 1,500,000 
players from which to pick. 
We beat them, spanked them soundly, and should have put them 
out with a Test-match score. But for all this England success it 




On the same page a series of cartoons depicted their three goal-scorers Bentley, 
Allen and Shackleton, writing letters of remorse for having behaved so nicely 
towards the Germans. The message was clear. England should have won more 
emphatically. 
 
The players’ accounts of the game were similar to those of the papers but 
differed in tone. Matthews, by far the oldest player on the pitch, had been lavishly 
praised by all three newspapers. ‘Here was a tour de force from the greatest player 
                                                 
115  The Times, 2 December 1954. 
 




in English football’, was Green’s assessment in The Times.
117
 The veteran later 
recalled in his ghosted memoirs: ‘The English press were also full of praise for 
my performance…I had been up against a good full-back in Kohlmeyer and had 
led him a merry dance. I never felt fazed by the fact that some players I was up 
against were twenty years my junior.’
118
 Some were inclined to be generous to 
their German opponents. Shackleton, whose ghosted memoir appeared within a 
year of the events, agreed that England should have scored more than three. 
Germany had been ‘poor’ but the goalkeeper’s performance had been under-rated. 
 
‘Roy Bentley put England one goal up in the first half. The 
Germans were so poor that we would have won the game by the 
interval, had all the scoring chances been turned into goals. I 
give a lot of credit to the visiting goalkeeper, Fritz Herkenrath, 
for keeping us out when we threatened to overrun Germany, and 
although some critics claimed he blocked shot after shot more 





Years later, England’s captain Billy Wright criticised newspapers that had 
overestimated England’s achievement in beating Germany in 1954. His 
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biographer quoted him as saying: ‘I have to confess that they picked only three of 
the players who helped them win the World Cup’. However, ‘that did not stop 
some of the newspapers declaring that we were the new world champions!’
120
 
This is interesting in the light of the reservations in the match reports and warns 
us that players’ memories gathered years after the event may not always be an 
accurate recollection of what happened at the time. 
 
Thus the first match after the Second World War brought England a fifth 
victory in seven matches against Germany. Evidence gathered from The Times, 
the Daily Express and the Daily Mirror suggests that the tone of the reporting was 
relatively mild; the odd war metaphor was used but not in the excessive fashion 
that became commonplace, at least in the tabloids, in the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, three days after the match, Peter Wilson in the Mirror, wrote an ill-
tempered review of German press coverage. He claimed to be outraged by 
comments in Die Welt which had dared to suggest that a full-strength German side 
would have beaten England whose victory could be attributed largely to the 
brilliance of Stanley Matthews. The headline – in large bold capitals – was ‘STAB 
IN THE BACK FROM GERMANY!’, a reference which would have resonated 
with anyone familiar with the history of the First World War.
121
 Wilson’s tone 
was venomous. His article opened by reminding readers that ‘Sir Winston 
Churchill once said that the Germans are always either at our feet or at our 
throats.’ Die Welt’s refusal to acknowledge an English victory was used to explain 
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why he had been so critical of England’s failure to win by a bigger margin. ‘It is 
because of exactly this sort of comment that I was so enraged that England did not 
rub Germany’s nose in the mud when for long periods we had them groggy and 
reeling.’
122
 Wilson’s intervention brought England’s two best-selling daily 
newspapers of the time into line and was a salutary reminder of a powerful 
undercurrent of hostility towards Germany which had not been so vehemently 
expressed until this point. It is interesting to speculate on how the press would 
have reacted in the event of an English defeat. 
 
Olympic Stadium, Berlin, 26 May 1956 
In retrospect, the England-Germany match in December 1954 signified ‘the 
passing of an era.’  When the return match was played in Berlin eighteen months 
later, only three of the players from 1954 still wore their country’s shirts: Byrne 
and Wright for England and Herkenrath for Germany.
123
 Walter Winterbottom’s 
reforms seemed to be producing results; England was undefeated in seven 
matches when they arrived in Berlin, a run which included a 4-2 victory over 
Brazil at Wembley a few weeks earlier. The long-term project to nurture youthful 
talent was beginning to bear fruit with Johnny Haynes, and two of Manchester 
United’s ‘Busby Babes’, Duncan Edwards and Tommy Taylor, making a big 
impression. The German team was certainly stronger than the one England had 
faced at Wembley though recent results had not been good. Seven of the World 
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Cup-winning team were selected and the forward line featuring Max Morlock and 
Hans Schäfer and the two Walter brothers had been restored. Robert Schlienz, 
who had lost an arm in a motor accident, was picked to play in Germany’s 
midfield. This provided Desmond Hackett with an opportunity to make mischief. 
‘The players say it is embarrassing to charge a man crippled by injuries’, he 
explained. Reg Leafe, an English referee who had refereed Germany’s recent 
match against Holland in which Schlienz had played was quoted as saying that it 
was ‘an unfortunate choice’.
124
 Nevertheless, in Berlin, England were said to be 3-




Apart from the minor controversy surrounding Schlienz there was little in 
the English press in the days before the match to suggest that Anglo-German 
relations were likely to be undermined in any way. Much of the gossip from 
England’s training headquarters was focused on whether right-back Jeff Hall and 
centre-forward Tommy Taylor would be fit to play. When Hall was eventually 
picked Archie Ledbrooke, writing for the Mirror, suggested that the fact that 
substitutes would be allowed had helped Winterbottom and trainer Jimmy Trotter 
to persuade themselves that he should start.
126
 England had used a substitute in 
their previous match against Finland in Helsinki, Nat Lofthouse coming on to 
score twice. Perhaps they were becoming more open to ‘continental’ ideas and 
practices. The football reporters certainly found much to admire in the new West 
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Germany that was beginning to take shape by 1956. Desmond Hackett in the 
Express raved enthusiastically about the Centre of Excellence at Barsinghausen 
where England prepared for the match. The Times compared the facilities 
favourably with what was available in England; it was the ‘somewhat advanced 
equivalent of Bisham Abbey and Lilleshall’. Nearby Hanover was a city that had 
been rebuilt since the war like a ‘Phoenix risen from the Ashes’.
127 
 Impressions of 
Berlin were also very favourable. Green wrote of the warm welcome that England 
had received and the enthusiasm of the autograph hunters who waited patiently for 
the England players, yet he also referred to ‘battle stations’ and of England and 
Germany who were about to ‘go to battle on a football pitch’, inevitable, perhaps, 
considering Berlin having been the place of heavy fighting at the end of World 
War II and the city’s embattled Cold War status.
128
 Archie Ledbrooke, 
meanwhile, was impressed by ‘the new Berlin which breathes prosperity and well-
being.’ The idea of West Germany as a country that England might want to 
emulate was establishing a foothold. 
 
As with Wembley in 1954, English newspapers left readers in no doubt that 
the match, though a friendly, was important. According to the Mirror, it was 
going to be ‘one of the noisiest, toughest, most exciting games of the century.’ 
Ledbrooke added, ‘Germany has never beaten us’, but predicted that England 
would win.
129
 Hackett, in the Express, pointed out that match tickets were in great 
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demand, while indirectly making a point about living standards under Communist 
rule. Always keen to feature in his own stories, Hackett reported: ‘In the wrecked 
and desolate centre of the Eastern Zone of Berlin where I strolled today, tickets 
for the match were worth more than the fantastically priced tea and coffee, which 
is still the No 1 Black Market commodity.’ He also drew attention to how much 
an England win would mean to the 10,000 British troops stationed in Germany 
who were expected to attend the match.
130
 This was a theme that was to reappear 
in the match reports filed after England’s 3-1 victory. In The Times, the emphasis 
in the match previews was on what a win would mean in terms of England’s 
improved standing in world football. Beating the world champions on their own 
soil would underline the renewed and rejuvenated status of English (and British) 




The match in Berlin marked a satisfactory end to England’s season and to a 
European tour which had seen them draw with Sweden and beat Finland before 
beating Germany. The account of the match in The Times rejoiced in an excellent 
England performance, Geoffrey Green noting that ‘the final score is sufficient, a 
gift in itself in a world where, for better or worse, sport has come to play a part of 
such significance in wider affairs.’ The literary quality of Green’s writing was 
much in evidence. Duncan Edwards ‘moved about the field like an express train’; 
Johnny Haynes, in scoring England’s third goal, ‘stroked the ball past Herkenrath 
with the air of somebody stroking a cat contentedly at the fireside.’ On the 
German side Fritz Walter was ‘a master of footwork and design’ but as a whole 
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the German attack ‘lacked ingenuity.’ Perhaps it was the presence of so many 
servicemen in the crowd that made him reach for an extended military metaphor. 
It had been ‘a team victory’. 
 
‘Yet, above all one must point to Wright at the heart of the 
defence, the experienced warrior of almost 80 international 
matches, a captain who as far as could be detected from the rim 
of the struggle, made only one slight mistake the whole way 
through. With him were his young lieutenants who now give 
hope for the future – Edwards at left-half and Taylor and 
Grainger in attack.’ 
 
They had proved themselves, not against their German opponents, but from ‘a 





Not surprisingly, Desmond Hackett’s match report in the Express found 
warlike and military metaphors hard to resist. He was even using them before a 
ball had been kicked. 
 
‘There was the ordeal of the march-out and a salute to the 
Germans from the packed stadium. 
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It rolled thunderously into the slate grey sky and 4,000 British 
troops bombarded back bravely with cheers for England.’ 
 
For Hackett, the ‘finest moment’ came at the end of the match when Wright led 
his team over to the corner of the stadium where ‘they had cheered and chanted 
‘”England, England” for 90 minutes.’ As far as the match itself was concerned, 
Hackett was convinced that England were worthy winners, not least because of 
the manner in which they had played. Wright, had been ‘strong and scrupulously 
fair’. This was ‘a lesson to the Germans who indulged in jersey-tugging, arm-
grabbing and savage tackles after English players had parted with the ball.’
133
 
According to Ledbrooke in the Mirror England had ‘simply crash-tackled 
Germany out of a grim game with no frills.’ This physical approach was 
apparently unproblematic, as opposed to Germany’s efforts as described in the 
Express. Like Hackett, he emphasised the contribution of the ‘Tommies’ in the 
crowd to England’s victory.
134
 Indeed, it was the major feature of his report which 
said little about the match itself. 
 
‘This was an encouraging phase indeed when England began to settle into 
some shape and order as a side’, Green later recalled.
135
 The World Cup, in which 
England had once shown so little interest, now seemed a more enticing prospect, 
with the finals in Sweden only two years away. Britain might have been entering a 
period of relative economic decline with its economy unable to match the Federal 
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Republic’s annual growth rate but it was performing better than its old enemy in 
international football. As Green put it: ‘England, then, seem on the way back into 
the picture with their young men at a time when Hungary and Germany, the world 
champions, are going over the hill with their stars. So the cycle of football is 
changing once more.’
136
 The Hungarian uprising in the autumn of 1956 helped to 
ensure that at least part of this prediction would be proved correct; Germany 
recovered to reach the semi-finals in Sweden. England’s improvement was to be 
halted when Byrne, Taylor and Edwards died in the Munich air crash in February 
1958. 
 
Other aspects of Anglo-German football relations in the 1950s 
Though the Anglo-German football rivalry was intense and press 
representations of Germany and Germany could sometimes reflect a negative 
view, there were other aspects of the cultural relationship between the two 
countries that were more positive. Probably the best-known German footballer at 
this time, as far as the English were concerned, was Bernd (‘Bert’) Trautmann, 
Manchester City’s outstanding goalkeeper, who was never chosen to represent the 
country of his birth at international level. At the time it was not DFB policy to 
consider ‘legionnaires’, as Germans playing in other countries were called, as 
eligible for selection. Trautmann’s story reads like a Hollywood tale of a prisoner-
of-war, who survives and prospers while living amongst his former enemies; his 
ability as a footballer helps him to gain respect and to overcome hostility by 
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proving that he is not a stereotypical German. Moreover, he falls in love with a 
local girl – though he later married a German – and becomes a national hero when 
he continues to keep goal for City for the full 90 minutes of a Wembley Cup Final 
after sustaining what turns out to be a life-threatening injury. It is indeed 
surprising, considering these ingredients, that no-one has come up with a script for 
a movie about Bert Trautmann’s life. 
 
Trautmann, in a ghosted autobiography published at the height of his 
popularity in 1956, just after he had broken a bone in his neck while helping 
Manchester City win the FA Cup, claimed that when he had first signed for City 
after playing non-league football for St Helens Town, reactions had ranged from 
‘City must be mad to think of signing this man’ to ‘send that …. … back to 
Germany where he belongs.’ Trautmann himself had wondered if the people of 
Manchester knew anything at all about their counterparts in Berlin, Dresden and 
Hamburg who had suffered far more in the war as a result of Allied bombing than 
they had.
137
 As both John Ramsden and Stephen Wagg have revealed the 
numerous myths have attached themselves to Trautmann over the years but there 
is no doubt that the German ex-paratrooper was generally popular.
138
 The fact that 
he was working-class helped him to integrate into what was then very much seen 
as ‘the people’s game.’ On receiving the prestigious ‘Footballer of the Year’ 
award in 1956 he stated: 
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‘Whatever success I have enjoyed in English football could not 
have been achieved without the co-operation, tolerance and 
sympathetic encouragement of the man who represents the 
backbone of your national game – the chap on the popular side 
with his cloth cap and muffler … Thank you to supporters all 
over the country for their many kindnesses to a German stranger 




Trautmann owed his popularity to the fact that he was an outstanding goalkeeper 
who earned the respect of fans and because he conformed to the stereotype of a 
‘good German’ as far as the English were concerned. His story, as Wagg points 
out, was – and is – used ‘as evidence of some special British capacity for 
forgiveness.’
140
 This, as we have seen, was not always evident in the sports pages 
of the popular press. 
 
Two years after Trautmann had won his medal with Manchester City a 
tragedy involving Manchester’s other club provided another opportunity to 
nurture Anglo-German cultural relations. United, the first English club to play in 
the European Cup were returning from a quarter-final tie with Red Star Belgrade 
when their plane crashed in snow at Munich airport when it tried to take off after 
refuelling. Twenty-three people were killed including eight of the famous ‘Busby 
Babes’ – Geoff Bent, Roger Byrne, Eddie Colman, Duncan Edwards, Mark Jones, 
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David Pegg, Tommy Taylor and Bill Whelan. ‘A brilliantly promising team was 
destroyed’, wrote the football journalist Arthur Hopcraft. It was the loss of 
Duncan Edwards, who died a few weeks after his colleagues,  that ‘gave the 
deepest, most lasting pain.’
141
 Among the football journalists who died were 
Frank Swift, former England and Manchester City goalkeeper, and Henry Rose, 
the opinionated but charismatic football writer for the Northern England edition of 
the Daily Express, which was published in Manchester. After his death he was 
described as ‘the undisputed sports King of the North.’
142
 Don (Donny’) Davies, 
who reported football for the Manchester Guardian under the by-line ‘An Old 
International’ and regularly supplied match reports for BBC Radio’s iconic Sports 
Report also died. ‘Old International’, according to his Guardian colleague, the 
distinguished cricket writer Neville Cardus, was ‘the first writer on Soccer to rise 
above the immediate and quickly perishable levels of his theme.’
143
 It was a 
significant, high-profile tragedy but, as David Kynaston observes of the reaction 
in Manchester, ‘generally it seems to have been stoicism – the legacy of two 
world wars – that marked the next few days.’ This owed little to the press which 
exploited the human interest aspect of the story for weeks.
144
 Nevertheless, this 
sad event, simply because it happened in Germany and the survivors were cared 
for by German doctors and nurses in a Munich hospital, provided an opportunity 
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to heal some old wounds. It was Matt Busby, the Manchester United manager 
who, when reflecting on his time in Germany after the crash, stated that he had 
considered Germans to be ‘the enemy if you like’, but added that ‘you learn as 
you get older.’ Frank Taylor one of the journalists who survived claimed that he 
had learned to reject national stereotypes after the care he had received at the 
Rechts der Isar Hospital. 
 
Professor Maurer and his staff received the warmest of receptions from 
United’s fans when they appeared at Old Trafford and the German national 
anthem was sung.
145
 Among the letters received by local newspapers in 
Manchester on the subject of how best to commemorate the event were many 
suggesting donations to the Munich hospital that had cared for the victims and 
travel scholarships for German nurses.
146
 The Professor was later awarded a CBE 
(Commander of the British Empire) by the Queen in recognition of his services. 
The citation read: 
 
‘The honour which Her Majesty has conferred is intended to 
symbolise the appreciation and gratitude, not only of the injured, 
but of the many thousands of British people who have anxiously 
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After decades of suspicion and hostility Munich 1958 provided a chance to 
rebuild trust and even friendship on a personal level, far more than any official 
programme or exchange could achieve. It is ironic that it was a tragedy that helped 
people from both countries to overcome the problems of national stereotyping and 
to see each other as human beings. 
Conclusion 
Considering that England and Germany had only recently emerged from a 
second devastating war within the living memory of many of their citizens, the 
first international football matches were passed off without endangering the 
fragile Anglo-German relationship unduly. Indeed, there were some reasons to 
feel optimistic about its future, especially towards the end of the 1950s by which 
time the two high-profile international matches were safely out of the way, Bert 
Trautmann had been adopted as an honorary Englishman and the English public 
had come to appreciate what Professor Maurer and his team at the Rechs der Isar 
Hospital in Munich had achieved. Though, in general, press reports and comments 
on Anglo-German football matches rarely referred to the sensitive subject of the 
war, there was an undercurrent of hostility that sometimes surfaced in the choice 
of metaphor (‘Blitzkrieg’, ‘Siegfried line’ etc.) and sometimes took a more overtly 
hostile form, especially in the populist Daily Express and Daily Mirror, whose 
journalists were expected to sensationalise the stories they reported. Desmond 
Hackett and Peter Wilson were certainly guilty on this count on occasions 
resorting to crude stereotypes. They did not claim to be impartial and it was made 
clear by the use of ‘we’ that it was England with whom they identified. Reporting 
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in The Times was rather more restrained though Green did use an extended 
military metaphor in his report of the 1956 match it was not a notable feature of 
his writing and might have been used in different circumstances, such as when 
reporting a domestic league match, with comment. Arguably, the oppositional 
nature of football invites this kind of approach. Significantly, just as concerns 
about relative decline were first becoming apparent in England, the achievements 
of the West German economic miracle were being recognised. Through the sports 
pages it was possible for English readers to grasp that Germany was modernising 
rapidly, not least because its training facilities were so new and advanced. By 
implication Germany was a country to emulate. As far as football was concerned, 
it was also a country to beat, especially after the World Cup victory in 1954. After 
England’s victory in Berlin in 1956 it was possible for England to look forward to 
the 1958 World Cup with optimism. ‘That victory over Germany, whose world 
title crown has been knocked badly askew since their triumph over the Hungarians 
at Berne in 1954 was “just the stuff to give the troops” in every sense of the 
phrase.’
148
 Football, it seemed could provide cultural compensation even as the 
German economy steamed ahead.
                                                 
148  The Times, 29 May 1956. 
87 
 
CHAPTER TWO: ‘Of course, a little chauvinism 
was in order’: England and Germany in the 
1960s 
After the match in Berlin in May 1956 it was nine years before England and 
West Germany met again at senior international level. This chapter is concerned 
initially with coverage of the matches played at Nuremberg in May 1965 and at 
Wembley in February 1966, which serve as a link with the generally benign state 
of Anglo-German cultural relations discussed in the previous chapter and also as a 
prelude to an account of coverage of the World Cup tournament of 1966 and the 
climactic final between England and West Germany, very much a turning point in 
the history of Anglo-German football. 
 
There were significant political changes in both countries in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. In Britain, the Conservatives, led by Harold Macmillan, were re-
elected in 1959, carried to victory on a wave of unprecedented affluence. After 
running into difficulties in the early 1960s and replacing Macmillan with Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home as leader, they were subsequently defeated after the general 
election of 1963 when Harold Wilson’s Labour Party won a narrow victory. This 
was confirmed when they won by a more comfortable margin in 1966, remaining 
in office until 1970. Wilson was determined to follow a modernizing agenda, 
especially in relation to the British economy. In terms of Anglo-German relations 
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there were difficulties and these were especially evident in the period before 1963 
when Macmillan and Adenauer were in office in their respective countries. There 
were tensions linked to support for German reunification, German rearmament 
and the FRG’s financial contribution to the cost of maintaining the British Army 
of the Rhine (BAOR). By this time, as John Ramsden observes, the West German 
economic miracle was ‘evoking both admiration and fear.’ In addition, when De 
Gaulle blocked Britain’s application to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1963, there were complaints that Germany had not been sufficiently 
supportive. As Ramsden notes: ‘The humiliation of this setback occasioned a 
good deal of indiscriminate chauvinism in Britain, but much was directed at 





There were other factors, however, that were drawing Britain and West 
Germany closer together, notably the Cold War, especially after the East German 
government sealed West Berlin off from the surrounding countryside in August 
1961 in an attempt to stop the outflow of its citizens to the West.  Military co-
operation saw German soldiers training in Pembrokeshire from 1961 despite some 
protests, reported by The Times under the heading ‘Call to keep out Panzers.’
150
 
Whereas Adenauer was seen as a cold and unfriendly figure, the President of the 
Federal Republic, Theodor Heuss, was more favourably regarded, especially after 
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a successful state visit to Britain in 1957, when he had presented money collected 
by churches in Germany for the rebuilding of Coventry Cathedral which had been 
badly damaged by the Luftwaffe during the Second World War.
151
 Eight years 
later, in 1965, just after the English football team played Germany in Nuremburg, 
Queen Elizabeth II embarked on a reciprocal visit to Germany, the preparations 
made by her hosts prompting the Daily Express to praise ‘the perfectionist 
Germans’ who were working hard to provide ‘the most expensive special train 
ever assembled, furnished and equipped in Germany’s history.’
152
 In a speech 
made just after arriving in Germany, the Queen spoke of the many historical links 
between the two countries which had so recently been enemies, reminding her 
audience that the British and German people had ‘for most of their history … been 
friends and often allies.’
153
 An editorial in the Sunday Times hoped that the visit 
was a sign ‘that this country has at last re-aligned its views about the Germans and 
accepts them genuinely as allies and fellow human beings.’ It pointed to West 
Germany’s military contribution to the Western Alliance and to the fact that the 
next Federal elections would see citizens born after the end of the war voting for 
the first time. ‘A new nation is forming, freed from, or at least not over-awed by, 
the legacies of the past, and it is a nation nurtured on democratic values.’
154
 
Underlying this more positive outlook towards Germany was a realization that 
‘even without reunification the Federal Republic [would] be economically the 
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strongest country in Europe.’
155
 This was important as British trade with the 
Commonwealth was declining, while its trade with EEC was rising. 
 
It is also important to note developments in European football that helped to 
change attitudes in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The game had become more 
thoroughly internationalized, not just through the World Cup, but through the 
European Nations Championship, with a competition taking place every four 
years after 1960, though England did not enter until the 1968 tournament. The 
European Champion Clubs Cup, started in 1955 proved very popular and 
Manchester United became the first English side to enter in 1956. The format was 
so successful that a European Cup Winners Cup competition was introduced in 
1961 and awareness in England was heightened when Tottenham Hotspur beat 
Atletico Madrid to win in 1963 and especially when West Ham United beat TSV 
Munich in the final staged at Wembley in 1965.
156
 The Inter-Cities Fairs Cup, 
which started in 1958, also attracted English interest with a team representing 
London losing to Barcelona in the first final; Birmingham City also reached the 
final in 1960 and 1961, losing to Barcelona and Roma respectively. It helped to 
raise awareness that the finals of both major European club competitions were 
staged at different venues each season. It certainly helped to make the competition 
more popular in Britain that Real Madrid’s scintillating 7-3 win over Eintracht 
Frankfurt in 1960 was played at Hampden Park, Glasgow, ‘under the noses of the 
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British press, radio and television.’ It was also important that this was the first 
football match to be broadcast live across the entire continent of Europe.
157
 For 
some it remains simply ‘the best game of all times.’
158
 David Goldblatt has argued 
that football has had a unifying tendency in Europe, noting that UEFA, founded in 
1954, had established a Europe-wide competition by 1955.
159
 Tony Judt has made 
a similar point in arguing that it was football, assisted by satellite television, ‘that 
really united Europe’, while observing that no-one gave a thought to the Treaty of 
Rome when Germany played England.
160
 All this testifies to the power of football 
in helping to create identity through collective memory. Indeed, Albrecht Sonntag 
has argued that it should be recognized as a European Lieux des Memoires.
161
 
Clearly, for the English, the World Cup Final of 1966, played against West 
Germany at Wembley on 30 July 1966 falls into such a category which is why it 
has resonated so powerfully in English popular culture ever since. It is important 
to acknowledge, however, that this ‘memory’ has been subject from the outset to a 
process of mediation in which the sports pages have played a major part. James 
Walvin has noted: the 1966 final was ‘impossible to forget, not least because the 
                                                 
157  Porter, D., ‘”Your boys took one hell of a beating”: English football and British decline, 
c.1950-1980’, in A. Smith and D. Porter, (eds.), Sport and national identity in the post-war world 
(London: 2004), 42; Goldblatt, D., The ball is round: a global history of football (London: Viking, 
2006), 402. 
 
158  Der Spiegel, ‘Fußball wie von einem anderen Stern’, online available: 
http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/topicalbumbackground/9221/fussball_wie_von_einem_anderen_
stern.html; accessed 24 April 2013. 
 
159  Goldblatt, The ball is round, 398-399. 
 
160  Judt, T., Postwar: a history of Europe since 1945 (London: Pimlico, 2006), 782. 
 









The task of finding something new to say about the 1966 World Cup Final 
is daunting. So much has been written about this particular match. It is, without a 
doubt, one of the most talked and written-about matches in football history, if not 
the most written about. The essence of the match has been captured by Guardian 
journalist Simon Hattenstone: 
 
‘In the final England eventually won with Geoff Hurst’s hat-
trick and a goal from Martin Peters. It might not have been great 
football (the 1966 finals, unlike the finals in 1970, was not a 
competition for purists), but the drama was consummate. 
Germany take the lead. Hurst equalises with a header. Peters 
gives England the lead. Germany equalise in the final minutes. 
Extra time. Hurst blasts onto the bar and onto the goal line and 
possibly over. We’ll never know for sure, but it was good 
enough for the referee. And, in the final second, Hurst’s hat-




By this time, however, even the controversy regarding England’s third goal, 
known in Germany as Das Wembleytor, seemed to have been resolved. Research 
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by two Oxford University scientists using computer-generated images which 
allowed the trajectory of Hurst’s volley after it hit the crossbar to be traced, 
indicates that the whole of the ball could not have crossed the line and that the 
referee’s decision on the day was incorrect.
164
 As has been argued elsewhere the 
main effect of this research – which could not change the result – was ‘to take any 




Historians have covered the 1966 tournament and final from many different 
angles. Martin Polley has set it firmly in the context of diplomatic history using 
British Foreign Office documentation and other official sources.
166
 Fabio Chisari 
began the exploration of the tournament and final as a media event, which allowed 
football to attract a new audience, including significant numbers of women 
viewers.
167
 Increasingly, however, the emphasis has been on how the event has 
been remembered and its place in the cultural history of late twentieth-century 
Britain. Richard Weight described the tournament as ‘a testament to how much 
the country had changed since the war’ and continued that ‘many still see it as 
part of the Golden Age of the 1960s – all the ebullient, meritocratic optimism of 
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the decade compressed into nineteen days of footballing action.’
168
 This has 
inevitably prompted historians to concern themselves with how the 1966 World 
Cup tournament and final was reported at the time and how the media has 
reflected on it since. Porter aimed ‘to explore the ways in which memories of 
1966 have been constructed and to identify some of the processes through which 
they have been assimilated into England’s popular culture.’
169
 This approach is 
similar to that of Franz Josef Brüggemeier who has argued that Herbert 
Zimmermann’s famous radio commentary on the 1954 World Cup Final in Berne 
created a virtual community amongst German listeners, and generated a 
remembered experience that has helped to shape a modern sense of German 
national identity.
170
 The fact that this process is evident in both countries, 
however, does not necessarily bring the English and the Germans any closer in 




Prelude: Municipal Stadium, Nuremberg, 12 May 1965; Wembley 
Stadium, London, 23 February 1966 
Both the English and West German teams were under new management for 
this match. Walter Winterbottom’s confident hopes that England would make an 
impression in Sweden had been dashed by the Munich air crash and they had 
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underperformed in Chile. He had been replaced by one of his former players, Alf 
Ramsey, in 1963. Ramsey, who had won the English First Division with Ipswich 
Town, was determined that he alone would select the team. ‘The selection 
committee, as such, is finished’, the FA admitted.
172
 The new manager announced 
boldly that England would win the World Cup in 1966. Jonathan Wilson has 
noted that the match at Nuremberg was the first in which he adopted the 4-3-3 
formation that was to bring England success three years later.
173
 His counterpart 
for the game in Nuremberg was Helmut Schön, who had in 1964 inherited a squad 
from Sepp Herberger that was about to blossom in the years to come. The start of 
the Bundesliga in 1963 had raised the level of domestic competition. Like 
Ramsey, he was determined to show his employers that he was in charge and did 
this by forcing the DFB to change its policy regarding the non-selection of 
Germans playing for clubs in other countries, such as Helmut Haller, Karl-Heinz 




‘It is fair to say’, wrote The Times ‘Special Correspondent’ in Nuremberg, 
‘that if these two countries were engaged in a World Cup match tomorrow instead 
of a friendly international their teams would bear scant resemblance to the ones 
that will in fact play.’ With both squads depleted by injuries and players being 
called upon by clubs still involved in European competition much of the pre-
match reporting was simply speculation regarding who was available and who 
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would be picked. There were rumours that Brunnenmeier was being rested as he 
would be playing for his club against West Ham in the European Cup Winners 
Cup final at Wembley a week later. ‘If this is true, then the priorities here are 
strange indeed’, it was observed.
175
 Desmond Hackett in the Express predicted 
that Ramsey would ‘put out a team of international infants to compete against 
West Germany tomorrow night’, including three new caps. In the event only Mick 
Jones and Derek Temple made their debuts. He anticipated ‘a rough 
uncomfortable trial for England, but I feel they will emerge the victors.’
176
 This 
proved to be correct, England winning 1-0. 
 
There were some references in the reporting that might have been regarded 
as insensitive. Frank McGhee, reporting for the Daily Mirror, expected England 
to face ‘another Nuremberg trial here tomorrow … at the stadium by the huge 
Zeppelin Field, where Hitler used to hold his hysterical rallies.’
177
 Despite the fact 
that this was a friendly match between two sides that were not at full strength 
there was sufficient interest to attract a capacity crowd of 69,000. The press 
reports for this match all commented on the behaviour of the German supporters. 
In The Times, the Germans had attacked in the second half ‘encouraged by the 
howling of a 70,000 crowd’, though any negativity implied here was mitigated by 
a reference to the generous applause given to England’s George Eastham at full 
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 Hackett was much less restrained when describing ‘the chanting, flag-
waving Germans’. 
 
‘The crowd howled their team into second-half action. I thought 
the furious fans would hurl themselves at the spiked-wire 
barriers when the referee refused to give a penalty for a rough-
looking tackle. 
They screamed their hatred and rose in a frenzy of rage. Then 





England defended resiliently and counter-attacked effectively. They had also had 
some narrow escapes. This brought out the commonplace stereotypes. The Times 
praised ‘the character, the residence and efficiency’ shown by England in 
achieving victory and the Mirror’s headline emphasized ‘England’s courage.’ 
This drew on a discourse founded ‘on a simple set of beliefs about what it is to be 
English.’
180
 It amounted to a positive affirmation of Englishness. McGhee’s match 
report opened with the words: 
 
‘Germany, the nation that have (sic) never beaten England – at 
anything – must now be convinced that they never will. 
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Not after this. Not after hitting the post once, the bar once, 
having a shot cleared from the line and claims for two penalties 
from 70,000 screaming Teuton throats turned down. 
Not after forcing England’s magnificent defence to the limits of 
its endurance on a day when the Germans turned this mighty 





Unlike the two previous post-war encounters in 1954 and 1956 the match at 
Nuremberg was overshadowed by the prospect of the World Cup tournament to be 
held in England in 1966. For Hackett it had been ‘a great encouraging day.’ He 
had seen ‘material here that can be finally blended into a side that can earn 
England high honours in the World Cup next year.’ West Germany, he concluded, 
were only shadow of the team that had won the World Cup in 1954.
182
 The Times, 
more cautiously, merely suggested that England now had a good opportunity of 
finishing their summer tour unbeaten – they played and beat Sweden in 
Stockholm a few days later – thus providing ‘a most successful springboard into, 




It is sometimes forgotten that England played Germany at Wembley twice in 
1966. Indeed, the first match, a return friendly international on a cold February 
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evening, might easily be overlooked, though it generated sufficient interest to draw 
a crowd of 75,000 on the night. ‘With the World Cup now less than five months 
away’, David Downing has observed, ‘this match was inevitably deemed relatively 
unimportant in itself.’
184
 Coverage in the English press on this occasion was far 
more restrained than when reporting from Nuremberg eight months earlier. Partly 
this was due to the nature of the match, which England won 1-0. The headline over 
Geoffrey Green’s match report in The Times – ‘Unconvincing victory for England’ 
– seems to provide a suitable summary of the occasion.
185
 Both managers had to 
chose their starting line-ups from squads depleted by injuries or because clubs 
were unwilling to release players. John Connelly pulled out of Ramsey’s squad 
because he had to stay at home to look after his two small children while his wife 
was in hospital about to give birth to a third. ‘There was a considerable chance he 
would have figured in an experimental forward line’, noted Desmond Hackett in 
an Express story reporting predictably that the Manchester United winger had been 
left ‘holding the baby.’
186
  The coverage – as far as England was concerned – was 
also much more critical, despite the victory. However, apart from a pre-match 
reference by Hackett to ‘the highly regimented German side’ the popular press 
seemed uninterested in England’s opponents on this occasion.
187
 Green in The 
Times also referred to the visitors only in passing acknowledging, in effect, that 
their strengths were very much like those usually attributed to the English. 
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‘Knowing the German fighting spirit, physical strength, stamina, and devotion to 




Analysis of the content and language of the match reports reveals an 
emphasis on two significant linked themes; breaking with tradition and the 
Wembley crowd. Ramsey, who was inclined to take a long view, seized the 
opportunity to give first caps to Newton, Hunter and Hurst while giving midfielder 
Nobby Stiles the number 9 shirt, traditionally worn by the centre-forward. The 
tactically aware Ken Jones, covering the match for the Mirror explained: 
 
‘It may not confuse the disciplined Germans. But then it is not 
designed to. This is the age of all-purpose players who are 
required to fill out the framework of an all-purpose system. That 
is why Stiles is wearing No. 9. And it does not matter.’ 
 
As far as Ramsey was concerned the match provided an opportunity to see how 
players fitted with the 4-3-3 formation to which he now seemed committed. Critics 
of English football were inclined to argue that it often lagged behind the latest 
trends in coaching and tactics. Jones was able to point out that Ramsey was in line 
with new developments. ‘His faith in a 4-3-3 framework that is rapidly becoming 
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Dilwyn Porter has argued that Labour’s victory at the 1964 general election 
‘suggested a quickening impulse to modernization and a willingness to look 
forward rather than back.’
190
 The narrow margin (0.7 per cent of the popular vote) 
by which Wilson’s party won, however, indicates that public opinion was not 
entirely comfortable with experimentation and radical change and that 
modernizing projects, such as that which Ramsey had embarked on in his role as 
manager of the English national side, were likely to encounter severe criticism if 
they did not produce results. In The Times, Green reported that it was a match 
‘which ended largely in disappointment.’ He was ‘all in favour of free thinking and 
free movement’, but went on to point out that Ramsey’s ‘new methods, which 
[had] started so well in Madrid in December, seemed to get nowhere.’ 
Significantly, England’s performance left Green looking to the past rather than the 
present for inspiration: ‘… for much of the time one longed for something old 
fashioned – some fast movement along longitudinal rather than lateral lines; for the 
days when two passes would have done what it now takes five to achieve.’
191
 In 
the Express, Hackett took a similar view. Germany ‘always threatened with 
precise, fast moves’; England had ‘merely plodded ponderously forward, labouring 
over a plan which gave no scope to enterprise or imagination.’ Like Green he was 
inclined to look to the past, beyond the ‘tactical corset’ of 4-3-3: ‘The team cried 
aloud for wingers, for men who could hold the ball, draw the defence or sweep 
round in the majestic style we once saw from Matthews and Finney.’ Both Green 
and Hackett were agreed that the Germans had been denied ‘what looked like a 
                                                 
190  Porter, D., ‘”Never-Never Land”: Britain under the Conservatives 1951-1964’, in N. 
Tiratsoo, (ed.), From Blitz to Blair: a new history of Britain since 1939 (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1997), 131. 




perfectly splendid goal’ when a linesman judged that the ball had gone out of play 




Jones, reporting in the Mirror, was more realistic. ‘Certainly’, he conceded, 
‘this was not the greatest of England performances but with a streak of experiment 
running through the side, no one really expected it to be.’ Though more 
sympathetic, he was not uncritical, admitting that 4-3-3 line-up had not allowed 
England to play ‘with the freedom that Alf Ramsey seeks.’
193
 At the same time, he 
was critical of the Wembley crowd which had given England the slow-handclap 
towards the end of the game. An interview with Ramsey in an adjacent box on the 
same page allowed the manager to voice his displeasure at this aspect of the match. 
‘I thought it was very unfair of the crowd to boo’, Ramsey complained, ‘and it was 
most extraordinary that they did so after a visiting team’s goal had been 
disallowed.’
194
 Hackett, responding in the Express, dismissed Ramsey’s remarks as 
‘pathetic’. He explained; ‘I am bitterly against slow handclaps and jeers. But I am 
equally opposed to unworthy cheers.’ He claimed that his view was in line with 
that of dissatisfied England fans who had made ‘non-stop phone calls’ to the 
Express.
195
 A day later the sports page carried letters from readers which broadly 
supported the line Hackett had taken. ‘The average soccer fan is fed up with 
theories, plans, systems, call them what you will,’ claimed one reader. What he 
wanted to see was ‘free-thinking, instinctive football by players operating in their 
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 It was clear that the modernization project which 
Ramsey had initiated was not universally popular at this stage. 
 
‘Tin soldiers’: the English press and the German team in 1966 
Coverage of Anglo-German football in 1966 has to take into account that 
the press was covering a tournament rather than a single match. No German team, 
either before or after the Second World War, had been required to stay in England 
for more than a few days and it is clear that manager Helmut Schön’s intention 
was that his players should make a good impression on and off the pitch. Having 
interviewed the German squad of 1966 to gather their recollections some thirty 
years after the event, Uli Hesse formed the view that Schön regarded this as being 
of paramount importance: ‘Again and again he drummed the idea into his players 
that the most important thing, more important than winning, was to behave like 
gentlemen and sportsmen.’
197
 In this they were generally successful. Their 
popularity was especially apparent at Ashbourne in Derbyshire where the squad 
was based for most of the tournament, the location being convenient for both 
Sheffield and Birmingham where group matches were to be played. 
 
Drawing largely on reports in the local press, Peter Seddon has looked back 
to the summer of 1966 ‘when the Germans invaded Derbyshire’ and concluded 
that relations between the visitors and the locals were friendly. He observes: 
‘Ashbourne residents do maintain fond memories of that “golden summer” of 
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1966 when Ashbourne became “Little Deutschland.”’ There were some who could 
not forget that Germany was the old enemy. One elderly resident, when asked if 
he was going to watch the squad train on the local field explained: ‘No, I’ve seen 
them on two fields already and that was quite enough for me.’ However, the 
younger generation took a different view, perhaps seduced by the glamour of their 
famous visitors. It was reported that ‘local schoolboys tag along their new track-
suited heroes – men called Seeler and Tilkowski – whilst teenage girls hitherto 
immune to the subtle charms of football take a sudden interest in the silky skill of 
a handsome young blade named Franz.’ The leader of Ashbourne Urban District 
Council, Councillor Birch, wished the German team all the best, yet hoped they 
turned out to be runners up, ‘to England of course.’ As the tournament progressed 
and it became clear that England and Germany were likely to play against each 
other, the Ashbourne News Telegraph reported that ‘Ashbourne has taken [the] 
German team to its heart.’ It seemed that the only mistake made by the Germans 
was to leave Ashbourne for Welwyn Garden City so as to be closer to Wembley 
but even in the moment of departure the locals did not bear any grudges towards 
the Germans ‘as a large gathering bade them farewell’ and ‘schoolboys waved an 




Though this was heartening in that it demonstrated that old hostilities could 
be set aside, the reception accorded to the German team in the national press was 
less friendly. This culminated in Vincent Mulchrone’s notorious article in the 
Daily Mail on the morning of the final which reminded readers that ‘if Germany 
                                                 





beat us at Wembley this afternoon at our national sport, we can always point out 
to them that we have recently beaten them at theirs twice.’
199
 It was journalism of 
this kind that led the West German television commentator Werner Schneider to 
complain after the tournament that English journalists were ‘tin soldiers’.  The ex-
Luftwaffe pilot argued that the English press had gone further than simply 
supporting their team. Ulrich Kaiser of the Sports Information Agency in 
Dusseldorf was equally alarmed. Schneider explained: 
 
‘Perhaps we have learned our lesson in World War Two. Perhaps 
we think more than other people how mad this thinking is. You 
would expect this from countries who have nothing else…but in 
England it is strange and sad.’ 
 
It should be recorded that Hugh McIlvanney of the Observer, a newspaper not 
associated with a jingoistic stance, thought that these anxieties were exaggerated:  
 
‘Of course, a little chauvinism was in order. Reaching the final was 
in itself a good reason for celebration and it was hard to sympathise 
with the German broadcasters and journalists who claimed to be 
appalled by the intensity of English reactions to the team’s 
success.’ 
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It was no consolation for the German visitors to be told that ‘their apprehensions 
were heightened by the experience of their own people,’ in other words, by their 




Schön’s team had established themselves as serious contenders early in the 
tournament by sweeping Switzerland aside 5-0 in their first group stage match. 
‘West Germany’s opening statement was the most impressive of the first week’, 
claimed Bob Ferrier in the Observer.
201
 It was a performance that earned 
unreserved praise on the sports pages of both the quality and the popular press. On 
the previous evening England had been stifled by Uruguay’s retreating defence in 
a dull 0-0 draw at Wembley. As far as The Times was concerned, Germany’s win 
at Sheffield had provided ‘a splendid evening’s entertainment.’ Green continued: 
 
‘Strong, fast, stream-lined, and functional, they moved the ball 
swiftly and cleverly. There was a drive and power about their play 
and with it no little imagination. True, it was orthodox. But it was 
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Alan Thompson, writing in the Daily Express praised Germany’s ‘powerful but 





Though West Germany had less reason to complain than, for example, 
Uruguay and Argentina, especially after the latter’s controversial quarter-final 
against England, press coverage of their matches became more negative as they 
progressed towards the final. ‘The Germans were tall, broad young men, exuding 
cheerful aggression,’ according to the Observer’s report of their group match 
against Argentina, but the military metaphor was never far from reach. ‘Heads 
high, chests out, the Germans tried to force their way forward like well-drilled 
militia’. They had been frustrated by ‘[the] Argentine guerrillas … with a splendid 
disregard for the Hague convention or the rules of soccer.’
204
 In this match 
Albrecht of Argentina became the first of four players in the tournament to be sent 
off against Germany and though it was felt that he had little justification in 
complaining about this decision, his dismissal was soon being fitted into a 
developing theory centred on German gamesmanship. After two Uruguayans, 
Troche and Silva, had been sent off in the quarter-final the Observer’s match 
reporter accused the Germans of acting ‘theatrically’ when tackled. He explained: 
‘In this as in most of their matches the Germans showed aptitude for the 
spectacular fall and a convulsive mime of agony and injury quite unreflected in 
the subsequent of their play.’ Helmut Haller, accused of being ‘leading actor’, had 
surprised McIlvanney by scoring Germany’s fourth goal ‘within minutes of 
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looking a complete cripple.’
205
 It was a view which found support elsewhere, 
notably in The Times which observed that the Germans, ‘eager to assist Mr Finney 
(the referee) in his decisions, took some flamboyant tumbles.’
206
 Alan Thompson, 
in the Express, joined the chorus of disapproval. They were ‘a fine side capable of 




This line of criticism resurfaced after Germany’s bruising semi-final against 
the Soviet Union, a highly physical encounter which provided reporters looking 
for negative stereotypes with an excuse to make use of them. It might be 
suggested that the Soviet team, given the political climate of the Cold War, were 
as likely to be characterised in this way as their opponents, especially in a right-
wing newspaper such as the Express. Clive Toye’s report did not hold back in this 
respect. 
 
‘The brutish Germans helped by the lumbering Russians turned 
the game sour by heavy tackling and late lunging … They also 
played football that would turn away fans in droves from a 
domestic fixture. Football that would have been out of place in 
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In The Times, Geoffrey Green reflected that there had been little artistry on 
display, aside from the ‘intelligent probing’ of Beckenbauer; ‘powerful order and 
cunning discipline’ had been the keynotes of the German performance.
209
 
Moreover, as Chislenko of the Soviet Union had been sent off just before half-
time, there was another opportunity to raise the questions implying cheating and 
gamesmanship that had first been raised seriously after the quarter-final with 
Uruguay. The Germans, it seemed, could not be trusted. 
 
This was very clear in the way the Daily Express and the Daily Mirror dealt 
with the issue of the four players sent off against Germany. For the Express, it 
provided a pretext to remind readers of Germany’s recent history. The sports page 
was dominated by Desmond Hackett’s match report of England’s semi-final win 
against Portugal: ‘England made their history with courage, poise, effort, and a 
code of conduct that was admirably matched by Portugal.’
210
 There was also 
space, however, for a report by Alan Williams on Helmut Schön’s angry reaction 
to the insinuations that his players had provoked opponents and over-reacted to 
physical contact. The way in which Schön’s words were framed would have left 
Germans in England – players, officials, journalists and supporters – in no doubt 
that the war had not been forgotten. 
 
‘Helmut Schoen, West German team manager, advanced on 
London yesterday, “angry, upset and disillusioned.” 
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Why? Because of suggestions that his well-drilled soccer troops 
had “provoked” opponents and “overacted” on their march to 




Coming a few days before the final against England, it was a way of making the 
point that, as far as the Express was concerned, Germany was still on probation 
and that the players had yet to prove that they were ‘good’ (like Trautmann) rather 
than ‘bad’ Germans. The Mirror, while not resorting to military metaphors and 
reporting in full Schön’s denial of the accusation that his players were ‘the best 
actors outside the Royal Shakespeare Company’, nevertheless gave the oxygen of 
publicity to the insinuations generated by the four sendings-off. West Germany’s 
team manager was quoted thus: 
 
‘To blame West Germany is a most unfair and unsporting way of 
interpreting the incidents. We are just as fair-minded as the English 
and can’t understand why such rumours are started against us. 
We don’t deserve the insinuations and I hope they are forgotten or 





The story came and went quickly but it is significant that it was given attention at 
all. It is clear that it made an impact on the German party. When, a day later, 
Franz Beckenbauer was cleared to play in the final after the second of two 
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cautions he had picked up was not confirmed, the DFB’s Wilfried Gerhard went 
out of his way to suggest that the star midfielder was ‘an honest and frank person 
with a clear conscience.’
213
 
                                                 




Wembley Stadium, London, 30 July 1966 
England’s progress to the 1966 final was marked by a slow start but 
gathered momentum as they progressed. This was very much reflected in the press 
coverage, which became more supportive with each match. There was general 
agreement that the opening match against Uruguay had been a dull goalless draw, 
with England frustrated by their opponent’s determination not to concede at all 
costs. Once again, this provided an opportunity to express doubts about Ramsey’s 
methods. ‘England, after all these months, seasons even, of planning, plotting and 
training, last night found themselves frustrated’, observed Geoffrey Green in The 
Times.
214
 Desmond Hackett, in the Express, remained confident that England 
would be more successful when teams were forced to abandon caution in the 
knock-out stages but was still inclined to look backwards rather than forwards; he 
wanted England ‘to play English football.’ 
 
‘The present method of persisting in being “wingless wonders” 
cannot produce success against teams that do everything bar 
boarding up the goalmouth in their insistence on defence, 
defence, defence. 
There were so many times when a well-lofted centre could have 
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The performances against Mexico and France, both 2-0 victories for the host 
nation, were better and it would have been difficult – not to mention unpatriotic – 
to criticise a team that was beginning to win its matches. Hackett captured the 
mood after the game with France, effectively reduced to ten men for most of the 
game after an injury to Herbin: ‘The progress is heartening but the manner of its 




What was most significant in the press coverage of the match with France 
and immediately afterwards was the way in which the English newspapers rallied 
behind Nobby Stiles when he was cautioned by FIFA after a challenge on Jacky 
Simon just before England’s second goal.
217
 Stiles, it was later recalled, had ‘one 
of his least happy nights’; the referee took his name ‘for giving an opponent a 
running push in the back and eventually was guilty of a foul that cast doubt on 
England’s second goal’.
218
 In his autobiography, published in 2003, Stiles, a 
ferocious tackler, admitted that his tackle had been badly mistimed but claimed 
that he had intended to play the ball. ‘These things did, after all, happen from time 
to time in the football trenches,’ he rationalised.
219
 Though this brought severe 
criticism from the television football pundits – Manchester City manager Joe 
Mercer claiming that it was a foul ‘to shame English football’ – it passed almost 
without comment in some match reports. Green simply noted that England had 
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scored while ‘the brave Simon was laid low in midfield nursing the effects of a 
tackle.’ Hackett did not mention the incident. Ken Jones, in the Daily Mirror, 
however, did observe almost in passing that it had been ‘a tackle that was far too 




Stiles, it should be noted, had not been reported by the referee for his 
mistimed tackle, but by a FIFA official from Brazil sitting in the stands. 
Following the match a FIFA disciplinary committee warned the FA, that ‘if Stiles 
was reported to the committee again either by a referee or an official observer, 
serious action will be taken.’ What seems a relatively mild rebuke in the 
circumstances prompted Ramsey, sensing that he was under pressure to drop 
Stiles from the team, to defend his player vehemently and in this he was supported 
by both the Express and the Mirror. In the Express Eric Cooper admitted that 
Stiles had a reputation as a hard player; his tackling had prompted ‘plenty of 
criticism from English clubs and players, as well as foreigners.’ But, he argued, it 
was not Stiles’ fault; ‘he has played the game according to instructions’ and it was 
unfair that he was now ‘a marked man with players, fans and referees.’ In the 
Mirror Ken Jones, who had criticised Stiles for his late tackle in his match report 
now backtracked, claiming that he had seen ‘far worse tackles in the other group 
games than the one with which he felled Simon.’ He also argued that Stiles had 
been unfairly treated; ‘If FIFA had felt that Stiles should be punished then they 
should have done so … and not branded him in public.’
221
 In a subsequent article 
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headed ‘Ramsey Defies the Stiles Witch Hunt’, Jones praised the England 
manager for his decision to pick Stiles for the next match against Argentina.
222
 
Schön and his team seem justified in their resentment of the accusations 
subsequently made against them in the light of press coverage of this earlier 
incident involving Stiles. 
 
Thereafter England progressed to the final via a notorious quarter-final tie 
against Argentina which had ended with Ramsey claiming that his opponents had 
behaved like ‘animals’ and a semi-final victory against Portugal which justified 
the praise with which it was received. At this point the press fell dutifully behind 
Ramsey and the English team. Hackett, in his report of the match with Argentina, 
observed:  
 
‘Stiles had his best game of the series. Much as I resented the 
high-handed action of FIFA at least it made Stiles realise he is a 





Argentina were routinely castigated for the negative way in which they were 
perceived to have approached the game as well as for their ‘undisciplined, cynical 
behaviour and flaunting of authority.’
224
 England had responded to provocation 
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with admirable restraint. As Hackett explained in the Express, ‘They kept their 
tempers. The Argentinians lost their heads – and inevitably the match.’
225
 The 
statistics – out of 52 fouls in the match 33 were committed by the home team – 
suggest that the story may have been slightly more complicated, though the crowd 
and English press observers were convinced that ‘the calculated dirty play came 
from Argentina.’
226
 England’s semi-final against Portugal was a totally different 
matter. As Hugh McIlvanney observed: 
 
‘Perhaps exposure to the ruthless mentality that has become the 
norm in professional football has made cynics of us all, but most 
people were flabbergasted to find, at this tense stage of the 
World Cup, that 22 men were able to play with such combative 
brilliance and still remain paragons of sportsmanship. It was 





The Times, for once putting a brief report of a football match on its front page, 




The newspaper coverage ahead of the final was inevitably filled with 
expectation and optimism. This was a contrast to what had been appearing very 
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often on the front pages of British newspapers as the relative weakness of the 
British economy led to pressure on the pound sterling in the summer of 1966.  On 
14 July the Mirror had carried banner headlines with the words ‘Britain is Deeper 
in the Red’; two days later it was reporting ‘The World puts the £ under Siege’. 
Front page headlines such as ‘Great! England’s Glory Boys’, on the day after 
Portugal had been defeated, no doubt made a welcome change. The Express, on 
the day before the final carried a front-page story about a briefing prepared for 
American diplomats ahead of a visit by the Prime Minister to Washington which 
made uncomfortable reading.  
 
‘The report says flatly that devaluation of the £ has merely been 
postponed by Mr Wilson’s latest austerity measures and must 
still come probably within the next year.  
It says that the really grave factor is the attitude and approach of 
the British people as a whole. 
They are, according to the American diplomatic assessment, 
unwilling to roll up their sleeves and really work. 
And a further criticism is the alleged disappearance, or at least 




Responding to this criticism in its editorial comment column, the Express took the 
view that ‘too much’ was heard about Britain’s failures and ‘too little’ about its 
                                                 




achievements. It was ‘time to set the record straight.’
230
 The sports pages, full of 
positive stories about England’s footballers, pointed to Wembley Stadium as the 
place where this process might start. 
 
On the day of the match the previews – apart from Mulchrone’s article in 
the Daily Mail and a reference by Hackett in the Express to ‘the Prussian army’ – 
were notable for the absence of military metaphors and references to the war. The 
only reference that Hackett made to recent history in his article for the Express 
was to remind readers that Germany had come to Wembley as world champions 
in 1954 ‘and were whipped 3-1.’ He did not mention that Germany on that 
occasion had been forced to field a below strength side but confidently predicted 
that England would win the final by a similar score. The emphasis generally was 
on England and Germany as football rivals who played the game in a similar way. 
Hackett noted that ‘these two teams play almost identical games’; England would 
win ‘because they play it better.’
231
 An article attributed to Manchester United’s 
manager Matt Busby, presumably ghosted, that appeared on the same page, 
celebrated the final as a triumph for Anglo-Saxon methods. Busby, a Scot, was 
generous in his praise of the German team which included ‘four or five world 
class players.’ He continued: ‘That this final has materialised is a triumph of the 
Anglo-Saxon style over the Latin. The power play and a system of progression 
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This theme was repeated with a slight variation in the Mirror, which 
observed that England and Germany had adopted the same approach in reaching 
the final ‘by working wisely with the same European techniques.’
233
 In The Times, 
Green also focused on what the two sides had in common: ‘Both believe in the 
hard tackle, both go for the ball fairly, and both will play until they drop.’
234
 By 
recognizing that Germany’s footballers had similar qualities to their English 
counterparts journalists were preparing the ground for labelling Schön’s team as 
worthy opponents, an important consideration whether England won or lost. The 
negativity that had characterized reports on Germany’s semi-final performance 
against the Soviet Union only a few days before, was no longer in evidence. 
Hackett tried to explain why Germany’s five goals against the Swiss and four 
against the Uruguayans should be discounted. Scoring five against ‘poor little 
Switzerland’ counted for little; scoring four against Uruguay, a team reduced to 
nine players by the end of the match, was similarly accounted as insignificant. He 
undermined his own case by forgetting that England had failed to score at all 





Similarly, any negativity regarding Ramsey and his ‘wingless wonders’ 
seemed to have disappeared. As Dave Bowen, the Welsh team manager had 
noted, Ramsey’s great contribution to the evolution of tactics was that he had 
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recognized ‘that the traditional winger was dead.’
236
 The Daily Express, often his 
severest critic when his new system failed to bring results, now went out of its 
way to point out England’s highly satisfactory record under his management. 
They had played 43 matches, won 28, drawn nine and lost only six, while scoring 
102 goals and conceding 50.
237
 Significantly, on the Monday after the final, a 
leading article in the Express was to praise Ramsey for his ‘sheer 
professionalism’, observing that England’s victory ‘was no death-or-glory charge, 
but the culmination of a long and carefully prepared campaign.’
238
 In the Daily 
Mirror, which had tended to be more supportive, any readers who still thought 
that England lined up in a traditional 2-3-5 formation were given a lesson in 
modern tactics.  
 
‘From the start England have used only two real strikers and 
their job is to use the whole width of the pitch creating passing 
opportunities with strong diagonal runs. See how Geoff Hurst 
and Roger Hunt set off when England have possession seeking 
to pull defenders wide and opening up gaps for others … see 
how [Martin Peters] performs a double role of defender and 
attacker, coming late into the German penalty area and trying to 
finish with a header or a shot.’ 
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For Ken Jones, writing on the same page, there was no doubt that an England 
victory would prove ‘the wisdom of their ways and the shrewdness of their 
strategy.’ Moreover, this would allow English football to resume the position it 
once had held in world football by ‘assuming once more the mantle of teachers 




As many commentators noted at the time, ‘what made victory all the 
sweeter [for England and the English] was that it came after two months of 
terrible economic and political news culminating in Wilson’s drastic austerity 
package and the six-month wage freeze.’
240
 That the victory was achieved against 
Germany, which seemed immune to such problems, was an additional cause for 
celebration. As John Ramsden has noted: ‘The fact that England reached that 
pinnacle of success by “beating Germany” in a battle watched by millions of 
viewers added a good deal of satisfaction to the process.’
241
 The story of the final 
has been recounted in various forms in the media, in the autobiographies of the 
players involved, in popular football histories and, more recently, by cultural 
historians.
242
 This means that the details of the match can be covered briefly here. 
In front of a crowd of 93,000, Haller opened the scoring for Germany, Hurst 
replying for England before half-time. Towards the end of the second half Peters 
performed the task that Jones had mentioned in his Daily Mirror article on the 
morning of the match, joining the forwards to score from fairly close range. With 
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England seemingly set for victory, the referee awarded a controversial free kick to 
Germany in the last minute of the match and, amidst confusion in the England 
goalmouth, the ball ran to Weber who equalized, sending the match into extra 
time. As if this was not sufficiently dramatic England’s third goal scored by Hurst 
in the first half of extra time was only awarded after the Swiss referee had 
consulted the Russian linesman.
243
 Then, with time running out, Hurst scored a 
fourth to complete his hat-trick, while a handful of over-excited England fans had 
already entered the field of play to celebrate. England’s 4-2 victory generated a 
wave of patriotic sentiment and celebrations. Thus the world championship had 
been decided.  Geoffrey Green concluded his match report in The Times thus: 
 
‘The matter was decided, dismissed. England’s players had 
proved Ramsey right. The Cup belonged to them and later they 
belonged to the jubilant, chanting crowds of the capital on what 




Green was not alone in comparing the post-match celebrations to VE (Victory in 
Europe) night in 1945, though as McIlvanney pointed out, in the circumstances, 
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Inevitably, the English press reflected the mood of euphoria. The main 
feature of the match reports was that England’s victory was instantly converted 
into a victory for Englishness; it had been achieved by players possessing qualities 
that the English liked to think characterised the English people.
246
 As Alan Hoby 
put it in his match report for the Sunday Express on the day after the match: ‘But 
what they will tell their grandchildren in the years to come is that it was English 
nerve and English heart which finally overcame the tenacious resistance of Uwe 
Seeler and his white-shirted men.’
247
 Desmond Hackett, his counterpart in the 
Daily Express, a day later, was to write of ‘the spirit of England and St George’ as 
he described how England fought back to equalize after Haller had given 
Germany the lead.
248
 As for Ken Jones in the Mirror, the fact that England were 
now world champions simply proved that ‘it was right to play to our strengths.’
249
 
In The Times, Geoffrey Green, referred to anonymously in his by-line as ‘Our 
Football Correspondent’, put the emphasis on the physical qualities traditionally 
associated with English – and also German – football. Writing of the England 
team he observed: ‘How some of them found the resilience and the stamina finally 
to outstay a German side equally powerful physically, equally determined, equally 
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The English press could afford to be magnanimous towards Germany in 
victory, especially as their players had behaved so well. Some were even prepared 
to admit that they were unsure if the ball had crossed the line for England’s third 
goal.
251
 Schön’s determination that his team should behave well meant that they 
behaved with great restraint despite the doubts regarding Das Wembleytor. Only 
after the game, at the official banquet, did anyone question the referee’s decision. 
‘What is perhaps not so well understood is that Germany did not hold a grudge 
about the outcome, and the controversial third goal in particular’, Uli Hesse has 
observed. He went on to explain that he had talked to many players in Schön’s 
squad ‘and their comments all struck similar notes’.
252
 This behaviour meant that 
they could justifiably be described by The Times as ‘honourable losers.’
253
 
Hackett in the Express, probably the most likely amongst any English football 
writers to play at being a ‘tin soldier’, was almost even-handed in his praise for 
the two rivals. 
 
‘England have won the World Cup. After that there seems little 
else to say, apart from a few million words to emphasize that 
England are the greatest. 
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The Germans were pretty good too. Their behaviour on the field 





It was, of course, easy to praise Germany’s performance because it reflected 
favourably on England who had managed to beat them. 
 
Inevitably, given the heroic quality of the match that had taken place, battle 
metaphors were not hard to find. Hurst’s ability in the air was a ‘weapon’; Hunt 
was ‘England’s spearhead’; but there is nothing there that would not be found in 
reports of almost any match. Eric Cooper in the Express, invented a striking 
image to describe England’s fourth goal. As Hurst ran towards goal and shot, it 
was ‘as if a conquering army, weary from their battle, had broken into a quick 
march to the strains of “When the Reds go marching in”.’
255
 Commenting on the 
English press coverage in the build-up to the final, Dominic Sandbrook, while 
quoting isolated examples, has noted that ‘there was little of the jingoistic baiting 
that would be associated with future Anglo-German encounters’.
256
 This rings 
even more true in relation to coverage after the final. Brian Glanville’s match 
report for the Sunday Times, however, was rather different in tone. The German 
supporters, who had behaved so well according to Hackett, were viewed 
differently by Glanville: ‘The noise from the terraces was like that of a small 
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Nuremberg rally.’ He also made a point of complaining about ‘the displeasing 
nature of [Germany’s] equalizing goal’, claiming that Haller had handled before 
Weber scored. ‘Haller’, he reported, ‘… played the ball down blatantly and 
undeniably with his hand.’
257
 Glanville later changed his mind about what he had 
seen; he blamed ‘a trompe-l’oeil that made me, from the press gallery, believe he 
had handled it.’ To be fair, Alan Hoby of the Sunday Express was similarly 
misled.
258
 Nevertheless, Glanville’s account of the match is notably less 
sympathetic towards England’s opponents than those in other newspapers. 
 
Glanville also stands out in giving only reluctant praise to Ramsey. After 
commending the way that the England team had been prepared and organized, he 
added that: ‘This [credit], however much one may disagree with his basic 
philosophy of football, one gives most happily to Mr Alf Ramsey.’
259
 Glanville 
was not impressed by Ramsey’s dour pragmatism. It is clear that he held Jimmy 
Greaves – ‘quintessentially Cockney, a “boy-wonder” still more remarkable than 
Charlton’ – in very high regard. ‘His turn of speed was extraordinary,’ Glanville 
observed, ‘his confidence more remarkable still, his left foot a hammer, his 
instinct for being in the right place near goal almost psychic.’
260
 Yet Ramsey 
seemed to distrust Greaves’s talents preferring work-rate to flair. ‘He is suspicious 
of genius unless it comes drenched in sweat’, as McIlvanney noted.
261
 It was clear 
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even at this moment of triumph that Ramsey had great difficulty in dealing with 
the press. Geoffrey Green described him as ‘intractable’ and ‘withdrawn’; Clive 
Toye in the Express, after a press conference, observed that ‘Ramsey in victory 




However, in the aftermath of the 1966 final and for some years afterwards it 
was difficult to criticize the man who had proved his critics wrong, stuck to the 
methods he believed in and delivered the World Cup to England. Danny 
Blanchflower, former Northern Ireland captain, writing in the Sunday Express, 
provided the most objective press account of the match to appear in the English 
press. England had won, he argued, ‘because more than anything else, they had 
home advantage.’ Germany had been the better team in the first half, ‘more tidy 
and efficient-looking all round’. In attack Ball and Hurst had put in outstanding 
performances that had effectively ‘won the game’, but England tended to favour 
‘defensive methods rather than attacking ones.’ As David Downing has noted, 
Blanchflower was denounced as a ‘traitor’, even though his criticisms had 
appeared in an article headed ‘Now I must pay tribute to Alf Ramsey’. 
Blanchflower had not expected Ramsey’s England to advance beyond the quarter-
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Generally, however, Ramsey could be sure of favourable treatment. ‘[He] 
does not have to answer to anybody. He did what he said he would do’, wrote 
McIlvanney just after the competition was over.
264
 As the Daily Mirror’s Ken 
Jones observed: 
 
‘The success of his side silences those who doubted the man and 
his ways of working. It does more. It boosts a country that is in 
need of it and a game that will gain much from it.’ 
 
In football, at least, Britain was ‘once more, among the advance guard, no longer 
in the wake of others.’
265
 Ramsey seems to have been very aware of the idea that 
England’s victory was reversing a historical trend. He admitted that England were 
unlikely to match the technique of some European and Latin American teams. 
‘We Englishmen are built differently’, he explained, but ‘from the fact that we 
won the cup, it can be taken that we have caught up.’
266
 At a time when many 
feared that British power was diminishing and that its economy was falling behind 
this was a consolation. 
 
It is also important to note what the press did not report on in any depth 
during the tournament itself and after England had won. There were controversies 
relating to the way in which the tournament had been staged and managed which 
                                                 
264  McIlvanney, World Cup ’66, 167. 
 
265  Daily Mirror, 1 August 1966. 
 




prompted criticism in some countries who believed that the host nation had been 
given an advantage.
267
 England had played all their games at Wembley and thus 
avoided the inconveniences of travelling to various venues and having to change 
hotels and training camps. They were due to play their semi-final at Liverpool 
(Goodison Park) but the match was switched to Wembley leading to complaints 
that they had been helped. West Germany, for example, played matches in 
Sheffield, Birmingham and Liverpool, and then had to move their base from 
Derbyshire to Welwyn Garden City to be nearer London for the final. There was 
also much criticism, especially from South America, about the list of referees for 
the tournament in which Europe (especially Northern Europe) tended to be over-
represented and which included four from England and one each from Scotland 
and Wales, as well as criticism of appointments to particular matches, though 
these were almost certainly ‘unwise rather than sinister.’
268
 With only four 
referees from South America (one each from Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay), 
Downing has concluded that the teams from Southern Europe and Latin America 




‘The controversial England-Argentina quarter-final – not so much a football 
match as an international incident’, according to McIlvanney – was the source of 
much discontent.
270
 As Brian Glanville later observed: ‘The Wembley match, or 
fiasco, would reverberate for years to come, would polarise European and South 
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American football, evoking almost paranoid reactions from the River Plate.’
271
 
Though this was reported in the English newspapers it was inevitably a minor 
theme while the focus remained firmly on the progress of the national team. The 
Daily Mirror, for example, informed its readers that ‘the angry men of South 
American soccer’ were ‘about to launch a counter-attack on the standard of World 
Cup refereeing.’ It also noted that newspapers in several countries had ‘attacked 
the choice of English and German referees for Saturday’s quarter-finals while 
England and Germany remained in the competition.’
272
 These details, however, 
were minor features of an article about possible disciplinary action against 
Ramsey for denouncing the Argentinians as ‘animals’ after the fiasco at 
Wembley. With the trophy secured, the Daily Express published a collection of 
quotes from foreign newspapers praising England’s performance in the final under 
the heading ‘World Salute’, including one suspiciously unidentified quote from a 
German newspaper: ‘Bravo. The players from the Motherland have done it for the 
first time.’ ‘The Argentines’, it was noted, were ‘off key again’; they had 




While the mood of celebration reigned, English newspapers saw no reason 
to remind readers that football fans in other countries might look at events 
differently. The Sunday Express front page headline on 31 July with reference to 
the post-match events was ‘It’s Jubiliation Night.
274
 The Times was exceptional in 
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this respect. Its first front page after the final featured a photograph of the German 
team’s parade through Frankfurt on their return from London and a report headed 
‘Supporters claim “You won”.’ It also carried quotes from several German 
newspapers which effectively disputed England’s right to the title of world 
champions and questioned the validity of England’s third goal. Bild am Sonntag 
was cited – ‘prevailing opinion of all eye-witnesses: “no goal”’, describing Das 
Wembleytor as ‘the most discussed, most universally contested goal in the history 
of football.’ Welt am Sonntag’s match report headline, ‘Russian Linesman decides 
world championship’, was also mentioned.
275
 Fabio Chisari has suggested that this 
was an example of The Times’ ‘Olympian detachment’.
276
 However, it has to be 
remembered that, even though it was a newspaper of great political influence, it 
had a much smaller circulation (around 254,000 in 1965) than the Express (3.9 
million) or the Mirror (5.1 million) and was less reflective of popular 
sentiment.
277
 Another aspect of the press coverage that merits attention is the 
assumption that people in all parts of the United Kingdom were fully behind 
England throughout the competition. London-based newspapers especially were 
inclined to underestimate regional and national differences. Yet there was huge 
disappointment in the North-West when England’s semi-final was moved to 
Wembley. ‘Liverpool as much as any competing nation had reason to resent the 
decision to play England’s semi-final at Wembley,’ claimed McIlvanney, writing 
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soon after the event.’
278
 Moreover, some Scots still regarded England as the ‘auld 
enemy’. Denis Law (Manchester United and Scotland) ‘refused to watch the 
match’ and played golf instead. When he heard the ‘great roar from the 
clubhouse’ he knew England had won: ‘It was the blackest day of my life.’
279
 
These complexities tended to get lost in the bigger story about how Alf Ramsey 
and his boys had restored national pride. 
 
England’s ‘fatal victory’: 1966 and all that 
The Sunday Express on the day following the final included a special four-
page ‘World Cup Souvenir’ supplement, written from the perspective of 1986 and 
looking back on ‘The Day It Happened’. It included such items as Nobby Stiles, 
(‘I’m a grandpa now’) looking back on ‘The greatest day of my life’ and a full 
page on ‘That Swinging Summer’: 
 
‘And so it was, as every middle-aged ex-mod or ex-dolly will 
cheerfully confirm. Either by coincidence or divine planning, 
England’s World Cup triumph came smack on time to crown an 
era. In the memory the images are all happily jumbled, just as 
the conquest of Everest and Roger Bannister’s four-minute mile 
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The Sunday Express was correct in assuming that by 1986 ‘the boys of 1966’ and 
what they achieved would be deeply embedded in English popular culture. 
 
The story of the final has been repeated so many times and in so many 
forms that it is familiar even to those not born at the time it happened. A statue of 
England captain Bobby Moore stands outside the new Wembley Stadium; an 
earlier statue of Moore, holding the trophy aloft with team-mates Geoff Hurst, 
Martin Peters and Ray Wilson, was erected outside West Ham United’s ground in 
the East End of London.
281
 The words with which BBC commentator Kenneth 
Wolstenholme described England’s fourth goal – ‘Some people are on the pitch. 
They think it’s all over. It is now!’ – have become so well-known that they are 
often repeated in affectionate remembrance or even parody. The BBC named a 
television panel show They Think It’s All Over while a film entitled They Think 
It’s All Rovers tells the story of Doncaster Rovers Football Club and its relegation 
from the Football League after 75 years in 1998.
282
 More recently, it has been 
used as the title of a blog aiming to ‘provide intelligent and reasoned discussion of 
all manner of topics in the football world.’
283
 As a story of English heroism it has 
become ‘in effect, a powerful self-sustaining myth that has been wired into the 
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 The fact that the event was televised and 
watched, in black and white, by an estimated UK audience of over 30 million 
ensured that it was a widely-shared experience. ‘I roar in the living-room in 
Isleworth in front of the black-and-white TV’, remembers David Thomson in his 
book 4-2 which attempts to recapture the experience as it was at the time it 




Thomson also reflects on what the winning the World Cup meant for 
English football after 1966: ‘Let’s just say that there were ways in which 
England’s victory in 1966 victory made later defeats more likely.’
286
 In this he 
anticipated the observations of Downing and other football writers who have 
argued that ‘the real loser in 1966 was English football’ in that ‘Ramsey’s success 
reinforced English insularity and reduced what willingness there was to learn from 
abroad, thus condemning the national game to the status of a backwater.’
287
 
Downing’s depiction of 1966 as ‘the fatal victory’, as Dilwyn Porter has argued, 
has parallels with much of the declinist history of post-war Britain appearing in 
the 1980s, such as Correlli Barnett’s Audit of War which blamed many of the 
problems of the British economy on the way in which victory over Germany had 
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Imagining the reaction after the final whistle had blown Thomson, in 1996 
with the advantage of hindsight, writes: 
 
‘”Well, that’s that,” said however many million people, settling 
into the rest of champions. And with it there must come a 
thought – we have won, we can relax, but if we ease off will we 




A polemicist, especially if they were from Germany, might point out that England 
are still enjoying their champion’s rest in that they could not repeat the success of 
1966 in the years since. And if there was a chance, coincidentally there was 
always Germany in their way, either in open play as in 1970 and 2010 or a penalty 
shoot-out as in 1990. This suggests that English football, having enjoyed 
supremacy in international matches up to 1966, entered a period of relative 
decline in relation to Germany thereafter. Since 1966, teams representing West 
Germany/Germany have achieved considerable success in major international 
competitions, never failing to qualify for the final stages of the World Cup. 
England have reached the semi-finals once in 1990, the quarter-finals on five 
occasions (1970, 1982, 1986, 2002 and 2006) and the first knock-out stage twice 
(1998, 2010). In 1974, 1978 and 1994, England failed to even qualify for the 
finals. This pattern has been confirmed by Germany’s superior performances in 
the European championships. Yet Kuper and Szymanski, arguing from an 
economist’s perspective, observe that England are performing within their 
                                                 




abilities given the size of the population and the social composition of the national 
team.
290
 This helps to explain why, when writing about England’s victory in 1966, 
English historians tend to see it as marking the end of an era rather than the 
beginning. For Dominic Sandbrook, for example, it was ‘like the last day of a 
long, lazy summer about to be swept away by the winds of autumn.’
291
 Chris 
Young has reflected  on ‘Two World Wars and one World Cup’, a terrace chant 
much favoured by English fans at matches against Germany in the 1970s and 
1980s when English football – along with much of British industry – seemed to be 
losing ground to foreign rivals. 
 
‘What Ramsey, his team’s victory and the legacy of 1966 stood 
for in fact was not the beginning of anything but the end. In 
hindsight and over the years, it has come to stand not even for 





Thus it might be argued that the World Cup final of 1966 was an event that the 
English had to remember while in Germany, subsequent success made it relatively 
easy to forget. As a cultural reference point which both nations shared it helped to 
shape Anglo-German cultural relations in the thirty years that followed. If 
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England and Germany should ever find themselves at war again, Peter Beck has 




As Michael Billig has argued, the sports pages are where nationalism is 
found in its most banal form. It is there that flags are waved daily for ‘us’, and 
‘our heroes’ and ‘our victories’ are celebrated.
294
 Football writers in the English 
press in 1966 undoubtedly got behind the home team and banal nationalism was 
evident in their representations of ‘our boys’. Desmond Hackett, to take the 
obvious example, made little effort to take an objective stance and there were 
elements of bias in what he did and did not write about in the Daily Express. It 
was, perhaps, excusable in the circumstances to be overcome by patriotic 
sentiment. The atmosphere at the final was a huge party with an English national 
subtext but the joyous eruption of feelings at the final whistle was understandable. 
Arthur Hopcraft, a seasoned football reporter but quite unlike Hackett in his 
approach, recalled that he had ‘shouted like everyone else, and congratulated 
myself on being English with all the acclamation at my command.’
295
 Military 
metaphors were used as teams met on the battlefields of sport. However, though 
those German commentators who complained about Fleet Street’s ‘tin soldiers’ 
had some justification, especially after Germany’s semi-final win over the Soviet 
Union, they would have had little to complain about in the way the English press 
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reported the final itself and in its aftermath, especially as they could agree that 
Schön’s team had been worthy opponents who had contributed to an exciting 
contest and behaved honourably in defeat. It was, of course, easier to write in this 
way in the light of an English victory. Also, given the nature of the competition, 
England was playing other countries as well as Germany and this may  also have 
been a factor, deflecting attention from the old enemy and modulating the way in 
which it was represented. ‘The Argentines’, as the Express called them, had a 
much worse press. 
 
‘On the whole, past events were kept in the background’, Downing has 
noted, though there were exceptions, such as when the Sun reminded readers that 
‘England have never lost to Germany – at soccer either.’
296
 However, even if the 
war was rarely mentioned in sports coverage, it may have been an unspoken 
presence of which people hardly needed to be reminded. BBC journalist John 
Humphrys, a Welshman and not a soccer fan, recalled the 1966 final as the only 
game he had ever watched from beginning to end ‘because it had nothing to do 
with football and everything to do with the war. The Germans were still the 
enemy and we had beaten them again’.
297
 In their ghosted autobiographies some 
of the England players have made specific references to the war and how it 
entered their thoughts at the time. Jack Charlton, in his ghosted autobiography, 
published in 1996, recalled, simply: 
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‘I was quite confident that we could beat the Germans in the 
final. We had beaten them a couple of times in the previous year 
or so, and I saw no reason why we should not do it again. To be 
honest, I was glad that West Germany had beaten the Russians 
in the semis, because I felt that the Russians would have been 




He is, however, also quoted by Downing as reflecting: ‘we had waged a war for 
six years against Germany…and now we were preparing to do battle on the 
football pitch.’
299
 So it is possible that he had more than football on his mind as he 
prepared for the match. Geoff Hurst recalled ‘a residue of bitterness towards the 
Germans.’
300
 Martin Peters claims that the sufferings endured by his wife’s family 
through German bombs in the war made him feel that he had ‘an added 
responsibility.’
301
 However, these memoirs were published many years after 1966 
and it is possible that reflected what the authors or their ghost-writers thought they 
should say then rather than reflecting accurately their thoughts at the time. As 
Joyce Woolridge has observed of ghosted autobiographies, ‘ghost and footballer 
work [together] to produce a representation of the footballer’s image to be 
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presented to the public.’
302
 So these are books written with the expectations of the 
audience very much in mind. 
 
In short, in 1966, there were many reasons not to mention the war, even – 
perhaps especially – for those for whom it was a vivid memory. England 
goalkeeper Gordon Banks who had served in the British army in Germany during 
his period of national service and was married to a German woman was surely 
well aware of the complexities of the Anglo-German relationship. Ramsden 
concludes that the press was ‘less careful’ but restraint was in order, especially 
while Schön and his players were so determined to be good ambassadors for their 
country while in England.
303
 Thus the press reports and comment analysed 
suggests that, while there were occasions when German sensitivities were 
offended, this happened less frequently than might have been expected. Overtly 
anti-German attitudes were not often expressed and this applied especially in 
relation to the final, seen by some as a pretext to celebrate ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
football. Downing has summed it up neatly: 
 
‘Given the frenetic outpouring of nationalism and worse that had 
accompanied England’s progress to the final, the country could 
conceivably have witnessed an eruption of bad feelings towards 
the enemy of two world wars and a million comic strips. It 
didn’t happen. Perhaps the old illusion that politics and sport 
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belonged to separate universes still had influence; perhaps the 
last war was now a sufficiently distant memory. Or perhaps the 
Germans no longer made such good enemies as they once had: 
both their values and their football were too similar to England’s 
own – in the hot light of unreason it was easier to hate the Latin 





It is important, however, to keep the events of 1966 in perspective. Maybe 
Germany was not England’s real football enemy. Alf Ramsey is often quoted as 
saying: ‘I’d rather anybody beat us than the bloody Scots.’
305
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CHAPTER THREE: ‘For the loser now will be 
later to win …’, 1968 – 1978 
Having failed to secure a win against England in matches at international 
level up to and including the World Cup Final of 1966, Germany finally achieved 
victory in a friendly at Hanover on 1 June 1968. For Ramsey’s team the match 
was part of their preparations for the final stages of the European Nations 
Championship to be held in Italy a few days later where they first lost a semi-final 
to Yugoslavia – Alan Mullery becoming the first Englishman ever to be sent off 
while playing for his country – and then beat the Soviet Union to achieve third 
place. This was the last occasion before 2000 when England outperformed 
Germany in a major tournament. Thus, though the match itself was of little 
importance, it was later seen to mark the end of an era. As Brian Glanville 
observed, ‘Nevertheless, after sixty-seven years, a win was a win.’
306
 Though the 
English could console themselves with the successes that its club sides enjoyed in 
Europe – Alex Stepney, Nobby Stiles and Bobby Charlton joined the England 
squad late having just helped Manchester United win the European Cup by 
beating Benfica at Wembley – the English national side performed badly over the 
next ten years, failing to qualify for the final stages of the 1974 and 1978 editions 
of the World Cup and making little impact in the European Nations 
Championships, failing to qualify for the final stages in 1976 and, though drawing 
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with Belgium and beating Spain, failing to progress beyond the group stage in the 
finals staged in Italy in 1980. 
 
Meanwhile for West Germany, the 1970s marked the beginning of a run of 
unprecedented successes in major tournaments. Having beaten England in the 
quarter-final of the 1970 World Cup in Mexico, they went on to finish third in the 
tournament. Then, having beaten England again at the same stage of the European 
Nations Championship in 1972, they went on to win the competition. This success 
was followed by victory in the World Cup in 1974 and further success in the 
European Nations tournament, finishing second in 1976 and winning for a second 
time in 1980. As Uli Hesse, writing of the situation in the mid-1970s observes: 
‘West Germany had lifted the World Cup for a second time, only two years after 
winning the European Championship. All seemed well.’
307
 Though English clubs 
enjoyed great success in European competition, winning the European Champion 
Clubs Cup in five successive seasons before the UEFA ban following the Heysel 
Stadium tragedy in 1985, and also making a significant impact in the Cup-
Winners’ Cup and the Inter-City Fairs/UEFA Cup, this did not easily translate 
into success for the national team.
308
 Apart from the argument – repeated with 
increasing frequency as the 1970s progressed – that the interests of the national 
team were being sacrificed in the interests of the Football League and its member 
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clubs – it has to be remembered that successful English club sides owed much to 
players from other countries, especially Scotland. The Leeds United team defeated 
by Bayern Munich in the 1975 European Cup Final comprised five Scots, one 
Welshman, one Irishman and only four Englishmen. Scotland, it might be noted, 
reached the finals of the World Cup in both 1974 and 1978 when England failed 
to qualify. 
 
Anglo-German football relations in this period covered by this chapter were 
conducted in a different cultural climate from the 1960s. England had won the 
World Cup in 1966 and this momentous occasion was still fresh in people’s 
memories. Inevitably, the England teams that followed stood in the shadow of 
their illustrious predecessors and what they had achieved.  The 1966 team 
became, as James Walvin has argued, ‘a talisman against which all subsequent 
English teams have been compared – unfavourably.’
309
 It also meant that 
Germany’s subsequent achievements tended to accentuate the idea that England 
was now failing. The backdrop of a comparatively poor economic performance 
also remained in place, prompting one economic historian to claim that by the 
early 1980s, the only ‘miraculous’ aspect of post-war British history was the 




On a political level, however, Britain and the Federal Republic drew closer 
together. After being thwarted by De Gaulle in the 1960s, the British government 
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made a successful bid to join the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath signed the Brussels Treaty in 1972 
bringing Britain into membership from 1 January 1973. Heath, a convinced 
Europhile, pursued a strategy which aimed ‘to get into the Community as soon as 
possible, and then solve any difficulties that remained, from the inside.’
311
 British 
membership was confirmed when Harold Wilson, after Labour had returned to 
power in 1974 and negotiated some changes in the treaty, called a referendum in 
June 1975, mainly to resolve differences on the issue within his own party. 
Though the vote was strongly in favour of Britain staying in, there was little 
enthusiasm for ‘Europe’. The ‘Yes’ vote, as Sean Greenwood observed, signalled 
‘essentially the approval of a confused and bored population voting for the status 
quo and taking their lead from the Government which, in March, had 
recommended them to do so.’
312
 The British were ‘reluctant Europeans’ and have 
remained so ever since, whatever the formal state of inter-governmental relations. 
As ‘Europeans’ the Germans had to learn to live with this problem. Moreover, 
whatever the state of the formal relationship between the two nation states, an 
undercurrent of anti-German hostility still existed, an opinion poll revealing in 
1974 that the Germans ‘were among the British people’s least popular foreigners’, 
liked by only 13 per cent of those questioned. Such feelings were strongest among 
18-24 year olds, a generation born after the war, but who had been exposed to 
negative stereotyping of Germans in children’s comics and British war films. Not 
surprisingly, they thought that Germans were ‘violent, lacking in tolerance and 
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 It probably did not help that they now seemed to be better than the 
English at football with two World Cup wins to England’s one after 1974. 
 
Remaining in membership of the EEC was probably a wise decision given 
the instability that followed the massive rise in world oil prices in 1973 which 
made it much more difficult for Britain to live with its long-term economic 
problems. After 1973 these presented themselves in the shape of high inflation, 
low productivity, rising unemployment and poor industrial relations. In each of 
these areas Britain’s economic performance continued to lag behind West 
Germany’s. For example, statistics published by the International Labour Office 
showed that the number of days lost to strikes per thousand employees averaged 
585 in Britain between 1970 and 1974 compared to only 49 in the Federal 
Republic.
314
 Towards the end of the 1970s two of England’s best footballers, 
Kevin Keegan and Tony Woodcock, left to join SV Hamburg and FC Köln 
respectively. When they returned, their impressions of how things were done 
better in the Bundesliga than in the Football League helped in their own way to 
underline the differences between the Germans and the English. ‘Generally 
speaking’, notes David Downing, ‘… both Keegan and Woodcock seemed highly 
impressed and were eager to bring the lessons they’d learned home with them.’ 
German players, workers in its football industry, trained harder, had a higher level 
of technical ability and applied themselves more strategically; the approach in 
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West Germany was ‘generally more scientific’. In comparison, ‘[the] English 
game was still far too full of “good, honest players” who merely worked hard.’
315
 
To many economic commentators this summed up some of the key differences 
between the industries of the two countries and helped to explain why the 
Germans continued to forge ahead. 
 
In these circumstances - and when the frustration generated by lack of 
success at international football is taken into account - it is not surprising to find a 
more hostile tone appearing in newspaper report and comment around the 
England-Germany matches of the 1970s. It is important, however, to keep a sense 
of perspective. While the problems that Britain faced in the 1970s are impossible 
to deny, it has been in the interest of both the Conservative right and the New 
Labour left to promote the idea that the 1970s were a total disaster, ignoring some 
of the more positive aspects of the decade. Dominic Sandbrook’s recent work is a 
sign that British historians are beginning to re-assess the 1970s and to challenge 
some of the myths that have entered popular discourse. ‘But we often forget’, he 
writes, ‘that most Britons, whether young or old, were not very interested in 
politics and continued to lead happy, prosperous lives, indifferent to the great 
public affairs of the day.’ He adds: ‘Even during the dreadful economic crisis of 
1973-4, most still led relatively comfortable, affluent lives.’
316
 A survey 
conducted by the New Economics Foundation in 2004 which focused on 
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measuring ‘domestic progress’ rather than economic performance concluded that 
‘Britain was a happier country in 1976 than it had been in the thirty years 
since.’
317
 Perhaps this helps to explain why, though the tone of press coverage of 
Anglo-German football relations changed in the 1970s, it did not cause offence in 
the way that it did in the 1990s, for example. We should also be careful not to 
treat the 1970s as if each year were the same. The end of the long post-war boom 
in 1973 changed the outlook and justified the idea that Britain, along with many 
other countries was experiencing a crisis. However, even as early as 1978, as 
another revisionist notes, ‘it appeared as though perhaps the worst had passed for 
James Callaghan’s minority administration’, not least because inflation was 
coming down and the number of strikes was falling.
318
 It is against this 
background that England lost the ascendancy it had previously held over Germany 
in international football. 
Niedersachsenstadion, Hanover, 1 June 1968 
It was inevitable that the shadow of the recent past should hover over the 
first meeting between England and West Germany since the 1966 World Cup 
Final with its controversial Wembleytor, even though it was otherwise a rather 
meaningless fixture for both sides. Reporting from Hanover, two days before the 
match, Geoffrey Green in The Times, noted that Germany will, of course, ‘wish 
revenge for that World Cup final and that debatable goal which is still talked 
about’. As for England, Ramsey’s priority was not the friendly with Germany but 
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the forthcoming European Nations Championship which he wanted to win ‘so that 
he can silence all the whispers about Wembley itself having won us the World 
Cup.’
319
 ‘1966’ was now routinely inserted into press discourse in relation to 
Anglo-German football, at least in English newspapers. Under the headline ‘Into 
Europe again: GERMANY NEXT LADS!’, which seemed to invoke the spirit of 
1944, Desmond Hackett in the Daily Express, previewed the match as ‘a repeat of 
the World Cup Final’ and reported a day later that ‘England will field the smallest 
complement of World Cup players since the Wembley triumph over West 
Germany two years ago’.
320
 Ken Jones, in the Mirror, having avoided references 
to 1966 in his pre-match dispatches from Hanover, claimed in his match report 





However, even though it became clear that Ramsey was unlikely to select 
a full-strength side, the English press did not expect defeat. Hackett was 
especially confident that England would remain ‘the unbeatables of Europe.’ He 
was convinced that ‘England, as they always have done, will beat the Germans 
soundly and add to an unbeaten record in Europe which has extended over 16 
internationals.’
322
 Though Green in The Times and Jones in the Mirror were less 
bombastic, they were not anticipating defeat. Green previewed the match against a 
country that had only narrowly lost to England in a World Cup Final two years 
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earlier as ‘just the sort of pipe-opener needed by England’; Jones argued that 
England could approach ‘this prestige friendly with confidence that has grown out 
of an unbeaten run this season and a remarkable record abroad over the past few 
years.’
323
 Perhaps it did not help to develop a more balanced view that the 
principal football journalists for the main newspapers were so embedded within 
the England squad when it travelled abroad. Significantly, Hackett referred to 
‘Nobby’ and not ‘Stiles’, as if he was on friendly terms with him; he further 
underlined the impression that he was an insider when he described Ramsey’s 




‘Football, too, has its non-events’, observed Brian Glanville in the Sunday 
Times on the day after West Germany had won, ‘and this match at Hanover was 
one of them.’
325
 A day later, Green tried to enliven his report of a ‘boring’ match 
for the benefit of Times readers in typical fashion.  
 
‘But basically here was a match of disarray, of thundery, 
draining heat, and of a soft, unruly ball. It quite failed the setting 
of a fine stadium, light-headed with flags. It offered neither the 
feeling of a deep note on the cello, nor the excitement of a 
climbing bird. It was flat.’ 
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He consoled his readers however, with the idea that, as defeat ‘had to happen 
sometime’, it was better that it had happened in a friendly when there was 
‘nothing at stake beyond a reputation.’ He quoted Helmut Schön as if to underline 
the point that the result had not been especially significant. For Germany, the 





For David Downing the occasion was notable for ‘England’s less than 
friendly approach to the game’. He mentions, in particular, a late tackle by Labone 
on Weber ‘and a gratuitously violent assault on Overath by Norman Hunter.’
327
 
Though there was some acknowledgement of this in the match reports carried by 
English newspapers it was put in perspective by complaints of German over-
reaction, a theme that had been evident in coverage of Germany’s run to the final 
in 1966. As Ken Jones observed in the Mirror, ‘(the) Germans showed a talent for 
embellishing their pain with histrionics.’
328
 Though, at least, this amounted to an 
admission that someone – presumably Labone and Hunter – had caused some 
pain. Jones was effectively taking his line from Ramsey who had raised the issue 
in his post-match press conference. It was to become a major theme for Jones 
after England’s European Nations matches in Italy when he argued that the 
Yugoslav team that played Italy in the final had been more inclined to stay on 
their feet after being tackled than they had when beating England in the semi-
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final. Jones suggested that, if Yugoslavia had been playing England, they would 
have behaved differently.
329
 ‘England’s opponents are now eager to find the 
floor,’ he claimed. 
 
For Desmond Hackett in the Express, however, England had failed against 
Germany – thus bringing to an end ‘a triumphant European invasion starting in 
1963’ – because they had lacked the will to win. Under the dramatic headline 
‘ENGLAND SURRENDER’, Hackett explained that it was the abject manner of 
England’s performance that was so disappointing. 
 
‘But I was depressed by the thought it was not so much that 
England were beaten, more that they forlornly surrendered. 
The forwards had no urge, no passion, no patriotism. It appeared 
to them this was just another shirt, just another match.’ 
 
The idea of England ‘surrendering’ to Germany was clearly unappealing after two 
World Wars and one World Cup. It was typical however, that it was the absence 
of ‘passion’ and ‘patriotism’ that was to blame for England’s performance rather 
than any technical deficiencies. This could be partly explained by the busy 
schedule to which England’s players were being subjected at the end of a long 
season. He asked: ‘What WERE England doing there four days before the most 
important matches since the World Cup?’
330
 On the same page, a report by 
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Hackett’s colleague, Norman Giller, who had been assigned to England’s Under-
23 international with Germany to be played at Kassel the following day, quoted 
Bill Nicholson, the Tottenham Hotspur manager who was in charge on the team, 
on the problems of getting the best out of his squad. ‘This is the penalty English 
football is paying for a season that is too long and packed with too many 
matches,’ Nicholson explained.
331
 Later, after England had lost their European 
Nations semi-final to Yugoslavia, Geoffrey Green in The Times offered the 
explanation that, for the players, it had followed ‘many long months of struggle at 
home.’
332
 This theme, closely linked to the ongoing ‘club versus country’ debate, 
was to resurface many times over the next twenty years as England teams failed to 
repeat to the achievement of 1966. 
 
In the circumstances – with important European Nations Championship 
matches immediately to follow – there was little time as well as little incentive for 
the English press to dwell on what had happened at Hanover. For Brian Glanville 
it underlined the fact that international ‘friendlies’ now counted for little ‘in these 
days of World Cups and Nation Cup’. He continued: ‘You could, if you wished 
try to breathe life into it in terms of spurious significance’, but the experimental 
team that Ramsey had picked surely obviated this, except for the most fervent 
German extremist.’
333
 There was some consolation in the 1-0 victory achieved by 
‘Young England’ in Kassel in front of a hostile crowd. ‘The fans did not like the 
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taste of defeat’, noted Giller in the Express, who also passed on manager 
Nicholson’s complaint that the German team had indulged in ‘needless play 
acting’.
334
 Whether he and other English football writers would have taken the 
same view if the result had favoured England, is an open question. The match was 
probably regarded as more important in West Germany, not only because they 
were playing at home but because Schön’s players had something to prove after 
failing to qualify for the European Nations Cup semi-finals by failing to beat 
Albania. ‘While it had not been a performance to remember, an important 
psychological barrier had been broken,’ notes Downing. There was not much 
between the teams on the day and the winning goal was not one to remember. As 
Franz Beckenbauer later recalled: 
 
‘Guess who scored the goal? Yes, I did. It was a real piledriver. 





However, ‘a win was a win’ and it was then that Beckenbauer and his colleagues 
‘realised we could really beat the English and lost some of the respect we had.’
336
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World Cup Quarter-final, León, Mexico, 14 June 1970 
In England, the other big story in June 1970 was the general election, called 
by Harold Wilson, the Labour Prime Minister, for Thursday June 18, the day after 
the World Cup semi-finals were to be played in Mexico. In 1966, Wilson had 
been keen to associate himself and his party with the heroes of Wembley, 
appearing on the hotel balcony with the team when they were being cheered by 
the London crowds on the evening after the match.
337
 He was famously quoted as 
saying that ‘England only wins the World Cup under Labour.’
338
 In 1970, Wilson 
hoped to benefit from any feel-good factor generated by World Cup success and 
confidently expected that Ramsey’s team would have successfully negotiated the 
group stage and the quarter-finals before the electorate cast their votes. It was a 
signifier of the extent to which the English football team and its fortunes in the 
World Cup were already deeply embedded in popular culture that Wilson was so 
concerned. As it transpired, England lost 3-2 to West Germany after extra time on 
14 June, and Labour lost the general election. There were some parallels in their 
respective performances. England had been two goals up but had made mistakes 
and allowed Schön’s team to rally and equalize; they had then conceded a third 
goal in extra time to lose the match to the team they had defeated four years 
earlier. Labour had gained a commanding lead in the opinion polls and, on the eve 
of the election The Times declared that it was ‘a near-certainty’ that Wilson would 
win. These predictions underestimated concerns caused by the monthly trade 
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figures and there was a late swing to the Conservatives bringing them, the party 
that Labour had defeated in 1966, back into office. 
 
A letter published by The Times on polling day had raised the possibility of 
defeat: ‘Thinking of strange reversals of fortune: Could it be that Harold Wilson is 
2-0 up with 20 minutes to play?’
339
 This proved to be an accurate assessment of 
the situation. There was an ominous opinion poll which showed that about twenty 
per cent of the electorate – most of them Labour supporters – were more 
interested in the outcome of the World Cup than the result of the general 
election.
340
 As Fabio Chisari has argued, the 1966 World Cup was a breakthrough 
tournament as far as televised football was concerned. Not least it had engaged the 
attention of a large proportion of the population, male and female, young and old, 
working-class and middle-class, many of whom would never think of watching a 
match from the terraces or even the stands.
341
 By 1970 attendances at English 
Football League matches had resumed their long-term decline but access to 
television was almost universal and this trend had been progressively reinforced, 
especially where the English national team was – now champions of the world – 
was concerned.
342
 It seems unlikely that the defeat inflicted on England by West 
Germany in Mexico was a primary or even secondary cause of Labour’s defeat 
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but the fact that the idea was even taken seriously is significant. International 
football now mattered in a way that it had not done before and this was 
increasingly reflected in the way it was covered in the press. 
 
The importance of television coverage was exaggerated in 1970 because of 
a strike of print workers in the newspaper industry during the course of the 
tournament. There were no newspapers from 9 June until 15 June, the day after 
the England-Germany quarter final. For this reason this section will largely focus 
on match reports and post-match analysis and comment. After England had been 
beaten in the European Nations Cup semi-finals two years earlier, Geoffrey Green 
had observed that ‘unfriendly critics who always pointed to Wembley as the 
reason for England’s global victory in 1966 are hugging themselves.’
343
 At the 
same time, Ken Jones in the Mirror warned that England, as they prepared to 
defend the title they had won in 1966, would have to ‘walk alone through 
international football, ignoring the sinister campaign they firmly believe is being 
directed against them.’ This seemed to reflect Ramsey’s own paranoia regarding 
foreign referees being unsympathetic to the English style of play, foreign players 
feigning injury when tackled and the media demonization of Nobby Stiles. 
Ramsey was quoted as saying that Stiles ‘has been subjected to poisonous 
treatment since before the last World Cup.’ Downing has noted that the failure of 
England to win a major tournament since 1966 has meant that the English have 
become over-protective of their one great achievement in global football and that 
they have little or no idea that ‘few non-Englishmen see the events of 1966 in 
                                                 




quite the same way.’
344
 They learned in 1970 that England had made few friends 
four years earlier and the English press coverage reflected the siege mentality that 
Ramsey and his squad developed. It did not help that Ramsey himself handled 
press and public relations so badly when abroad, treating Mexican journalists, for 




If the English public had high expectations as England departed for Mexico 
in 1970 they were largely justified. England were the defending champions, their 
record suggested that they were still very hard to beat and they had played against 
Mexico, Uruguay and Brazil in a ‘goodwill tournament’ held in Mexico the 
previous summer where they had drawn with the hosts, beaten Uruguay and lost 
narrowly to Brazil. For many, the squad which Ramsey took to Mexico was 
actually stronger than the one which had won the World Cup four years 
previously, an assessment which still finds favour. As David Thomson puts it, 
‘1970’s is the best team that England has ever had in a World Cup … this was a 
very skilled and experienced side.’
346
 For Downing, it had been strengthened at 
full-back where Cohen and Wilson had been replaced by Newton and Cooper, and 
in midfield where Mullery was proving more constructive than Stiles, and in the 
forwards, where Lee had replaced Hunt. ‘It was slightly more attack-minded than 
its 1966 predecessor, or had the potential to be so.’
347
 Despite the result in 
Hanover in 1968, Germany still regarded England as a serious threat. Uli Hesse 
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has claimed, though without citing supporting evidence, that ‘some players were 
so fazed by the prospect of meeting their nemesis that they approached Schön and 
suggested that they should take it easy against Peru [in their last group-stage 




The story of the match is well known. England played brilliantly for the first 
hour and established a 2-0 lead. Then, with twenty-two minutes left and the match 
seemingly won, Ramsey decided to rest Bobby Charlton, allowing Franz 
Beckenbauer the freedom to move forward with decisive effect scoring with a 
weak shot that appeared to deceive Peter Bonetti, a late replacement for Gordon 
Banks in England’s goal after he had been taken ill. Seeler then equalized with ten 
minutes of normal time remaining, heading past the stationary Bonetti after the 
England defence had failed to clear a cross. Finally, Gerd Müller, scored from 
close range to win the match for Germany in the second-half of extra time.
349
 It 
was, observed The Times, which carried a summary of the match on page one 
along with a photograph of Müller’s winning goal, ‘a bitter setback for England’ 
who had confounded their critics with ‘a wealth of splendid football’. Two themes 
that were to dominate post-match analysis were also quickly identified by the 
anonymous ‘Staff Reporter’. Firstly, that the tactical decision to withdraw 
Charlton had been wrong. Secondly, that they had been handicapped by the 
absence of Banks who ‘might have prevented one or two goals.’
350
 It cannot have 
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Geoffrey Green’s match report on an inside page was notably even-handed: 
‘it had been a battle royal under the mid-day sun which was finally a cruelty to 
man.’ It was clear that the summary report on the front page was following 
Green’s line for he also questioned Ramsey’s substitutions, which had conceded 
the centre of the field to Beckenbauer and Overath; ‘that was the heart and core of 
this extraordinary upheaval.’ The point about the goalkeeping was also reiterated: 
‘I do feel that Gordon Banks, had he been under England’s crossbar, would not 
have come off his line to let Seeler’s header loop over him.’ Though there was a 
reference to German fans singing ‘Deutschland über Alles’, Green’s historical 
references were to the recent past, to 1966 rather than 1945. Using, perhaps 
unconsciously, Kenneth Wolstenholme’s words from the Wembley final, he 
observed: 
 
‘It looked all over. But it never is against these Germans. The 
day of settlement for that 1966 final had to come sometime and 




Exemplifying the Olympian detachment of which The Times was still capable, 
Green argued that ‘West Germany were worthy winners’.
 352
 He followed this up 
                                                                                                                                     
 




the next day when previewing the semi-finals, declaring that the semi-finalists 
(Brazil, Uruguay, Italy and Germany) represented ‘the best that football has to 




A few days later, another article in The Times, filed from Mexico City by 
Roger Macdonald, made the point that the German performance had been superior 
to England’s both on and off the pitch. At the start of the tournament, he claimed, 
the German squad had come very close to going on strike ‘so unhappy were they 
with Schön’s tactical disposition.’ They had, however, been pulled round by the 
example set by veteran Uwe Seeler, a player who ‘does not know the meaning of 
defeat’. Seeler, scorer of the second goal against England, ‘moves like an 
automaton, always capable of one more effort.’ These qualities explained why he 
had become ‘a German institution.’ West Germany had been just as impressive 
off the field, their goodwill initiatives ensuring that ‘the bulk of the crowd has 
been behind them in every match, as it had been when they played England. They 
had charmed Mexico by saying from the start that, as the hosts for the next 
tournament, they had come to learn ‘how it should be done’. There was clearly a 
lesson here for Ramsey and for his employers, as Macdonald was not slow to 
point out.
354
 Perhaps it was unfair to blame Ramsey entirely for failures in public 
relations, but it was an aspect of World Cup preparation that could have been 
better managed. Bobby Charlton recalled that it had been a disaster from the start: 
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‘[We] got off on the wrong foot and we were unpopular throughout the country. 




In terms of how this match was represented in the press, the focus was more 
on analysing England’s defeat rather than explaining Germany’s victory. Brian 
Glanville later summed it up by saying that: 
 
‘(…) it might be said, a little callously, that Bank’s place went 
to Peter Bonetti and the match to West Germany. That it was by 
no means so simple as this is shown by the controversy which 
has surrounded the game ever since; not the kind of controversy 
evoked by Hurst’s goal in the two teams’ previous World Cup 
meeting, but by the question of tactics, the question of Ramsey, 
the question of Bonetti’s fallability. Was it an 
oversimplification, too easy an escape for Ramsey, to say that 
had Banks played England would have won – or had his 





It was certainly these two questions that dominated coverage of the match in the 
Express and the Mirror. The first question – about Banks and Bonetti – was 
unanswerable. The second was essentially about Ramsey, his management style 
and his tactics. In the Express, Desmond Hackett characteristically denounced 
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those who were subjecting Ramsey to ‘over-hasty criticism’ before going on to 
join them. Ramsey’s handling of the media, he noted, echoing the point made by 
Macdonald in The Times, had been ‘unfortunate’ and had ensured that his team 
had always had to play in front of hostile crowds. More significantly, however, he 
had ‘stubbornly geared his thinking to the World Cup series of 1966.’ The 
implication was that England had stood still while the rest of the world had moved 
on. West Germany, for example, had learned to trust players with the kind of 
individual flair that could win matches. ‘But England would have none of this star 
system. It was play to the plan or get out – and in the end we got out.’
357
 In the 
Mirror, Ken Jones, though more sympathetic to Ramsey took a similar line, 
raising the question of whether it had been wise in Mexican conditions to use a 4-
4-2 formation, in which strikers could become isolated unless supported by 
runners from midfield. ‘Running has always been an essential feature of 
England’s football under Ramsey’, he observed, leaving readers to draw the 
obvious conclusion that Ramsey had been mistaken.
358
 The failure of British 
management to retain a competitive edge by sticking to outdated methods and not 
adapting to new circumstances was to become so commonplace in the ‘declinist’ 
literature in the years that followed that it became one of the stories that the 
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All this introspection left little space to say very much about the Germans. 
However, it has to be acknowledged that what was written about them in 1970 
was generally complimentary and contextualized with reference to recent football 
history rather than the perspectives derived from the First and Second World 
Wars. This seems surprising, considering the undercurrent of hostility that had 
been evident when England had played at Hanover and in reports relating to the 
under-23 match at Kassel played at around the same time. It might have been 
expected to be even more evident when the stakes were higher in Mexico two 
years later. As it happened, the English press were more inclined to focus their 
hostility in the weeks before the tournament on the Columbians, especially after 
England captain Bobby Moore had been arrested by the police in Bogotá and 
accused of stealing jewellery, and on the Mexicans, who had jeered when the 
Union Jack had been paraded at the opening ceremony. Reporting the opening 
match of the tournament (Mexico v the Soviet Union) for the Express, Norman 
Giller observed that the over-excited crowd had ‘filled the thin Mexican air with 
screeches and whistles [in a] volcanic display of hatred.’
360
 The short match report 
in the Express on Germany’s group stage victory over Bulgaria ran under the 
innocent headline ‘Gay Germans march on’ and noted that they had qualified for 
the quarter-finals ‘in style’.
361
 It was not until the group stages had been finalized 
that it became clear that England would have to play Germany and by then the 
printers were on strike. Neither the Express nor the Mirror went quite as far as 
The Times in declaring that Schön’s team had deserved their victory. However, 
Hackett praised them for their sporting behaviour. 
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‘West Germany showed courage and gallantry against England. 
When they were in the shadows of defeat they were never 
unfair, and in the glory of victory they were almost movingly 
generous.’ 
 
Finally, as Germany approached their third-place play-off match against Uruguay, 
the Daily Mirror came down firmly on their side. ‘The Germans deserve to 




The European Championship quarter-final: London 29 April 1972; 
Berlin, 13 May 1972 
 
At the beginning of the decade, even after England had returned defeated 
from Mexico, ‘life was good and all seemed far from lost…there was joy in the 
present, and hope for the future’.
363
 England’s players returned from Mexico 
frustrated at having thrown away a two goal lead against Germany. Martin Peters 
claimed in his autobiography that he was sent off a few weeks later – for the only 
time in his career – when he kicked Wolfgang Overath during a pre-season 
friendly between Tottenham Hotspur and Cologne. ‘I suppose I was still irritated 
and frustrated by our World Cup exit’, he explained. With the new English 
football season starting just two months after the defeat at León there was little 
time to take in any lessons that could have been learned. ‘The big football news as 
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we prepared for the season to kick off was George Best’s decision to sign an 
eight-year contract with Manchester United’, Peters recalled.
364
 England had lost 
only narrowly to Germany and the idea that they could have won if only Ramsey 
had not made a wrong substitution and, especially, if only Gordon Banks had been 
playing instead of Bonetti, meant that a prolonged inquest was not necessary. 
‘There was good reason to believe that Banks would have seen us through the 
crisis’, Bobby Charlton recalled years later.
365
 Or, as Jonathan Wilson has 
observed, there was a sense that ‘on another day, had a couple of key events gone 
the other way, the result might have been reversed.’
366
 For the English it has 
always been an integral part of the story of the match. Moreover, though 
England’s performances on their return from Mexico had not been outstanding, 
they were unbeaten until they played Germany again at Wembley in April 1972. 
On the eve of this match, as Downing has argued, ‘there was certainly no clear 




As in 1970, the European Nations Championship quarter-final which 
brought England and Germany together again, was played out against a 
background of relative prosperity. Though there were some signs of the problems 
that were to be seen as symptoms of British decline a few years later, they were 
not necessarily visible to the general public in 1972. A survey conducted in 1972 
revealed that nine out of ten people were either ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with 
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their jobs; eight out of ten were satisfied with their living conditions. ‘Bombs, 
strikes, riots, disasters’, the unhappy events that tend to dominate accounts of 
Britain in the 1970s, for most people, ‘happened offstage.’
368
 Only a month before 
the first of the two England-West Germany matches of 1972, Edward Heath’s 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, had cut taxes while at the same 
time increasing pensions and social security benefits in an effort to cut 
unemployment and boost economic growth. ‘To call it a giveaway budget was an 
understatement’, notes Sandbrook.
369
 Though this was to backfire on Heath’s 
government in spectacular fashion a year later, it would have contributed to the 
feel-good factor in April 1972. All this may have contributed to the relatively 
benign view of Germany and Germans on the sports pages which continued to 
regard them in a positive light within a framework that now took in 1970 as well 
as 1966, but left other, more serious aspects of Anglo-German rivalry unspoken. 
In the Daily Express on the day before the match, Desmond Hackett reported that 
Geoff Hurst ‘will spearhead England’s attack against the team he destroyed with 
his 1966 World Cup Final hat-trick.’
370
 This was followed by a passing reference 
to ‘Alf’s Army’ relying on ‘the old brigade’ (Banks, Moore, Peters, Ball, Hurst) 
but, generally, the ‘tin soldiers’ of the English press were not much in evidence. 
Norman Giller’s account of Schön’s press conference, which appeared on the 
same page, stressed football values that the two countries shared, quoting the 
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German team-manager’s remark that ‘[leading] nations like England and Germany 




In The Times, Geoffrey Green noted that there would be ‘few television 
screens up and down the country not alive to the action’ before going on to 
remind his readers that ‘since the World Cup final of 1966 the meetings of these 
two nations have carried Wagnerian undertones.’
372
 This suggested that an 
operatic high drama was likely to ensue and a close contest was expected with 
England’s ‘old enemy’, as the Daily Mirror referred to Germany in passing.
373
 
Historians of English football are in little doubt that it was this match that marked 
the end of English claims to supremacy. For Jonathan Wilson, it was only then 
 
‘... that the fact that England were no longer best in the world 
became incontrovertible. What had happened in Mexico could 
be blamed on heat, foreign conditions, a stomach bug picked up 
by the goalkeeper; Wembley that April evening was cool and 




Downing makes the same point: 
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‘The West German triumph at Wembley in April 1972 was a 
real watershed for both the English national team and the 
expectations that surrounded it. It knocked the incipient 
cockiness out of English football. In future the predictions of 
three-goal victories would be confined to visits from Luxemburg 
and San Marino, and England managers would become 
accustomed to solemnly declaring, in the face of much evidence 





The final score was only 3-1 in Germany’s favour. Moreover, though 
Germany had scored first, England had equalized with twenty minutes remaining 
and the two decisive, match-winning goals had only come late in the game which 
‘taken in its entirety was not the humbling most pundits described.’
376
 But there is 
no doubt that Germany were by far the better of the two teams and that the result 
and the way in which it was achieved administered a psychological shock. At the 
end of the match, Hackett noted in his match report for the Express, ‘German 
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For Germany, this was ‘the second most famous 90 minutes of its national 
team’s history, surpassed only by the 1954 final.’ It was quickly recognized as ‘an 
instant classic’ and the German performance, especially that of midfielder Günter 
Netzer, was described by L’Equipe, the French sports newspaper, as ‘football 
from the year 2000.’
378
 Geoffrey Green in his match report for The Times, 
described the German performance as ‘fluent’ and went on to point out that: 
 
‘They were the better technicians, an infinitely superior 
combination imaginatively. They hit England below the 
intellect. They were better in my opinion – even without the 
presence of the splendid Overath in midfield – than the side who 
beat England so dramatically at León in the Mexico World Cup 
two years ago.’ 
 
Identifying himself with the English team, Green concluded his report: ‘Not 
having beaten us for some 40 years, they have now won three times in succession. 




Green’s match report contained a number of themes which are important in 
terms of representing both England and Germany and these were picked up by 
both Hackett in the Express and Ken Jones (‘The Voice of Football’) in the 
Mirror. The first was that there was no longer any pretence of parity between the 
                                                 
378  Hesse, Tor!, 190-191. 
 




two nations. Green had argued that for England to reverse the Wembley result in 
the second leg in Berlin would require ‘a small miracle’, and this was echoed 
elsewhere. The second theme was that England’s management was at fault, not 
simply because Germany had been better organized but because Ramsey’s team 
was past its best. ‘Experience is valuable up to a point, but there is now the look 
of too solid flesh about one or two members of [the England side]’, with an 
average age of 29 compared to Germany’s 26. Hackett declared bluntly that 
‘England could just as well stay at home if Ramsey continued to pick ‘outdated, 
outworn, old-fashioned players.’
380
 Jones was equally critical in this respect 
arguing that Ramsey ‘was clearly out-thought by Schoen on the night and he may 
have over-assessed the loyalty and willingness of some players.’
381
 So a 
consensus emerged around the idea that German management was superior, that 
its team had been better organized and worked to a better system, and that its 
workers were younger, fitter and better skilled than their English counterparts. All 
this was underlined in an adjacent column by Peter Wilson, (’The man they can’t 
gag’), the Mirror’s flamboyant sports columnist, who claimed that some of 
Ramsey’s players – presumably those from 1966 to whom he remained loyal – 
were ‘as out-of-date as such footballing antiquities as centre-hair partings.’ 
England had won the World Cup once, he went on, ‘But that was back in 1966, 
and, as is so often the case in British sport, we have been content to dwell 
complacently on past triumph until events – and other nations – overtake and 
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 As Dilwyn Porter has argued, this kind of analysis paralleled much 
that was being written about the British and West German economies at the time. 
Public opinion on Britain’s membership of the EEC, for example, continued to be 




The two weeks before the second leg in Berlin provided ample opportunity 
for journalists to consider the implications of what they had seen at Wembley. 
Their reflections helped to shape a view of the English as complacent, backward-
old-fashioned in outlook, and content to dwell on past glories. Much of the 
criticism focused on the club versus country issue. Ken Jones in the Mirror, on the 
day after the match at Wembley, had observed that the disappointing result was 
due, at least in part, to ‘a system which permits a match of this importance to be 
played within a web of critical domestic contests.’ At the England team’s hotel 
after the match: 
 
‘… the player talk was of a League championship yet to be won, 
and not of the match which had just been lost. 




The race for the English First Division title was reaching its climax and England 
squad players from Leeds United and Derby County had two vital matches to play 
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before the match in Berlin. Moreover, on the Saturday falling between the two 
international fixtures, the players from Leeds would be back at Wembley for the 
FA Cup Final against Arsenal. There was also the first leg of the UEFA Cup Final 
to be fitted in involving two English First Division clubs – Tottenham Hotspur 
and Wolverhampton Wanderers. The club versus country theme was taken up and 
developed further by Daily Express sports editor John Morgan in his column 
where he noted that two Derby County Players, Colin Todd and Roy McFarlane, 
who had been unavailable to play for England through injury, had somehow 
managed to play in a vital league match for their club two days later. England had 
lost because of the habit of putting club before country. 
 
Morgan observed that other European countries arranged these things better 
than in England: 
 
‘Throughout Europe, the League fixtures are cancelled, re-
arranged, suspended, altered, amended or whatever is necessary 





A few days later, when it was announced that Francis Lee, who had played at 
Wembley, had been admitted to hospital and was in need of ‘complete rest’, 
Morgan used it as a pretext to argue that English club football expected too much 
of its top players. ‘Someone has got to cry “Stop” to this nonsense that demands 
                                                 




in excess of 60 tension-packed games a season for the clubs that are expected to 
provide the players for England,’ he pleaded.
386
 The Football League, founded in 
1888, had been a target for criticism from those who saw it as old-fashioned and 
outdated, a trade association which existed primarily to keep its inefficient 
member-clubs in business, since the early 1960s.
387
 Morgan’s take on this well-
worn theme was to point out that England’s competitors in Europe all had much 
smaller top divisions – with only 16 clubs in Italy, for example, and 18 in West 
Germany, compared to England’s Football League with 22. The national team 
was underperforming because it had to rely on tired players drawn from a league 
where ‘the few successful clubs subsidise the many who can’t make ends 
meet.’
388
 It was a theme that the Express returned to several times. A few days 
after the second leg in Berlin it featured Arsenal manager Bertie Mee’s ‘3-Year 
Plan’ to save English football; his major recommendation was a First Division 
reduced to 16 clubs.
389
 Geoffrey Green’s match report from Berlin for The Times 
was headed ‘Selfish clubs cause England’s fall.’
390
 The failure to abandon old 
institutions that had once served the country well but were now holding it back, 
along with the failure to organise effectively in the national interest, were thus 
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very much on the agenda. These were recognizable symptoms of what economic 




David Downing has argued that the shock administered to English football 
at Wembley in April 1972 was so much greater because it was administered by 
Germany. ‘England had been utterly outclassed by a nation who traditionally 
played English-style football … How had the Germans suddenly become so 
good?’ The post-match quotes attributed to Helmut Schön that appeared in most 
English newspapers after the game provided an explanation. Even in 1966, he 
suggested, it was apparent that it was necessary to raise skill levels. However, 
England’s ‘fatal victory’ (as Downing calls it), means that this problem had not 
been addressed. ‘They seem to have stood still in time’, Schön argued, whereas 
West Germany had learned from defeat and moved forward. Reflecting on the 
match, he observed that the English had put up a fight ‘but we were far superior 
technically.’ Downing cites, as supporting evidence, ‘a wonderfully perceptive 
article’ by Ian Wooldridge in the Daily Mail which ‘proved something of a 
turning point in Anglo-German relations.’ Later events, especially press coverage 
of England-Germany matches in the 1980s and 1990s, would cast doubt on this 
but Wooldridge had recognized that the manner of the German victory was all 
important. They had won by abandoning the Anglo-Saxon football that had got 
them to the final in 1966. ‘The Germans had played nothing like the brutal and 
humourless automatons of English legend, and they had accepted the victor’s 
laurels as graciously in 1972 as they had accepted defeat in 1966.’ The style of the 
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German victory, symbolized especially by Netzer’s flair in midfield, ‘made 
nonsense of the pulp magazine conception of the German character and [would] 





However, though England’s weaknesses had been exposed, it was difficult 
to shift entrenched attitudes. Norman Gilller, in the Daily Express, wrote in terms 
of Ramsey picking up the pieces and re-assembling his team for ‘a blitz on 
Berlin’.
393
 As the second leg approached Desmond Hackett, though his Wembley 
match report had suggested that he was well aware of what was wrong with the 
England team, urged them to ‘Give it a go’. There was still hope that England 
‘with their typical battling spirit could yet revive and put up a shock score.’
394
 
Though, it became increasingly clear that Ramsey was more interested in damage 
limitation, this did not deter Frank Taylor in the Daily Mirror from referring to 
previous performances when English fighting spirit had allegedly been sufficient 
to win the day – Nat Lofthouse’s famous ‘Lion of Vienna’ goal in 1952 and 
Duncan Edward’s performance in Berlin in 1956. ‘Let’s have a blitz in Berlin!’, 
Taylor wrote. ‘That’s what 15,000,000 Daily Mirror readers are hoping to see in 
the famous Olympic Stadium today.’
395
 However, these allusions to World War II, 
did not inspire Ramsey to change his mind and pick an attacking team. As Brian 
Glanville, who was covering the match for the Sunday Times, later recalled, 
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England needed to win by at least two clear goals if they were to progress to the 
semi-finals. 
 
‘But Ramsey, throwing in the towel, picked a team which had 
no hope of doing that; essentially a team of hard men. There was 
Peter Storey of Arsenal, Nobby Stiles, Norman Hunter of Leeds 
United and Mike Summerbee of Manchester City. It was a 
deadly goalless draw which did nothing for England. Günter 





Glanville’s memory was faulty here. In fact, Stiles did not play in this match, but 
it is significant that Glanville thinks that he did. ‘I had to sort people out’, Stiles 
recalled of his own career, ‘I had to win the ball because without it, the greatest 
talent in the world couldn’t begin to operate.’
397
 Ramsey’s team in Berlin, even 
though it did not include Stiles, was not short of ball-winners, but it was short of 
world-class talent. 
 
On the morning of the match in Berlin, the Daily Mirror published a 
ghosted article by Alan Ball under the headline ‘We’re bidding for revenge.’ No 
doubt the intention was to raise the spirits of England supporters and to convince 
them that it was not ‘all over’ yet. However, the overall tone was very downbeat. 
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The defeat at Wembley had turned England into ‘nobodies, failures, footballing 
has-beens.’ As world champions, ‘everywhere we went, we were guaranteed to be 
followed and feted.’  Now the team felt ‘snubbed.’ The airport had been ‘almost 
deserted’ on their arrival and they had felt only ‘emptiness’ and ‘loneliness’ on 
the pre-match visit to the stadium. Yet Ball reassured Mirror readers that the tie 
remained open; England would ‘pull out all the stops and force all Europe to start 
respecting us again.’ The impression that the players felt beleaguered was 
extended when Ball dismissed claims that England lacked skill ‘as a load of 
nonsense’, adding that there was more skill in the squad than ‘back in ‘66 when 
we were good enough to win the World Cup.’ These criticisms that had been 
directed at the team were frustrating but they were determined to ensure that ‘the 
snub rebounds straight into the face of the enemy.’
398
 Alas, it remained unclear 
who he thought the enemy was, the Germans or the English press, their football 
writers and their readers. 
 
Just after the match at Wembley, Schön had predicted that England would 
‘come to Berlin and fight, because that is their way’.
399
 However, given the 
defensive character of the team Ramsey chose on this occasion, the 0-0 draw that 
was achieved was probably as much as England could have expected. Ken Jones, 
who had a good understanding of Ramsey, had written a day previously: ‘The 
Germans know that Sir Alf Ramsey and his players are under enormous pressure 
of public opinion, and that two bad beatings in a fortnight could add up to a 
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 This Ramsey succeeded in avoiding. However, 
in the aftermath of the match, it was clear that the press’s patience with England’s 
manager and his team was running out, whatever he had achieved in 1966. Ken 
Jones observed that Ramsey had used the four days before the match ‘to raise the 
blazing morale which always has been such an essential feature of England 
teams.’ The effect of this had been evident mainly at the after-match reception 
when ‘players huddled in groups … belligerently daring anyone to come forward 
and criticise their performance.’
401
 This did not seem to have the desired effect as 
journalists were unanimous in condemning England’s performance. 
 
Jones’s article appeared alongside an action photograph from the match 
showing Germany’s goalkeeper Sepp Maier keeping his eye on the ball while 
‘ignoring the challenge of a high-flying, foot-first challenge at a corner kick from 
England’s Roy McFarland.’
402
 No performance by an England team has ever been 
subject to harsher criticism. Unusually, they were attacked because of the cynical 
physicality employed by Ramsey’s hard men. On its back page, the Mirror 
allowed space for England players to defend themselves against this charge. 
Under the headline ‘CRY-BABIES: England hit at German play actors’, Bob 
Russell assembled quotes from various England players responding to Helmut 
Schön’s accusation that the England had ‘aimed at the bones’, when tackling. This 
was accompanied by two photographs – one showing a ‘dejected’ Netzer being 
helped to his feet and another showing Höttges rolling ‘in apparent agony.’ Colin 
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Bell claimed that it was ‘a hard game but never vicious’; Alan Ball was 
disappointed that the Germans acted like ‘cry-babies’ who had ‘tried to make 
villains of us’; finally ‘Leeds’ iron man’ Norman Hunter, added that it was ‘no 
more physical than the average English League game.’
403
 There may have been an 
element of truth in Hunter’s statement that would have gone some way to 
explaining West Germany’s technical superiority but this passed without 
comment. However, these denials were effectively undermined by Frank Taylor’s 
column on the same page, which described the English players as looking ‘as 
cultured as a clog dancer in a ballet class.’ Moreover, Taylor complained 
vehemently about England’s lack of ambition and enterprise: ‘If this was a victory 
for tactics, give me the glory of adventurous defeat.’ He had watched the match 
on television hoping to see England attack, or ‘the lions rampant’, as he put it 





According to Desmond Hackett’s view in the Express, England had been 
reduced ‘to kicking at the Germans’, who had not retaliated. He had been appalled 
when Mike Summerbee ‘brought down Günter Netzer, the idol of Germany, and 
appeared to stamp on his hand.’ Urging Ramsey to ‘forget 1966 and all that’, he 
continued: 
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‘When you are compelled to feel shame for an English 
international team, the situation has to be more than grim. It 
was. It was pathetic. 
Twenty-for hours after the miserable and silent retreat from 
Berlin, I still writhe over the ignominy of once proud England 
being jeered off after a goalless draw. 
 
The German newspapers, he had to confess, had told the truth with ‘jackboot 




In The Times Geoffrey Green was more measured. He conceded that ‘a 
modicum of prestige was salvaged from what was a limited, face-saving 
operation, but even that had undertones’. England had been prepared ‘to aim for 
the body at times.’ For Green, this was ‘the least agreeable aspect of the English 
effort.’ He did not dispute that the traditional fighting qualities associated with 
Englishness had been displayed – ‘the heart, the courage and the will were all 
there.’ In the end, however, ‘a physical challenge cannot subdue a lively 
intelligence allied to artistry’ and that is what West Germany had possessed. ‘The 
unarguable fact remains’, he explained, ‘that the fluent Germans were the better 
footballers.’ They ‘boasted players who possessed a refined skill, an eye for the 
unexpected, and a style capable of challenging the New World.’ Turning to 
England, Green argued: 
 
                                                 




‘What matters most is England’s future. They need more 
adventure, a pair of real wingers for a change, and a chance 
for youth. But as much as anything, if we are to make any 
showing in the next World Cup, Sir Alf must receive more 





If Green had turned to almost any other newspaper, he would have found an echo 
of his complaint about the clubs. There seemed no way out of this difficulty. 
Arsenal chairman Denis Hill-Wood was quoted in the Mirror a day later. ‘Of 





The matches played in spring 1972 finally swung the pendulum towards 
Germany; especially during the game at Wembley it became clear that England 
and Germany were moving in very different directions. Though there were 
occasional allusions to ‘Blitzkrieg’ and even ‘jackboot brutality’, English 
newspaper reports and comment tended to take a positive view of the German side 
that Schön brought to Wembley, acknowledging that they were technically 
superior and pleasing to watch. If anything, there was a tendency to overstate the 
extent to which the Germans had dominated at Wembley where England had 
equalized in the 77
th
 minute to make it 1-1 and Banks had come close to saving 
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Netzer’s crucial penalty which had restored Germany’s lead.
408
 In contrast, press 
coverage of England’s performance, especially in the second leg, was universally 
negative. As Downing has indicated, complaints about German ‘play acting’ went 
largely unsupported. Peter Batt in the Sun was more typical in contending that 
England had approached the game ‘cynically and, at times, viciously.’
409
 West 
Germany had proved manifestly superior and could even claim the moral high 
ground as they had not retaliated when kicked in Berlin. 
 
‘But somewhere England have lost their way. For thirty years 
and more they dominated world football and in 1966, when they 
won the World Cup, they were a great power again. 
Since then they have not improved. The national team is always 
an extension of a country’s football pattern. The pattern in 
England is all about speed, strength and aggression. There is no 




This was the verdict on English football attributed to former German coach Sepp 
Herberger after the two matches and widely publicised in the English press. In 
1972 and for many years afterwards few in England would have disagreed with 
this negative representation of England and its national game. As Jonathan Wilson 
has observed, ‘there were no great howls about the unfairness of the result from 
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‘Friendlies’: 12 March 1975; 22 February 1978 
By the time that England and West Germany faced each other again, in a 
midweek friendly match at Wembley in February 1975, West Germany were the 
world champions, having both staged and won the tournament in 1974. England, 
meanwhile, had failed even to qualify for the final stages, having drawn with 
Poland at Wembley in a match they needed to win, thwarted principally by the 
heroics of a goalkeeper, Jan Tomaszewki, as England forced 26 corners on the 
night to Poland’s two. It marked the end of the Ramsey era – he was eventually 
sacked in March 1974 and replaced by Don Revie – whose Leeds United team 
were feared rather than admired. They were, according to the outspoken Brian 
Clough, who briefly succeeded him, ‘the dirtiest and most cynical team in the 
country.’
412
 This was happening against an increasingly troubled economic 
background. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 had effectively brought the world 
economy’s long post-war boom to a sudden end; the cost of a barrel of oil rising 
from $2.40 in the spring of 1973 to $11.65 by the end of the year. In these 
conditions Britain’s long-term economic problems became increasingly visible as 
Edward Heath’s government struggled with rising unemployment, rising prices 
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and strikes in major British industries as workers sought pay increases to keep up 




A few weeks after England’s match with Poland, with Britain’s coal-miners 
‘working to rule’, the government was forced to take the drastic step of 
introducing a three-day working week in an effort to conserve dwindling fuel 
supplies at the power stations. In Northern Ireland violence continued to escalate 
and by the end of 1974 the IRA had extended its bombing campaign to the British 
mainland, with especially devastating consequences for Birmingham where two 
pubs were attacked in one night, causing 21 deaths.
414
 In such desperate times the 
performance of the England team, especially failure to perform in line with 
expectations, became symbolically significant. As Dominic Sandbrook has 
argued: 
 
‘Even in an autumn of inflation, bombings and strikes, there 
were few more compelling symbols of national decline than 
England’s failure against Poland. Just seven years after the 
golden victory that had supposedly capped the youthful 
optimism of Harold Wilson’s swinging Britain, England had 
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It did not help that English football was now burdened with the additional 
problem of hooliganism. There was, as Eric Dunning and others have pointed out, 
a long history of football-related violence and disorder, however it appeared to 
reach a new level at this time. By 1974 some newspapers were publishing 
statistics (a ‘Thug’s League’), which was supposed to shame clubs into taking 
measures to ensure that its supporters behaved themselves but this had no effect 
and may even have made the problem worse as rival football ‘firms’ battled for 
supremacy.
416
 Moreover, the English problem worsened as hooliganism began ‘to 
spill over into Europe’, notably when Tottenham fans caused mayhem in 
Rotterdam in May 1974 and Leeds fans rioted in Paris at the European Cup final a 
year later leading to the club being banned from European competition for four 
years.
417
 Writing about Britain in the mid 1970s, journalist Peter Jay identified a 
condition which he named ‘Englanditis’, describing the English – and the British 
in general – as ‘a confused and unhappy people’.
418
 For Scots – their national 
team qualified for the finals in both 1974 and 1978 – football could provide some 
consolation. This was not so for the English. 
 
English press coverage of the final, in which Schön’s team beat the 
Netherlands 2-1, after going behind in the first minute to a penalty awarded by 
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English referee Jack Taylor, continued in the broadly sympathetic vein that it had 
followed in 1972. England was not involved in the final stages of the tournament, 
having failed to qualify. This meant that it was easier for English journalists to 
take an objective view. The consensus of opinion was that both finalists were 
‘teams of very high quality.’ ‘Both’, as Frank McGhee noted in the Daily Mirror 
on the day before the final, ‘are very much better, stronger and much more skilful 
than any side England could put into the field right now – but no better than 
England under Revie must become.’
419
 Writing in the Sunday Times on the day of 
the final, Brian Glanville reminded readers of how West German football had 
developed under Schön since Wembley 1966. ‘Schoen it was, after all, who broke 
the mould dear to Herberger and the nation at large, substituting artists for 
warriors yet winning still.’
420
 Having said that, there was agreement in the English 
press that what had seen West Germany through to victory in a final which most 
believed the Dutch should have won, was character. The Dutch had lost, 
according to David Miller in the Daily Express, because they had forgotten ‘that 
being the best team is not enough. You have to prove it.’ Thus, though 
acknowledging that if the Dutch had won, it would have represented ‘a triumph of 
pure skill’, there was much to be said for ‘Germany’s gritty but less-than-polished 
achievement.’
421
 In The Times, Geoffrey Green, covering ‘my last World Cup 
final’, observed that the Germans were now a better side than they had been at 
Wembley in 1966 ‘but as always their greatest asset has been their untameable 
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 What this suggests is that they were perceived as being, perhaps, not 
quite as good as the team of 1972, but still good enough to beat England 
comfortably. 
 
As Green noted, when West Germany came to play England at Wembley in 
1975, the situation was similar to when they had made their first post-war visit in 
1954, ‘just three months after gaining the title and with only three of their side 
that had caused one of the greatest upheavals in history by beating the unbeatable 
Hungarians.’
423
 In 1954, however, England had not just been knocked out of the 
World Cup. As in 1954, there was considerable interest in the match with a 
capacity crowd of 100,000 who would ‘demand victory, especially after what the 
Germans have done to us in the past five years – in the Mexico World Cup and at 
Wembley itself in the European Championship of 1972.’ Alan Ball, 
controversially appointed England captain for the first time – a Labour MP had 
urged Revie to reconsider on account of Ball’s disciplinary record – was said in 
the Express to be keen to gain revenge for the painful defeats inflicted by ‘the 
competitive Germans’ in 1970 and 1972. Though there was nothing at stake, 
Steve Curry in the Express went to some lengths to show that, for the Germans, a 
match against England was considered special and important; 3,500 German fans 
were travelling to Wembley and the match was being broadcast live on German 
television. A spokesman for the DFB was quoted as asking rhetorically: ‘How can 
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a match between England and West Germany now be called a friendly?’
424
 This 
seemed to apply even though Schön was fielding only five of the team that had 
lifted the Jules Rimet Trophy in July 1974: some Bayern players were rested as 
they were said to have been overworked by European Cup duties. England had 
also been forced into late changes after four of the squad originally selected were 
required by their clubs for a replayed FA Cup match between Leeds and Ipswich. 
 
Generally, in that coverage reflected the recent history of Anglo-German 
relations, the sports pages acknowledged only the framework provided by 
encounters on the field going back no further than 1966, or 1954 for Geoffrey 
Green. The war was only mentioned in the Daily Mirror and then only in passing. 
Two photographs – one showing Schön and Beckenbauer discussing ahead of the 
‘tonight’s friendly battle’ and captioned ‘Target for tonight’ and another featuring 
Don Revie ordering England to ‘Open Fire!’ – consciously or unconsciously made 
the connection.
425
 The newspapers were happy to have some good news to report 
for a change and focused almost entirely on a comfortable and stylish 2-0 victory 
for the home team. ‘The West Germans had been beaten for the first time since 
1966, England had looked good for the first time for many moons, and for a few 
weeks it was hard to resist a rare and heady sense of optimism’, as David 
Downing observes.
426
 It was very encouraging from an English point of view, 
though the celebratory tone of the reports was tempered with a sense of realism. 
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Frank McGhee, covering the match for the Daily Mirror, was typical. England 
‘outclassed’ Germany on the night. 
 
‘They cannot claim the world title because of that. But they can 
most definitely claim that they produced both the type of skilful 
player and the kind of accomplished, adventurous football 





‘For the moment, then, the Germans are the dispossessed’, Geoffrey Green 
observed in The Times, before reminding his readers that ‘nothing hung upon this 
match.’ There were some aspects of their performance that were praised, ‘as 
always’ they were ‘neat and formal’ in midfield with Cullmann and Flohe 
‘covering acres of the sodden pitch.’ These qualities, however, fitted with a 
pattern of football that Germany appeared to have abandoned in 1972, but this 
time Netzer was absent, watching from the stands. Beckenbauer was ‘still 
masterly in some of his touches’, but was not at his very best, having dived full 
length to handle the ball ‘just as Macdonald was about to break free for a probable 
third goal.’
428
 Much was made of this incident because it seemed to exemplify the 
extent to which the world champions had been embarrassed by a relatively 
inexperienced and experimental England side. In the Express, David Miller 
reported that Beckenbauer had scrambled on his knees in the mud to halt 
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Macdonald – ‘with his hands.’ He also suggested that there had been an element 
of desperation of times. At one stage of the match ‘the Germans were surviving 
precariously with a profusion of sliding tackles exploiting the mud to take both 
man and ball.’
429
 It was clearly not a vintage performance by the world 
champions. 
 
Given the damage that Günter Netzer had inflicted on England 1972, there 
was great rejoicing because England seemed to have found an outstanding flair 
player with similar technical ability and vision in Alan Hudson, formerly of 
Chelsea but now at Stoke City, making his England debut. To make the point that 
England had discovered a midfield genius to match West Germany, the Express, 
the Mirror and The Times carried quotes from Netzer. In the Express it was: 
 
‘HUDSON is the best English player I have ever seen. He has 
control and style and he can obviously affect a team. I think he 




The report went on to put Hudson on the same level as Raich Carter and Wilf 
Mannion, inside-forwards from what many readers would have regarded as a 
golden age of English football in the 1940s, and also with 1966 hero Martin Peters 
‘at his peak.’ Frank McGhee in the Daily Mirror, was even more complimentary 
about Hudson’s ‘majestic’ performance. It had ‘the assurance, the elegance, the 
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efficiency of someone who was born to play at this level.’ McGhee went on: ‘He 
is here to stay – all the way to the 1978 World Cup.’
431
 Unfortunately England did 
not qualify for the finals in 1978 and Hudson was to gain only one more cap as his 
career faltered badly on account of injury and a rather wayward lifestyle. 
 
The English press had much to be pleased about – a well-deserved victory 
against the world champions and a stunning debut by the stylish Hudson. It was 
not just the fans at Wembley who came away from the match with ‘a warm glow’; 
an additional 30,000 had watched the match ‘live’ in fourteen cinemas around the 
country.
432
 Moreover, as Green pointed out in the opening paragraph of his report, 
it was England’s ‘first win over their old opponents since beating them in the 
World Cup final of 1966.’
433
 The occasional military analogy surfaced – in the 
Mirror England’s three ‘front-line troops’ (Keegan, Macdonald and Channon) had 
each been assigned ‘a sentry’ to mark them. There was also an obligatory 
reference to ‘Kaiser Franz’ (Beckenbauer).
434
 However, it was not overstated and 
seems to have been simply a variation on the kind of clichés that might be found 
in a tabloid newspaper report of almost any match. Two days after the match the 
Express back page featured an interview with the Yugoslav coach Milan Miljanic, 
introduced to readers as ‘one of soccer’s top brains’, whose Red Star Belgrade 
team had knocked Liverpool out of the UEFA Cup a year previously. For the 
Express, the most backward looking of England’s popular newspapers to seek out 
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foreign expertise in this way was a sign that attitudes were changing. He was 
reported as saying that ‘England’s victory over the world champions once again 
makes them the team everyone else in Europe wants to beat’. Yet Miljanic’s more 
critical insights were also reported. England had lacked width in attack as well as 
left-sided midfielders. Hudson was good but he was no ‘super player’; he gave 
England the ‘improvisation essential at this level’ but did not use his left foot 
enough.
435
 The tone of the writing was filled with hope for a brighter future for 
English football. The dark side covered in 1972 regarding the ‘greed’ in the 
English club game seemed to have been pushed aside by a national team that 
looked refreshed and more importantly, rejuvenated. However, also notable was 
the absence of the sort of reporting that accompanied English football during the 
1950s and 1960s, which carried with it the notion of inherited superiority. 
 
By the time that England and West Germany played again, in an 
international friendly in Munich in February 1978, the broad context of Anglo-
German relations was probably better than it had been three years earlier. The 
March 1975 match had been played just after Prime Minister Harold Wilson had 
succeeded in renegotiating some of the terms of British membership of the EEC. 
This had at times involved a confrontational approach to Britain’s European 
partners ‘in order to convince the British people that the government was fighting 
vigorously on their behalf.’ This proved successful at home in that Wilson secured 
a two-thirds majority for continued membership of the EEC at the referendum 
held in June 1975, ‘a more convincing majority than any British government had 
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received in an election in the twentieth century.’
436
 At the same time it seems clear 
that ‘the British over the years became faintly tiresome in the eyes of the 
continentals, what with their comings and goings and their insistence on 
renegotiating what had already been negotiated.’
437
 More specifically, as far as 
British attitudes to Germany were concerned, television comedy may have been a 
more reliable guide to the persistence of underlying hostility. ‘All comedy series 
based on sketches, like The Dick Emery Show (1962-1981) and Morecambe and 
Wise (1961-83), had their moments in which humour relied on a spiked helmet, a 
German accent or a comedy Nazi’, as John Ramsden has pointed out. The famous 
‘Don’t mention the war!’ episode in Fawlty Towers (1975-1979) was enormously 
popular. Not many viewers seemed to realise that John Cleese’s aim had been ‘to 




As far as Anglo-German football relations were concerned the essential 
facts were that in February 1978 the West Germans were still the reigning world 
champions while England had failed to qualify for the final stages of the 
tournament, just as they had failed in 1974. The early promise at the start of the 
Revie’s period as manager had evaporated and the reputation that he had earned as 
manager of Leeds United – according to Brian Clough the Revie family was 
‘closer to the Mafia than Mothercare’ – ensured that it was difficult to retain 
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public support when results were disappointing.
439
 In February 1977 England had 
lost 2-0 to the Netherlands at Wembley and ‘were given a footballing lesson by 
the Dutch which ranked alongside those previously inflicted by the Hungarians in 
1953 and West Germans in 1972.’
440
 According to Jeff Powell in the Daily Mail, 
England had been beaten so soundly that they ‘joined the rest of the second-raters 
in the gutter of world football last night.’
441
 What made this seem worse was that 
the England manager appeared to conclude that he did not have the players 
capable of competing against the very best. Revie, as Alwyn Turner has observed, 
‘admitted after that defeat as though commenting on Britain’s economic position 
relative to its rivals, ‘We just couldn’t cope.’
442
 His tenure as England manager 
ended in acrimonious controversy six months later when he resigned during the 
course of an England tour to South America. Revie, fearing that his reputation as a 
manager was being damaged, had given up on England and secretly negotiated a 
much better contract for himself with the United Arab Emirates. Though it is 
questionable what kind of reputation he possessed at the time within the English 
game. 
 
England’s fortunes revived under his successor Ron Greenwood. In the last 
match of their World Cup qualifying group in November 1977 they had secured a 
2-0 victory over Italy which pointed to a brighter future. What is noticeable about 
the match previews in the press, however, is a more cautious, more realistic 
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approach than would once have been the case. ‘West Germany, the world 
champions, are not usually too concerned about “friendly” matches’, observed 
Norman Fox in his opening paragraph for The Times. They were likely to take 
England seriously, however, simply because they were a team in transition. The 
eleven that had won the World Cup in Munich four years previously had now 
disintegrated and Helmut Schön was in the process of rebuilding, so players were 
competing for World Cup places. However, though Fox did not discount the 
possibility of an England victory altogether, especially if West Germany 
underperformed, he made it clear that he did not expect it, not least because 
Greenwood was only just beginning the difficult task of reversing several years of 
stagnation and decline. 
 
‘If West Germany’s attitude fails to do justice to the serious 
expression Mr Schön presented this morning with his talk of the 
many “classicals” between the countries since 1966, it would 
not be a complete surprise, but for England this is the start of the 
real Greenwood era. His previous work was little more than 
salvaging the leaking craft he was asked to take over.’ 
 
Fox seemed to be very well aware of where England now stood in the hierarchy of 
international football. He noted that Schön, at his press conference, had also 
mentioned that for West Germany to play England was a way of preparing for a 
possible meeting with Scotland in Argentina, Scotland having qualified. ‘If 
197 
 





Pre-match comment in both the Express and the Mirror was equally guarded 
about England’s prospects. This seems to have been very much in line with the 
views being expressed in the England camp which appear to have been 
deliberately low-key as Greenwood wisely sought to reduce the weight of 
expectation on his players. Kevin Keegan, who had been with Hamburg for the 
past six months and was, therefore, well aware of the nature of the challenge that 
lay ahead, was quoted in the Mirror as saying that England had ‘almost got it 
together again as a team …[but] we are not there yet’. He could not say that 
‘England are a better team [than Germany]’ but they ‘could set them problems’.
444
 
The Express reported Keegan as warning that ‘we should not go overboard about 
that result over Italy.’
445
 Greenwood himself took a similar line and this 
influenced the sympathetic match-day previews in the Mirror and the Express. In 
terms of relations with the media he was clearly a significant improvement on 
both Ramsey and Revie. Frank McGhee in the Mirror dutifully reported the 
England manager talking about ‘my old friend Helmut Schoen’ who had told him 
that he had been quite glad when Wales had achieved a draw in Dortmund 
recently ‘because it proved to the [West German] public that their team could not 
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 Greenwood’s relaxed approach helped McGhee to take a realistic 
view of its likely outcome. When Greenwood suggested that he wanted ‘five or 
six captains on the field’, McGhee, ‘slightly cynically’, responded by saying that 
he preferred ‘Helmut Schoen’s ambition to have eleven players.’ McGhee 
concluded his match-day preview by observing that ‘The most I can hope for is a 
respectable result – a draw or a narrow defeat.’
447
 In the Express, David Miller 
was more upbeat, though the old habit of predicting that England would win had 
clearly given way to the more modest suggestion that England could win. It was 
an ‘absurdity’ that England had failed to qualify for the finals when countries such 
as Iran and Tunisia would be there and this would be underlined if they managed 
to beat Germany. ‘Trevor Brooking and Butch Wilkins in midfield and Kevin 
Keegan up front, all world class players, can possibly achieve a result which will 




It was clear, however, that the idea that England still lagged behind West 
Germany – and not just in terms of recent matches won and lost – was powerful. 
A ‘B’ international was played at Augsburg on the evening before the match in 
Munich, England winning 2-1. ‘This was Germany’s first defeat in eight matches 
at this level and it must give heart to every English soccer fan’, wrote Alan 
Thompson in the Express. Thompson’s article, however, ended on a different 
note. The match had been played despite adverse weather conditions. 
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‘The idle English clubs, who could not get their games played at 
home last night, might like to know that in Germany everything 
is possible with a little bit of effort. 
For this game they took about 12 inches of snow from the pitch, 
rolled the remainder into a thin “carpet” – and got on with the 
game with red line-markings, fluorescent orange ball, and with 
some German players in ballet tights and wearing gloves. 




This was hard on Third Division Bradford City and Fourth Division Huddersfield 
Town, the only two English clubs whose matches had been called off on the night 
in question. However, Norman Fox in The Times effectively endorsed this view 
when he reported of the B international, ‘That the game was played was 
remarkable by British standards.’
450
 As if to underline the point, the Mirror 





As for the match itself, there was general agreement that England had 
stretched the world champions with ‘a performance of strong character and no 
little skill’ in which Keegan had been outstanding.
452
 Having taken the lead just 
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before half-time England were defeated by two late goals, the second a free kick 
by Bonhof taken while Wilkins was contesting the referee’s decision. As Alan 
Thompson noted in the Express, England had lost because of ‘[one] sad, mad 
moment of indiscipline that you can see every Saturday in our League soccer.’ 
Thus, what should have been a night for England’s players to remember ‘turned 
out to be yet another “lesson” in what international football is all about.’
453
 Or yet 
another reminder that England were no longer the masters. There was general 
agreement, however, and much satisfaction in England running Germany so close 
and in the evident signs that they were improving under new management. The 
players, according to McGhee in the Mirror, could console themselves because 
‘[they] know they stand well on the road to recovery.’
454
 The Express was 
probably the least restrained in its praise of England’s performance with David 
Miller claiming in his match report that ‘Ron Greenwood’s squad put the clock 
back ten years to a time when England led Europe with pride and prestige.’
455
 
England, of course, had not led Europe ten years earlier, having finished third in 
the European Championship in 1968, but that inconvenient detail was overlooked. 
England’s attitude had been admirable; they had taken the game to their illustrious 
opponents. This led Alan Thompson to wonder, 
 
‘… just where we would have been with this sort of attitude in 
the early games of the World Cup qualifying matches and it 
                                                                                                                                     
 
453  Daily Express, 23 February 1978. 
 
454  Daily Mirror, 23 February 1978. 




made me think regretfully of all those wasted years from 
towards the end of the Ramsey regime and throughout the entire 




As Porter has argued, there was a tendency for narratives of decline relating 
to English football to reinforce more general concerns regarding British economic 
performance and its reduced standing in the world.
457
 Thompson’s critique, which 
pointed to ‘wasted years’ and unimaginative management, provides an example of 
how this might have worked. 
Conclusion 
As Downing makes clear, it was possible to look at this match in a different 
way. Greenwood was generally satisfied but was also aware that the German team 
had shown greater technical ability. Some of their close combination work ‘was 
breathtaking … and we would be foolish not to try and match it.’ As in many 
other spheres this represented an acknowledgement that the West Germans were 
superior and supplied a model which the English would do well to emulate. The 
Daily Mail bluntly reminded readers who might have been inclined to think that 
all was well of the vast gap that had opened up over the years. It was ‘a measure 
of the depths to which English football had sunk that Ron Greenwood’s travelling 
circus flew home from Munich yesterday celebrating a defeat.’
458
 In general, 
however, what is noticeable about the match reports and press commentary on the 
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two friendly matches in 1975 and 1978 is the restrained tone of the English press, 
its acceptance of German superiority and the relative absence of anti-German 
sentiment. The focus was almost entirely on English football and the hope that the 
failings which had become apparent after 1972, in particular, would be addressed. 
The negative stereotyping of Germany and Germans which Ramsden suggests 
was a staple of British television comedy was noticeable by its absence on the 
sports pages of the newspapers surveyed here; there were very few allusions to the 
history of Anglo-German warfare and few military metaphors, mostly not specific 
to Germany. As the period progressed, references to England’s triumph of 1966 
were also less frequent. Over the course of the ten years surveyed in this chapter 
England had gone from being world champions to being mere underperformers in 
relation to Germany, as the swing of the pendulum went against them after a long 
period of supremacy. Perhaps the disappointment was made more bearable by the 
new style which German teams demonstrated after 1972 which made it easier to 
express admiration of the old enemy. Perhaps the broader political climate which 
saw the British coming to terms with their new place in the world to some extent, 
as demonstrated by the large majority which voted to stay in the EEC in the 
referendum of 1975, was also a factor. Overall, however, the sports pages in this 
period tended to confirm a view of Germany as an efficient, modern, progressive 
country capable of abandoning old methods when they were not working and 
replacing them with something more effective. It seemed better equipped to 
achieve success in the modern world than Britain which increasingly saw itself as 
others were inclined to see it, as the ‘sick man of Europe’, badly led and managed 
and slow to change. The course of Anglo-German football history over this period 
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generated numerous opportunities for sports journalists to reinforce these 
impressions, especially when the superiority that England had achieved by 
winning the World Cup in 1966 was overturned and the methods by which it had 
been achieved were superseded, as Germany and other countries moved on. 
 
In conclusion, it has to be stated that within of ten years, England had fallen 
from the pinnacle of being world champions, to being beaten by Germany in 1968 
and 1972, and then failing even to qualify for the World Cup finals in 1974 and 
1976.  In the 1970s the performances of the England team were characterised 
mainly by underachievement and failure. The reasons for this are manifold and 
would fill many pages and deliver material for lengthy discussions. The team who 
won in 1966 were a special blend of gifted footballers; though the team of 1970 
was said to be better, other teams had changed, developed and progressed. 
England sought to recreate the 1966 model and realized too late that victory is but 
the first stage in the rebuilding of a team. For a short period it appeared as though 
England and Germany were on a par. This phase ended at León in 1970 when 
Ramsey’s team ‘surrendered a two goal lead’ only to go out after extra time. That 
the unthinkable might happen was made an established fact in 1972 when 
Germany not just beat but outplayed England at Wembley with a performance that 
many still consider the best ever by a German national team. After these two 
games in 1972 the fortunes of both teams changed dramatically. England, under 
Don Revie hoped to rebuild, only to be disappointing and disappointed once more 
as Revie was not able to replicate the success he enjoyed as manager of Leeds 
United; he left under a cloud in 1977, selling the story of his resignation to the 
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Daily Mail. Finally, Ron Greenwood took over and the spirit of the new flew 
through England. The contrast with Germany could not be stronger. The team had 
their most successful period under Helmut Schön winning the European 
Championship in 1972 and the World Cup in 1974. However, after the retirement 
of a number of key players in the mid to late 1970s staleness seemed to have set 
in. Germany were set to become the boring team of the 1980s, grinding out results 
with grim efficiency. Nevertheless, they continued to outperform England. These 
changes in the relative position of England and Germany as football powers 
helped to shape the way that matches were covered on the sports pages.
205 
 
Chapter Four: ‘Let’s Blitz Fritz’: England 
versus Germany in the 1980s and 1990s 
Referring to the 1990s, John Ramsden noted that ‘German newspapers now 
routinely commented in advance on their British counterparts’ entirely predictable 
coverage of football matches.’
459
 These comments normally expressed dismay at 
the tone of the newspaper coverage before, during and after matches between 
England and West Germany/Germany and this undoubtedly underwent significant 
change in these years. As we have seen, in the post-war period through to 1966 a 
generally restrained and conciliatory tone prevailed which acknowledged the 
negative aspects of the Anglo-German relationship in the twentieth century 
mainly by not referring to them directly. In 1966, when the West German team 
made an extended visit to England for the campaign which took them to the final 
of the World Cup, English sports writers, especially in the middle-market and 
down-market newspapers, were more inclined to resort to militaristic metaphors 
and negative stereotyping, though this changed once the final was over and the 
German threat had been overcome, when Schön and his team suddenly became 
worthy and sportsmanlike opponents, a status which reflected well on England 
who had defeated them. In the 1970s, as the balance of success in the Anglo-
German football relationship began to swing decisively in Germany’s favour, 
German teams were admired for the efficiency with which they achieved results in 
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tournaments for which England often failed to qualify and sometimes, as in 1972, 
for the style in which they played. 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the way in which Anglo-German football 
rivalry was represented in the media underwent a major transformation. 
Negativity towards Germany and the Germans, always an undercurrent in public 
discourse but one that surfaced only occasionally, became more noticeable and 
more vehement, even if it sometimes presented itself in the form of a form of 
humour which Germans could not comprehend. In order to understand this shift it 
is important to locate it within the broader context of changes that were occurring 
in British political and media culture at the time. Politically, the 1979 general 
election saw the beginning of the end for the consensus politics that had 
predominated in post-1945 Britain where, despite approaching the political centre 
from different directions, Conservative and Labour governments framed their 
policies around a broad level of agreement in relation to maintaining a mixed 
economy, promoting full employment, and commitment to broadly progressive 
health and welfare policies. Under Margaret Thatcher between 1979 and 1990, 
Conservative governments took off in a different direction as they sought to 
shrink the public sector and liberate market forces in an effort to reverse British 
decline and make its economy more internationally competitive. As Paul Addison 
has observed, ‘By the time she was forced to resign from office in November 
1990 she had carried through changes so far reaching as to amount, by British 
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standards, to a revolution.’
460
 This was combined with an assertive stance in 
foreign policy which took Britain into its first major overseas conflict since Suez 
in 1956 and caused friction with other EU states, including the Federal Republic 
of Germany. It is important to note that throughout this period ‘Euroscepticism’ 
was always stronger in England than in the other countries comprising the United 
Kingdom. As Richard Weight has noted, ‘like most postwar British nationalism, it 
was predominantly defined and expressed by the English.’
461
 It could also provide 
opportunities for those who remained hostile and suspicious towards the old 
enemy of two world wars (and one World Cup) to express their views, especially 
when the reunification of Germany became a realistic prospect in 1989. Mrs 
Thatcher, a few months before her resignation, was forced to distance herself from 
her Secretary for Trade and Industry, Nicholas Ridley, who in a press interview 
had described the European Union as ‘a German racket designed to take over the 
whole of Europe.’  Referring to British sovereignty, he added: ‘You might as well 
give it to Adolf Hitler, frankly …’.
462
 Ridley’s remarks forced Thatcher to sack 
him but it was clear that he represented a significant body of right-wing opinion – 
both inside and outside parliament – and it was widely believed that ‘he had 
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The centre of British politics moved to the right in this period. Two key 
events of the 1980s precipitated this shift, The Falklands War of 1982 and the 
Miners’ Strike of 1984-85. Sending a ‘Task Force’ of British troops to liberate the 
Falkland Islands, 8,000 miles away in the South Atlantic, after the tiny British 
colony had been invaded by Argentina, whose military government disputed 
Britain’s claim to the Malvinas, provided a patriotic focus that saved the Thatcher 
revolution when the Conservatives appeared to be heading for certain defeat at the 
next general election. The military victory achieved by British armed forces – in 
retrospect sending them seems to have been a huge gamble that could very easily 
have been lost – provided an opportunity for an unrestrained outbreak of patriotic 
fervour as the nation was encouraged by the media to get behind ‘Our Boys’. 
Right-wing politician Enoch Powell detected national solidarity and seriousness 
of purpose which reminded him of the Second World War. ‘The tabloid press 
went overnight from bingo to jingo’, as Addison observes.
464
 Throughout the 
conflict the British government enjoyed uncritical backing from the Sun, owned 
by Rupert Murdoch’s News International, who signalled the direction in which 
tabloid journalism was moving with its front page banner headline exclaiming 
‘GOTCHA!’ to celebrate the sinking by a British submarine of an Argentinian 
warship with the loss of many lives.
465
 Military success meant that Britain could 
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{Paragraph break inserted here} 
Marwick has argued that it is important not to overstate the importance of 
‘The Falklands factor’ at the 1983 general election as the Conservatives swept to a 
decisive victory over a divided Labour Party.
467
 This prepared the political ground 
for taking on and defeating the National Union of Mineworkers, historically 
Britain’s most powerful trade union, when they struck over the government’s 
plans to close ‘uneconomic’ state-owned coal mines. Tony Judt has argued that 
once this victory had been achieved the Thatcher government was free to set about 
its ideologically-driven task of ensuring that ‘the public space became a market 
place.’
468
 Seumas Milne has recently argued that the real outcome of the Miners’ 
Strike has become visible 30 years later. The striking miners had envisioned a 
Britain ‘rooted in solidarity and collective action’ but their defeat paved the way 
for the deregulation of the labour market including ‘zero-hour contracts, falling 




The shift to the right in politics and the defeats suffered by Labour and the 
trade unions were reflected in changes occurring in the British national press in 
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this period. In the years after newspaper sales had peaked in the mid-1950s two 
long-term trends became evident. The first was that, in a segmented newspaper 
market, there was a gradual drift of readers to upmarket titles like The Times, the 
Daily Telegraph and the Guardian. The second was that there were ferocious 
battles going on to dominate the middle-market, where the Daily Express was in 
competition with the Daily Mail, and the mass market, where the Daily Mirror 
found itself in competition with Rupert Murdoch’s revamped Sun after 1969. The 
Mail had adopted tabloid format in 1971; the Express in 1977. While the Express 
(daily circulation of around 2.2 million) led the Mail (1.9m) in 1980, the Mail 
(1.8m) was ahead of the Express (1.6m) by the end of the decade. In 1980, the 
Mirror (3.6m) had just been overhauled by the Sun (3.7m); by the end of the 
decade the Mirror (3.1m) was clearly in second place in its sector falling behind 
the Sun (4.2m). It was also facing competition from another downmarket tabloid, 
the Daily Star with sales of just under a million. The battles between these titles 
were especially intense because the total daily sales of both middle-market and 
mass-market newspapers was in long-term decline.
470
 Of these changes, the rise of 
the Sun was probably the most significant; by overtaking the Mirror it suggested 
that working-class readers and voters were moving to the right. Since it had been 
acquired by Rupert Murdoch in 1969 it ‘had risen from the bottom of the tabloid 
heap to the top, adding more than 3 million in sales. In so doing, it also 
irretrievably changed popular newspaper culture.’
471
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The Mirror, with its tradition of irreverent but informative popular 
journalism, was at first shocked by the Sun and the brash new populist tabloid 
style that it cultivated. After a leading article in the Sun accused the Mirror of 
having ‘no faith in its country and no respect for her people’, the Mirror accused 
it of falling ‘from the gutter into the sewer.’
472
 That said it was popular with 
working-class readers and probably reflected their values rather more than the 
Mirror by the mid-1980s. In the longer term, however, the Mirror tried to protect 
and rebuild its market share by becoming more like the Sun in pushing the 
boundaries of taste and decency. It seemed at times as if the editors of the two 
papers were engaged in a journalistic duel to the death with sensationalism as 
their chosen weapon. In 1986, after Bild had attacked the behaviour of British 
holiday-makers in Majorca, the Sun retaliated: 
 
‘It’s war folks! Your patriotic Sun was last night assembling a 
Wapping task force to invade Germany – and give those lout 
Krauts a lesson to remember.  
We sprang into action after a blitzkrieg-attack on you by the 
vicious, heartless barons of Germany’s gutter press. 
Their biggest-selling newspaper, Bild, branded fun-loving 
British tourists in Majorca drunken louts.  
 …So the Sun – which first highlighted the sinister, selfish antics 
of Germans on holiday in Tenerife – is mobilising a platoon of 
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It was in this media climate that the Mirror launched its notorious ‘war’ on 
Germany during the build-up to the EURO 96 semi-final between England and 
Germany at Wembley in 1996. Arguably, by then it had sunk to the low standard 
set by its principal rival. It should be noted that the only other tabloid with 
substantial sales, the Daily Star, launched in 1978, ‘rapidly acquired a reputation 
for making the Sun look classy.’
474
 
World Cup, 29 June 1982, Estadio Santiago Bernabeu, Madrid 
The final stages of the World Cup in Spain in 1982 were held against the 
background of the Anglo-Argentine War over the Falklands/Malvinas which 
ended as England were preparing for the first group stage of the 24-team 
competition, just two days before their first match against France. Fortunately for 
FIFA, England and Argentina had been allocated to different groups and were 
destined not to meet in Spain. It had been suggested a few weeks previously that 
the British teams – Scotland and Northern Ireland had qualified as well as 
England – should withdraw but this drastic measure was avoided and the teams 
started the tournament only a day or so after the Daily Express ‘Falklands Victory 
Special Edition’ had appeared with a banner headline on its front page announcing 
‘VF’ (Victory in the Falklands) Day. These patriotic sentiments framed front page 
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pictures of Her Majesty the Queen and Margaret Thatcher.
475
 Having been on a 
war footing for some time it was hardly surprising that the sports pages made 
connections between the England football team and the conflict which had just 
ended in the South Atlantic. Steve Curry, reporting for the Express from 
England’s training camp, was quickly off the mark in this respect. 
 
‘England will spread the euphoria of victory to the sports arena 
where they launch their World Cup assault against France in 
Bilbao this afternoon. 
The mood of celebration at home has been captured by the 
England team, even though they step into action with two 
reserves in key positions. 
Ron Greenwood, commenting on the surrender of Argentina in 
the Falklands, said: “Our players along with the rest of the 




It did not occur to either Greenwood or the Daily Express that others – especially 
in the Spanish-speaking world - might not see these events in the same way, 
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Though the conditions were abnormal, much of the press coverage before, 
during and after the tournament would have seemed familiar to English readers, 
not least an article in The Times on the day of England’s opening match by the 
veteran football writer Geoffrey Green focused on 1966 and its legacy as far as 
English football was concerned. The victory, he observed: 
 
‘… left English football in a state of euphoria for the following 
four years until the crown was taken from them in Mexico. By 
then, however, the world in general had come to consider our 
earlier triumphs as highly suspect, contrived, and a ‘fix’. Bobby 
Moore and his men had been required to play every match only 
at Wembley. There was something in what the world thought.’ 
 
Ramsey’s 4-3-3 formation with the emphasis on defence had been taken up by 
English clubs with unfortunate consequences. In the ten years after 1966, ‘the 
game sank into a desert of negative midfield stalemate,’ Green argued, and ‘a 
whole generation of footballers with individualism and flair’ had been lost.
478
 
Readings of 1966 as ‘a fatal victory’ had become more fashionable over the 
course of the 1970s and early 1980s and there was a note of realism as the start of 
the tournament drew near, even in the Express. England, managed by Ron 
Greenwood, had qualified for the finals for the first time since 1970. Their 
progress to the finals had not been especially convincing and Curry recalled that 
only a year earlier, after a demoralising away defeat in Switzerland, ‘you would 
                                                 




not have given a peseta for England’s chances.’ Curry’s assessment was upbeat 
but also realistic. England were improving, yet he did not think they could win the 
World Cup. The ‘magicians from Brazil’ and ‘the disciplined but talented West 
Germans’ were likely to be too strong for them.
479
 In The Times a few days 
earlier, Nicholas Keith took much the same view, naming Brazil and West 
Germany as favourites to reach the final with Peru the best of the outsiders. 
‘England has run into a decent patch of form at the right time’, he noted, before 




Having progressed through the first group stage with three consecutive 
victories, despite the absence through injury of both Keegan and Brooking, 
England found themselves in the same group as West Germany and Spain when 
they reached the last twelve. Once it became clear that battle would be resumed 
with the Germans, the tone of the coverage, especially in the tabloids, became 
significantly sharper and more jingoistic. The Sun, still basking in post-Falklands 
War glory, set the tone with a veiled reference to the two world wars, noting that 
England had ‘beaten the Germans at most things. But not in the 1982 World Cup. 
Not yet.’ On the morning of the match it ran with the headline ‘ACHTUNG 
STATIONS’, as David Downing observed, ‘a depressing foretaste of the coming 
decade.’
481
 However, at this point, the Sun’s headline writers seemed out of line 
with the sports pages in the Daily Mirror, where a more balanced approach 
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prevailed. After winning their matches against France, Czechoslovakia and 
Kuwait it was understandable that the mood within the English squad was upbeat. 
Harry Miller, having interviewed Captain Mick Mills and Bryan Robson, sensed 
that ‘revenge is about to arrive for the defeat in 1970’ and predicted a 1-0 win for 
England.
482
 His colleague Frank McGhee was more cautious, drawing attention to 
Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, who had ‘stormed in’ with three goals against Chile 
thus achieving ‘lift-off’ for Germany’s World Cup hopes. There was also new 
‘attacking sensation’ Pierre Littbarski who moved ‘like lightning.’ McGhee 
reported that Germany were said to be nervous while England were confident, 




English newspaper readers were left in no doubt of the historic importance 
of an England-West Germany World Cup match and the forthcoming encounter 
was set within the framework of recent (i.e. since 1966) England-Germany 
matches. Steve Curry in the Daily Express predicted ‘a repeat of the 1966 final 
and quarter-final of 1970.’ Stuart Jones in The Times quoted England manager 
Ron Greenwood who had observed that this match represented the start of the 
‘real competition.’ West Germany, Jones, observed, had not lost to European 
opposition since Derwall had taken over from Schön in 1978 and England’s 
defence would find itself under sustained pressure for the first time in the 
tournament. Like Miller in the Mirror, Jones emphasized the threat posed by 
Rummenigge and also mentioned Briegel and Kaltz, ‘who look and even sound 
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like tanks.’ His concluding remarks again framed the match within the context of 
recent Anglo-German football history. Everything had gone England’s way ‘on 
that ‘famous afternoon in 1966’ but, he reminded his readers, ‘all went wrong 
against West Germany in 1970.’
484
 In the Mirror, DFB spokesman Wilfried 
Gerhardt was quoted in order to point out that the fixture held a special 
significance for England’s opponents. For Germany, he claimed, a match against 




Of the three English newspapers which this thesis has tracked from the mid-
1950s, it was the Daily Express which appeared to be most hostile towards West 
Germany. It might be speculated that this reflected the desperate determination of 
the Express to fight off the challenge from its main middle-market rival the Daily 
Mail. In the early 1980s, ‘the Mail was barely 50,000 behind its old rival, which 
was often selling no more than 1.8 million.’
486
 The Express was represented in 
Spain by David Miller, Steve Curry and Jimmy Armfield, a former England 
captain and a member of Ramsey’s squad in 1966 who subsequently made a 
career as a football broadcaster and journalist. In the days before the match West 
Germany received a bad press after the 1-0 win over Austria in their final group 
match; a result which had the appearance of a ‘fix’, allowing both teams to 
advance to the next round at the expense of Algeria. The Express reported this 
match under the headline ‘Algeria storms – ‘It’s a fix’ and gave details of 
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incidents suggesting that Germany’s own supporters had been appalled by what 
they had seen.
487
 David Miller returned to this story two days before the England-
Germany match.  
 
‘Germany are less than confident following the abuse rained 
upon them for their part in the “arranged” 1-0 win over Austria. 
Manager Jupp Derwall’s head is being demanded at home in 
some quarters, especially by those supporters who flew by 
charter for just one match against Austria. 
“Greetings from Fraud City”, one fan began his postcard home.’ 
 
Miller’s story undoubtedly reflected negatively on West Germany though they 
had made few friends by their performance against Austria and it could be argued 
that he was merely expressing a consensus view. He was, for example, able to 
quote from a Swiss and a Brazilian newspaper to support his case. Miller was also 
careful to direct some of the blame at FIFA for failing to schedule the final group 
matches to be played simultaneously as in previous tournaments.
488
 The Express 
journalists seem to have had a reasonable working relationship with the German 
squad who were staying at the same hotel in Madrid. Jimmy Armfield recalled, 
‘Access to the players and coaching staff couldn’t have been easier and we had 
everything first hand all the way to the final.’
489
 He was able to file a well-
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informed article from Madrid on the day of the match reporting on the fitness of 
various German players and speculating on the tactical changes that Derwall 
would make to his line-up. ‘West Germany admitted they have not played well in 
the World Cup so far’, Armfield noted, but Derwall was confident that they would 
find their form against England.
490
 Armfield’s well-balanced report featured on an 
inside page whereas Steve Curry’s report headed ‘Bulldogs will put the bite on 
Germany’ appeared on the back page (the main sports page) and was far more 
aggressive in tone. Ron Greenwood’s respect for the opposition was duly 
signalled: ‘they are very good tactically and technically and their organisation has 
always been of the highest quality.’ The main theme of the article, however, was 
revenge and the tone was aggressive. Curry’s opened with the sentence, ‘Ron 
Greenwood’s English bulldogs tonight bare their teeth at the arrogant Germans as 
they seek World Cup revenge for 1970.’ He concluded by waving the flag in 
patriotic fashion and predicting that ‘these supercharged England stars are tonight 





The match is remembered as a dull and uninspiring goalless draw even by 
those who played in it. England full-back Kenny Sansom recalled in his ghosted 
autobiography: ‘Unfortunately the play didn’t match the splendour of the arena. 
The Germans were determined not to lose against us and played boring, defensive 
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football. We weren’t much better …’
492
 According to the Daily Mirror, a match 
that had promised to be a ‘fire-works party’ turned out to be ‘a damp squib in 
Madrid.’ Frank McGhee found some consolation in the fact that West Germany 
were ‘world class opposition’ and that England had ‘more than matched’ them. 
He conceded that Rummenigge looked ‘strangely lethargic and not fully fit’ but 
he had almost won the game for West Germany with a shot that hit the crossbar 
five minutes from time. Using a metaphor derived from the trenches of the First 
World War he observed that the Germans would not ‘go over the top and 
attack.’
493
 Though England and West Germany remained in the tournament at this 
stage as both had yet to play Spain, it seems that the imperative for both sides was 
to avoid defeat and this made for a dreary spectacle.  Summing up the match for 
The Times, Stuart Jones concluded: 
 
‘As fascinating to watch as chess, it was also, for the most part, 
as ponderous. No blood flowed but enough sweat was poured 
out during the sultry evening to satisfy all those who admire 
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However, such moments had not been provided. ‘The format of the tournament 





According to Brian Glanville, it had been ‘a dreary game’ and a ‘sterile 
evening.’
496
 England’s forwards had failed to adjust to West Germany’s use of a 
sweeper to which they were not accustomed. However, as far as the Daily Express 
was concerned the blame for the dismal spectacle lay entirely with Derwall and 
his team. Steve Curry’s match report was unequivocal: ‘And if the game turned 
into a nothing match, then I condemn the Germans for their over-cautious, catch-
us-if-you-can approach.’ If West Germany had won, it would have been ‘an 
inglorious victory.’ In an adjacent column headed ‘Insulting way to send us to 
sleep’, David Miller, though not uncritical of England, was scathing about 
Germany, arguing that their performance in Madrid was in line with what had 
gone before.  
 
‘This goalless draw was only marginally less cynical than the 
“agreed” victory of Germany’s with Austria and was an insult to 
the 90,000 who whistled them off at the end. 
Germany played like frightened sheep and England had not the 
inventiveness and sharpness to shear them naked as they 
deserved. 
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… Ron Greenwood, not unfairly, put the blame squarely on 
Germany, saying, “If one side doesn’t want to come at you, it’s 
difficult.”’ 
 
This analysis took some of the pressure off Greenwood and his players but the 
Express was quite clear that the blame for the disappointing spectacle lay with 
‘the frightened Germans.’
497
 It was a viewpoint subsequently endorsed by The 
Times where Stuart Jones made it clear that he believed that Derwall had picked a 




It seems significant that this negativity followed West Germany through the 
rest of the tournament all the way to the final against Italy, which they lost. David 
Miller, two days after the match, accused sweeper Uli Stielike of ‘calculated 
obstruction and tripping every time he was threatened’.
499
 When, with the 
outcome of the group undecided, it was reported that FIFA was considering 
drawing lots to decide which team should progress to the semi-finals – 
Greenwood had been under the impression that England’s superior goal difference 
in the first group stage would count – the Express implied that a malign Teutonic 
influence was at work. The issue had been raised only ‘after the issue became of 
importance to West Germany after the first match draw with England.’
500
 It was 
easy for the Express to join the almost universal chorus of disapproval after 
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goalkeeper Schumacher’s ‘grotesquely unfair forearm smash’ on Battiston as 
West Germany defeated France in the semi-finals.
501
 Moreover, for Steve Curry, 
there was no doubt regarding which of the two finalists deserved to win the 
tournament. Italy, he claimed, had ‘earned the right’ to be in the final but that 
could not be said of West Germany: 
 
‘… punished for their arrogance in their first match by losing 2-
1 to no-hopers Algeria. 
Then came the match against Austria, which left a nasty taste. 
Even the committed suggested that it was a manipulated result 
to ensure that both participants got safely through the first phase. 
From that suspicious platform they took on England with a 
defensive side and a cowardly approach, achieving a 0-0 draw 
… 
And in the semi-final their tactics against France were straight 
from the dirty tricks department. There was not an unbiased 
voice around that didn’t suggest it was an injustice to the French 




The Italy–Germany final was covered for the Express by David Miller who 
welcomed the result for two reasons – ‘the appalling unpunished foul by West 
Germany’s goalkeeper Harald Schumacher against heroic France … and Italy’s 
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obvious superiority on the night and over the last three matches.’
503
 It is important 
to remember the context. By 1982, as Uli Hesse has pointed out, the flair players 
that had made West Germany so popular in the 1970s had departed, ‘to be 
replaced by the sort of players who would garner West Germany a very bad name 
indeed during the 1982 and 1986 World Cups.’
504
 Even so, there had not been a 
more sustained assault on the German national team in the English press since the 
controversial semi-final win over the Soviet Union in 1966. The Express was not 
the only newspaper to take this line. On the day of the final the Sun ran with the 
headline ‘THESE GERMAN CHEATS MUST NOT WIN.’
505
 In The Times, 
under the same ownership as the Sun since 1981, Stuart Jones, was more even-
handed in that he thought that both Italy and West Germany had brought the game 
into disrepute; both were ‘unsporting and physical, almost to the point of being 
thugs.’ However, of the two, it is clear that he believed that Derwall’s team were 
the worst offenders. ‘But Italy and, particularly, West Germany’, he wrote, ‘are 
not worthy of either the prize or the title. For all that they deserve, the trophy 
might as well be a battered tin pot.’
506
 
Football in the Dark Ages: England v Germany in the 1980s 
In his study of German football, Uli Hesse assigns the label ‘the Dark Ages’ 
to the 1980s on account of the football hooliganism that plagued the game at this 
time and also because of the joyless, pragmatic style adopted by the West German 
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team. He added, ‘The main problem with this sort of football was that it proved 
successful. West Germany reached two World Cup finals in a row’ (1982 and 
1986).
507
 For England the 1980s were even darker in that football had to deal with 
a problem of hooliganism so serious that, after the Heysel Stadium disaster of 
1985, English club sides were banned from the European competitions, at first 
indefinitely but later reduced to five years. At the same time, the national team, 
though qualifying for the World Cup finals in 1982 and 1986 did not advance 
beyond the quarter-finals and continued to be outperformed by the Germans. Paul 
Addison argues that the successful intervention in the Falklands plus an economic 
revival that began at about the same time  ‘drew a line under ‘the thesis that the 
British were forever sliding downhill and would never achieve anything of 
significance again.’
508
 However, there were frequent reminders that the Germans 
were more successful – and not just at football. Auf Wiedersehen, Pet, a highly 
popular television series which started in 1983, traced the story of seven 
construction workers, mainly from North-East of England, who had been forced 
to go to the Federal Republic to find work that was not available at home. As one 
of the exiles explains bitterly to an uncomprehending German, unemployment 
was one of England’s great success stories: ‘We’ve managed to put more people 
out of work than any of our European counterparts.’
509
 As Downing observes, the 
Second World War was now forty years in the past, ‘though its representation in 
the media often gave new life to those negative images of Germany most 
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 Representations of post-war German success were also 
frequent feeding into a new stereotype of the Germans that could be admired or 
despised depending on the occasion. 
 
Press coverage of the three friendly matches played by England and West 
Germany in the 1980s – the first in October 1982 at Wembley, the second in May 
1985 at Mexico City, and the third in September 1987 at Dusseldorf – was less 
intensive than if they had been World Cup or European Nations Championship 
matches.  For the first of these fixtures, there was an element of negativity in the 
pre-match coverage that was carried over from the World Cup finals a few months 
earlier. Harald (‘Toni’) Schumacher arrived in England as ‘current public enemy 
number one’, according to Tony Stenson in the Daily Mirror, though it was 
pointed out that West Germany’s goalkeeper was anxious to lose his reputation as 
‘an assassin’ and had made peace with the unfortunate Battiston. Schumacher was 
quoted, however, as complaining that others had ‘broken players’ legs without as 
much fuss,’ which tended to suggest that he was looking for sympathy that was 
not likely to be forthcoming at Wembley or anywhere else. There was evidence of 
a minor German charm offensive. Derwall admitted that his team had contributed 
to the dull game in Madrid – though he blamed FIFA for creating the situation in 
which it had occurred – and promised ‘to be more open’ in order to woo fans back 
to the game. Frank McGhee noted that both England and West Germany were in 
‘approximately the same stage of rebuilding’, resorting to stereotyping only with a 
passing reference to the ‘Teutonic thoroughness’ with which Derwall had 
                                                 





 This had included asking the stadium officials to play a recording of 
the Wembley roar at full blast when his players visited before the match. This was 
hardly necessary as tickets had not been selling fast and only 68,000 attended on 




In the end West Germany won 2-1 against a young and experimental 
England side which, according to Steve Curry in the Daily Express, had shown 
‘encouraging signs of enterprise’ and thus justified new manager Bobby Robson’s 
selection policy. The headline over his match report – ‘German lesson’ – merely 
underlined what had long been apparent, that England’s footballers are no longer 
capable of teaching their German rivals very much.
513
 There were no references to 
1966 and 1970 and few references to the war, though Frank McGhee’s match 
report in the Mirror was headlined ‘Blitz of the Blond Bomber’ and claimed that 
in the first half the visitors had needed ‘barbed wire and bayonets in their 
defensive work to survive.’ Rummenigge, scorer of both West Germany’s goals 
had ‘shot England down’ with ‘bullets supplied by the amazing Pierre 
Littbarski.’
514
 However, though the Express -along with The Times – avoided 
military metaphors in its match report, an element of hostility surfaced on the day 
after the match when David Miller used his column to resume the attacks on 
Derwall’s team which had been such an important feature of the Daily Express’s 
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coverage of the 1982 World Cup finals. The Germans, he claimed, ‘continued 
where they left off in that deplorable World Cup final against Italy in which there 
were 20 bookable fouls in the first half hour’. Referring to a domestic initiative to 
reduce the number of professional fouls, Miller went on to claim that German 
cynicism might even have cost England a victory. ‘If Football League regulations 
had applied at Wembley, Wolfgang Dremmler would have been sent off long 





The second of the three England-West Germany friendly matches in the 
1980s was played in Mexico City in May 1985. For England it was the third 
match in a ‘mini-tournament’ involving Mexico and Italy, as well as West 
Germany, and the main purpose of the trip was to give players experience of the 
high-altitude, high-temperature conditions that they would meet in the 1986 
World Cup finals. England, who had been in Mexico for 12 days whereas their 
opponents had only recently arrived, had clearly had an opportunity to 
acclimatize, despite losing their previous matches against Mexico and Italy. As 
Stuart Jones observed in The Times, ‘England, who had not lost to Germany until 
1968, have not beaten them since. This afternoon clearly represents their best 
chance.’
516
 This proved to be a correct assessment as England won 3-0, ‘a marked 
and encouraging’ improvement on England’s recent form, though Jones had to 
point out that ‘the fitness of the Germans has to be taken into account.’
517
 Steve 
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Curry’s match report for the Daily Express was a little sharper in tone and implied 
that the West Germans had only themselves to blame for their biggest defeat by 
England in thirteen matches. 
 
‘The Germans believed that 48 hours at 7,000 feet above sea 
level would be preparation enough for a match against one of 
their oldest enemies. How wrong they were. 
For England’s two weeks acclimatisation here in Mexico City 




There was a hint at German arrogance here but it was not overtly stated. A 
victory, however, was encouraging and the Daily Mirror concluded that ‘England 
do not have to be scared by anyone from Europe’ as Bobby Robson’s team had 




However, on this occasion – probably because of the remote location and a 
realization that it was a match of little consequence in terms of a result – press 
coverage was minimal and restrained.  It has to be remembered that this particular 
England end-of-season tour was overshadowed by the continuing fall-out from the 
disaster on the final Saturday of the English League season when 56 lives had 
been lost in a fire at Bradford City and the even more recent tragedy at Heysel 
Stadium. The same issue of the Express that carried the match report also carried 
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news of a proposal that all football fans should be required to have ID cards which 
could be checked before going to a match and that a ‘Downing Street summit on 
hooliganism’  would be held shortly.
520
 Bradford and Heysel had prompted much 
soul-searching within and around British football. ‘Heysel was a horrible, horrible 
shock,’ observed England manager Bobby Robson. ‘You felt ashamed.’
521
 Daily 
Mirror columnist Keith Waterhouse argued that ‘soccer thugs’ were merely 
symptoms of an age of ‘brutalism’ which was ‘gradually corroding our national 
fabric.’ He blamed, among other features of modern life, junk food (‘the brutalizer 
of appetite’), tower blocks (‘the brutalization of architecture’), violent picket lines 
(‘the brutalization of trade unionism’), the Sun newspaper (‘the brutalization of 
journalism’) and, finally, Thatcherism (‘the brutalization of life itself’). Former 
trade union leader Jimmy Reid argued that the ‘bully boys in politics are in no 
position to lecture the bully boys of football. They set the pattern.’
522
 In these 
circumstances there were other priorities, even for the tabloids, than an England 
victory over West Germany in a non-competitive fixture in distant Mexico. The 
coverage for once was minimal and restrained. 
 
The third and final meeting in this sequence of friendly matches was at 
Dusseldorf in September 1987. On this occasion it is clear that the English tabloid 
press was beginning to shed the inhibitions which had characterized reporting 
from the match in Mexico two years earlier. The Sun used the headline ‘BATTLE 
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OF THE KRAUTS’ for one of its articles before the match; for Downing this was 
an early indication that the word had been resurrected.
523
 It was a sign of the times 
that the pre-match coverage was concerned as much as what would happen off the 
field as what would happen on it. FA Chairman Bert Millichip was widely quoted 
regarding fears that English hooligans would cause major problems: 
 
‘What is at stake is our European future. We might be out of 
European football at club and international level for the 
foreseeable future if there is any hooliganism involving England 
supporters. 
We could be thrown out of the European championships next 





Given recent history, Millichip’s fears were justified and they were echoed 
elsewhere on the sports pages. Stuart Jones in The Times, for example, feared that 
English football fans ‘will live up to their own foul name.’ He observed that the 
Rhein-Stadion stadium, where the match was to be played, resembled ‘a huge 
zoo’ which for some ‘may feel appropriate’ as the ‘behaviour of the English louts 
in the past has been animalistic and there was little or no reason to expect it to 
have improved.’
525
 Aside from these anxieties, there was the prospect of playing a 
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German team which could still be regarded as one of the strongest in the world. 
As the Daily Express observed, ‘The game is a searching test for England in the 
Fatherland where we have not won since 1965.’
526
 England striker Gary Lineker, 
interviewed by the Daily Mirror, underlined the point and was quoted as saying 
that matches between the two countries have ‘always been a big game, whether it 
is a friendly or otherwise.’
527
 Franz Beckenbauer, now in charge of the German 
national side, had responded politely before the match, claiming that he had 
sought this fixture because ‘I need to know how good my side is.’ This persuaded 
Steve Curry in the Express to claim that the match would be ‘another classic 
encounter between the two nations.’
528
 As Simon Kuper has observed, 
‘Professional footballers are always polite about their opponents, because they 
know that they will run into them again somewhere.’
529
 For the Germans, 
however, it seems certain that by 1987 a match with the Dutch was considered of 
more importance than a match with the English, whatever Beckenbauer might 
have said to the English press. 
 
After Germany had won 3-1 the quality newspapers, though critical of some 
aspects of England’s performance, were also generous in praise of Beckenbauer’s 
newly-assembled side. They emphasised the gap in quality between the two sides. 
‘England were well behind the West Germans in terms of sure first touch on the 
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ball, combined with imaginative running and breathtaking changes of pace,’ 
according to the Guardian.
530
 For Stuart Jones in The Times, Germany’s newly 
assembled side were ‘more efficient, technically more gifted and particularly more 
organized in defence’ than Robson’s comparatively settled formation.
531
 In an 
article written after the match Jones was inclined to praise Germany rather than to 
criticize England as the side ‘reassembled by Franz Beckenbauer has already 
developed into one of the best in the world and must be considered overwhelming 
favourites to be the next European champions.’ Bobby Robson had argued that 
‘only Argentina and Brazil could compete with them (West Germany)’, to which 
Jones added that even they might ‘struggle to break down their defence or contain 
their attack.’
532
 The tabloids did not disagree with the verdict of the broadsheets. 
England’s performance was not without merit though, as Nigel Clarke observed in 
the Daily Mirror, they had come close to ‘being outplayed.’ Perhaps the best news 
from England’s point of view was that the fans had behaved well. ‘[T]hey can be 
trusted again’, Harry Harris noted with some relief in the Mirror, though this was 
probably an over-optimistic judgement.
533
 The Express, on an inside news page, 
noted that thirty English fans, including twenty BAOR soldiers, had been arrested, 
‘mainly for drunken brawling.’ An English fan had been stabbed. As a spokesman 
for the British consulate in Dusseldorf had observed, ‘By football standards, it 
was not bad at all.’
534
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‘Significantly, the headline over the Mirror’s match report was ‘Blitzed! 
Robson’s men really kaput,’ signalling the result in terms that could have been 
understood by anyone familiar with the comic-strip papers read by English 
schoolboys.
535
 Close reading of the Daily Express, in particular, suggests that it 
was more willing to resort to a form of discourse which was characterized by 
frequent references to the war and German aggression. The main headline for 
Steve Curry’s match report was ‘Shilton is caught in crossfire’ – England’s 
veteran goalkeeper had not been at his best – but the sub-heading was ‘Germans 
shoot down England.’ There was praise for West Germany’s performance; they 
were ‘the new pride of the Fatherland’ and superior to all other European national 
sides. ‘What this prestige match illustrated,’ Curry observed, ‘is the enormity of 
the task facing the seven nations who will be trying to prevent Germany winning 
next summer’s European championship.’ However, when describing the sheer 
power with which West Germany had played, there were references to ‘Franz 
Beckenbauer’s new panzer unit’ and the England back four being ‘under the blitz 
from strikers Rudi Voeller and Klaus Allofs.’ England’s best moment – a goal 
from Gary Linker – had temporarily ‘killed Germany’s arrogance.’
536
 After a 
pause, it seemed that Fleet Street’s tin soldiers were re-emerging, perhaps sensing 
that opportunities to attack the old enemy would be forthcoming at EURO 88, to 
be held in West Germany, for which England looked likely to qualify. 
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Analysis of the English press representation surrounding Anglo-German 
encounters in the 1980s suggests initially that traditional antagonism towards 
Germany was fading. It was very evident in 1982 during and after the World Cup 
finals, especially in the right-wing Daily Express, but was framed with reference 
to contemporary football history – the ‘fixed’ result against Austria and 
Schumacher’s assault on Battiston, for example – rather than the First and Second 
World Wars, though occasional references did occur. Similarly, there were 
relatively few references to West Germany seeking revenge for 1966 or England 
for 1970. It helped, perhaps, that England had performed better in the 1986 finals 
than had been expected and that the Falklands War had provided another 
convenient target for the English press. The fact that there was no competitive 
match involving England and West Germany between 1982 and 1990 was also a 
factor as the international friendly had now been devalued. Indeed, especially in 
the mid-1980s, there was little evidence of anti-German discourse in match 
reports and sports-page comment. Compared to what came later the tone of 
reporting was restrained, even in 1982 when, as Downing observed, ‘at least they 
were still called Germans.’
537
 What the sports pages did provide, however, were 
reminders of German superiority in football which, for much of the 1980s, 
reflected perceived German superiority in other areas and which underpinned the 
long-standing stereotype of German arrogance to which many English people, 
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World Cup Semi-Final, Turin, Italy, 4 July 1990 
England’s next competitive encounter with Germany, in the semi-finals of 
the World Cup in 1990, occurred at point when Anglo-German relations were 
entering a particularly difficult phase. The confidence that had fed into a surge of 
British/English nationalism in the early and mid-1980s, after military victory in 
the Falklands and a period of economic recovery, was fading. The stock market 
crash of October 1987 burst the economic bubble and two years later interest rates 
had risen to 15 per cent. As Alwyn Turner observes, ‘There had been an economic 
boom that was supposed to have heralded a rebirth of the nation and yet, as the 
signs appeared of an incipient new recession, it seemed that much had been left 
undone in the good years’.
539
 As the government struggled on into 1990 it might 
have seemed that it would benefit from the feel good factor generated by an 
England team performing unexpectedly well and reaching the last four but Mrs 
Thatcher was  unable to benefit from this ‘for she had already made clear that she 




In terms of Anglo-German relations the end of communism and the 
dismantling of the border between West and East Germany created a new context 
which, as we have seen, many in Britain, especially those who were Eurosceptics, 
found disturbing. A leading article in The Times, still regarded in other countries 
as the voice of the British government, which warned that ‘the Fourth Reich, if it 
comes, will have a natural tendency to resemble its predecessor’, had caused 
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outrage in the German press.
541
 Though it was difficult not to respond positively 
to the euphoria that greeted the destruction of the Berlin Wall, there were early 
signs that it was creating a situation which would be a source of anxiety. As the 
Daily Express – in a leading article headed ‘A great day for freedom’ – noted at 
the time, ‘The reunification of Germany is now on the cards, whether non-
Germans want it or not.’ It argued that ‘joy must be tempered with realism and 
caution.’
542
 This was very much Mrs Thatcher’s position and that of many of 
those who were close to her as she struggled to obstruct or delay German 
reunification using the argument that it was ‘simply too big an issue to be decided 
by Germans for themselves.’
543
 It did not help that British opposition to important 
European initiatives, like the Social Charter guaranteeing basic rights for workers, 
left her government without allies in Brussels, Strasbourg and elsewhere. ‘Battle 
lines were drawn up last night for another clash between Mrs Thatcher and the 
other 11 Common Market members this time over the social charter’, the Express 
had reported a few days earlier.
544
 It was by now a familiar story and it 
highlighted another area where Anglo-German political interests differed. 
 
England’s performances in the two years before the tournament did not 
suggest that they were likely to be among the more successful teams playing in 
Italia 90. As Jonathan Wilson has observed, the disaster of Euro 88 ‘left an 
undertone of embarrassment that, intensified by the optimism with which they had 
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gone into the tournament, had never quite gone away.’ The two-year build-up to 
the World Cup finals ‘had been characterised by gloom.’
545
 Little was expected 
and it was a great surprise when Robson’s team reached the semi-final. One result 
of this was that the prospect of England meeting West Germany did not 
materialize until the tournament was well under way and this may have moderated 
press coverage of their opponents, who were among the favourites to win. In 
general, Beckenbauer and his team were highly regarded and much admired as 
they made their way to the last four while England were, at times, heavily 
criticized, especially after their opening match against Ireland, a 1-1 draw which 
appeared to showcase all that was worse in English football. ‘We are a bankrupt 
soccer nation without inspiration, method and scarcely an inkling of how the 
game is now being played across the wider world’, observed James Lawton in the 
Express.
546
 He continued his attack a day later, claiming that English soccer 
‘which used to demand universal affection, then grudging respect for its strength, 
is now openly despised.’
547
 Previewing the final, The Times headline – ‘England 
totter into the last four’ – was hardly an expression of confidence in Robson and 
his team. Stuart Jones, reporting England’s quarter–final victory over Cameroon, 
complained that they had been ‘unimaginative and pedestrian’ and predicted that 
they would be no match for Germany in Turin. In the same issue Clive White 
reported West Germany’s 1-0 quarter-final victory over Czechoslovakia, 
describing it as ‘awesome’ and one which would reverberate ‘all the way to 
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Rome.’ David Miller claimed that Italy and Germany had brought ‘real style’ to 
the World Cup, a quality which most observers thought England lacked. Germany 





Coverage in the Daily Express, not noted for its admiration of Germany and 
its people, was notably favourable towards England’s semi-final opponents. There 
were occasional references that seemed to indicate that the tin soldiers were at 
work once more. For example, even before the tournament began, the headline 
after a warm-up game against Egypt – ‘Bobby’s Desert Rats lead march on Italy’ 
– was an uncomfortable reminder of the Second World War.
549
 However, as 
Beckenbauer’s team progressed through the tournament, they were not only 
praised in match reports but in features on the sports pages. John Giles (‘The man 
the players read’) wrote in praise of Lothar Matthaeus, ‘an outstanding footballer’. 
Giles could not see anyone else ‘lifting the trophy on July 5, because the Germans 
have also built a fabulous side around their skipper.’
550
 James Lawton wrote in 
praise of Franz Beckenbauer (‘Kaiser Franz’), who had announced that he would 
be leaving his position as coach to the national team after the tournament.  
 
‘If they had a scrap of imagination the FA (Football 
Association) would try to lure him to England rather than haggle 
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with Aston Villa’s Doug Ellis over the services of Graham 
Taylor. Taylor … is not in the same league as the man who 




For the FA to have appointed a German to coach England’s national side in 1990 
would have been revolutionary and that Lawton should make the suggestion was 
an indication of the extent to which England and its unimaginative governing 
body had fallen behind the rest of the world. In the context of football, it was an 
oblique reference to relative national decline. 
 
Moreover, Lawton, when reporting West Germany’s victory over Holland, 
praised their performance extravagantly and clearly believed that they were likely 
to win against England in the semi-final at Turin. 
 
‘The Dutch came to make war, a petty, hacking, vicious little 
war but the Germans came to play football. 
They did – beautifully, swiftly, powerfully as they shrugged off 
the 20
th
 minute dismissal of their brilliant striker Rudi Voeller. 
… There can rarely have been worthier favourites for the 
game’s supreme title and England – scheduled to meet them in 
the semi-final – can only tremble at the prospect of colliding 
with quality players like Matthaus, Klinsmann and Brehme.’ 
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Having made his admiration for West Germany clear, Lawton could be forgiven 
the clichéd military metaphor used in his final paragraph when he noted that they 
would ‘march on stronger for this performance.’
552
 In contrast, he argued a few 
days later, England had reached the semi-final through a combination of good 
fortune and dogged determination, or ‘True Brit Grit’ as Manager Bobby Robson 
had called it after the extra-time win over Cameroon.
553
 Lawton was certainly not 
alone in his assessment of England. David Miller in The Times argued that 
England had been ‘lucky’ in their quarter-final when it had been necessary to do 
‘the Dunkirk bit’ and observed that  Robson’s claim that ‘we’re in the top four of 
the world’ could not be taken seriously.
554
 England’s supporters were reported to 
be realistic, which meant that they recognized that Germany were superior but 
also that there was just a chance that England might win. It was ‘good to be in the 
semi-finals’ [but] if it wasn’t for Gascoigne, we’d have been out in the first or 
second round.’ Miracles were possible, as in the 1988 FA Cup Final when 
Wimbledon had beaten Liverpool: ‘If Wimbledon win the FA Cup and the ball is 
round, England can win the World Cup.’
555
 However, no-one really expected this 
to happen. 
 
Reading the English sports pages before the semi-final it seems as if many 
journalists were finding it difficult to find any reasons to dislike the German team. 
                                                 
552  Daily Express, 25 June 1990. For this explosive match see Kuper, Football against the 
enemy, 12-13. 
 
553  Daily Express, 2 July 1990. 
 
554  The Times, 2 July 1990. 
 




Simon Barnes in The Times made no secret of wanting Italy and Germany to 
progress to the final and wanting Italy to win. ‘For an Englishman it is hard to 
love the German football team’, he observed, hastily adding that this attitude was 
not a product of sports history or even ‘real history’, but it was simply that 
‘German football teams do not stir English blood.’ Unlike Brazil, for example, 
they offered no ‘relief from the humdrum;’ ‘they are like us, only better,’ Barnes 
concluded. Thus they were a team that ‘inspires respect rather than affection.’
556
 
World Cup football had moved from the back to the front pages of newspapers as 
England had progressed to the semi-final and it was reported that a television 
audience of 30 million would watch the match at home. In these circumstances it 
was not surprising that the Daily Express should publish a war cry on the morning 
of the match, though it chose Nelson’s ‘England Expects!’ from the now ancient 
war against France for its front-page banner headline rather than one of the 
familiar Churchill quotes from the Second World War.’
557
 Growing excitement, 
however, as England crept through each round on the way to Turin did provide 
newspapers at the bottom end of the market with an excuse to indulge in ‘sales-
boosting rants’ as the match hit the front pages.  This was especially evident in the 
Sun, weakened by ten years of self-vulgarisation’, and the Star, which had never 
set its sights very high in that respect.
558
 In the Sun there were numerous pathetic 
puns based on the words ‘Hun’ and ‘Kraut’ and a whole page outlining changes in 
Germany since 1966. As Downing notes, ‘These generally boiled down to the 
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Germans getting richer, though space was saved for the illuminating information 
that the average German bust-size was thirty-eight inches.’ Its rallying cry was 
less sensitive than that used by the Express: ‘We beat them in ’45, we beat them 
in ’66, now the battle of ‘90’. This was picked up by the Star which ran a number 




As on the occasion of previous significant Anglo-German football 
encounters there was a tendency to frame the match in the context of recent 
football history. As ever for the English, 1966 and 1970 loomed large. Even 
before the tournament began the Express had asked three heroes of the 1966 team 
– Bobby Moore, Geoff Hurst and Bobby Charlton – to assess current members of 
Robson’s squad, Bryan Robson, Gary Lineker and Paul Gascoigne respectively.’ 
‘The years’, it was noted, ‘have hardly touched Bobby Moore, ‘as if sunlight still 
falls on him from that Wembley afternoon when he captained England to the 
World Cup itself.’
560
 Two days before the match Gary Lineker provided a human 
interest angle recalling that he had shed tears as a nine-year-old boy watching on 
television as England lost to West Germany in León. ‘Twenty years is a long time, 
but I still have that World Cup quarter-final in Mexico vividly in my mind,’ the 
England striker explained. Naturally, the Express concluded that England ‘look 
for their revenge tomorrow night with a record of only two wins against the 
Germans in 10 games since the 1966 World Cup triumph.’
561
 By this stage the 
historical record had turned decisively in Germany’s favour and it was this that 
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weighed most heavily with Stuart Jones in The Times. Beckenbauer was quoted as 
saying that Germany v England was ‘a classic’ but, for Jones, the German record 
– six semi-final appearances in the last seven tournaments – simply underlined the 
gap between the two teams. Once England had been ‘the masters’ and Germany 
had been ‘the students’. However, roles had now been reversed and now it was 
‘the masters (Germany) against the novices (England), the efficient against the 
spirited, the practised against the spontaneous.’
562
 However, it was possible that 
the unlikely could happen. BBC television’s coverage of the match began by 
juxtaposing a clip of Ramsey predicting victory in 1966 with a clip of Robson 




Jones predicted that the match would be close, not least because of 
England’s team spirit and new self-belief. In the Express, Bobby Robson 
explained ‘that his team’s greatest incentive was to stuff it up your (the media’s) 
nostrils.’ As James Lawton noted, ‘There have been more uplifting battle cries’; it 
simply emphasized the overwhelming conviction in the English press that whereas 
West Germany had a right to be in the semi-final, England had ridden their 
luck.
564
 As it transpired it was close and England defied their critics. Hesse has 
summarized succinctly: 
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‘It was 1-1 after extra time between West Germany and England 
in the 1990 World Cup semi-final, and penalties now had to 
determine who was to meet Argentina in the final. The match 
was the closest and most evenly fought that West Germany 
would play in the tournament, the two sides matching each other 
strike for strike, tackle for tackle. They even both hit the post 
once, but thanks to misses from Chris Waddle and Stuart Pearce 




On the night 80,000 spectators in the Stade delle Alpi in Turin and 26.3 
million viewers, at least half the population of England, watched Robson’s team 
lose from the penalty spot. Predictably some of those watching at home responded 
badly to the defeat and there were disturbances in many towns and cities; three 
people died and about 600 were injured. In Eltham, South-East London, German-
made cars were attacked; in Woking a Scotsman wearing Germany’s colours had 
his ribs broken; in Brighton a mob chased German students through the streets.
566
 
There was some post-match violence in Turin, yet, though this spasm of violence 
was regretfully noted, the reports were generous in praising England’s 
performance against the tournament favourites. The Times headlined its match 
report ‘England pay a cruel penalty’ and emphasized how close they had come to 
beating West Germany who had never looked like ‘the masters’ and were never in 
complete control of events until after Pearce had missed his penalty in the shoot-
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 In the Daily Express, Steve Curry’s report concluded positively, with just a 
faint echo of 1966: ‘It was all over. The feeling of deflation was awful. But at 
least we have a team that can hold its head up high today and we should applaud 
them.’
568
 This positive view tended to prevail. After a horrible decade that had 
seen football reported negatively on the front pages on account of the rise of 
hooliganism, Robson’s team managed to unite the nation behind them, ‘returning 
the game to the fans rather than the hooligans.’ It could be argued that this was the 





As Wilson notes, ‘there was a great dislocation in perception between 
journalists in Italy who had endured a month of negative, grinding football and 
regular violence, and those swept along by the mass hysteria at home.’
570
 This 
may explain why football journalists were happy to praise England’s 
performance, ‘but not to the skies.’
571
 Curry’s colleague at the Express, James 
Lawton, was realistic in his assessment, ‘We were not good enough to win even 
this World Cup lacking evidence of true greatness.’ On the night England had 
played well but ‘West Germany were the better team’ with ‘more shape, deeper 
talent, greater reserves of concentration.’ What England had offered in their 
gallant defeat was some hope for the future based on a performance that had 
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demonstrated ‘old English values … Values of heart and cussed belief that 
something stirs in the nation, something that forbids any easy bending of the 
knee.’
572
 When Luton Airport had become a ‘venue for national euphoria’ as vast 
crowds gathered to greet the returning heroes, it is clear that the emphasis on 
‘heart’ struck a powerful emotional chord with the English football public ‘but 
let’s try, for once, to keep matters in proper perspective’, urged ex-Leeds United 
and Ireland midfielder John Giles in his column for the Express.
573
 Elsewhere, 
veteran sports journalist Hugh McIllvaney reminded readers that England had 
prospered in a tournament which had been characterized by a disappointing 
standard of football. ‘If the 1970 World Cup finals were the finest of the seven 





If the pantomime antics of the Sun and the Star are discounted, the West 
German team had been treated with respect by the English press as they made 
their way to the final against Argentina. Steve Curry, in his match report of the 
semi-final maintained that ‘there is little doubt that Germany will win this World 
Cup.’
575
 It was unfortunate, perhaps, that Beckenbauer’s players then found 
themselves having to take some of the blame for what Brian Glanville described 
as ‘probably the worst, most tedious, bad-tempered Final in the history of the 
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 Curry’s match report of the final did not exempt the German team 
from criticism, raising once again the familiar accusations of ‘Oscar-winning 
behaviour’ which the Express had first mentioned during the 1966 tournament. 
Readers were left in no doubt, however, that the Argentinians (‘Negative, nasty 
and Neanderthal’) had been largely to blame: ‘West Germany, who had brought 
style and sophistication to the earlier rounds of this competition, found themselves 
enmeshed in a brawling, untidy game.’
577
 It was clear that Germany had deserved 
to win the tournament and relief that the trophy had ended up in the right hands. 
Yet, within a few days of the final, a political development occurred which 
suggested that British public opinion still contained an element that was hostile 
and suspicious towards Germany however much the West German team was 
admired. Trade and Industry Secretary Nicholas Ridley’s tirade against the 
‘Fourth Reich’ caused embarrassment to Mrs Thatcher and her government and 
led quickly to his resignation but not before the Daily Express had received 
15,498 phone calls from readers backing his ‘anti-German outburst’.’
578
 Here was 
evidence, as John Ramsden has observed, of ‘an early flowering of the 
xenophobia that would flourish during the Maastricht debates and in the UK 
Independence Party as an electoral force.’
579
 This puts football journalism and any 
positive impact it might have had into perspective. 
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‘Within two years, though, the optimism would be gone’, writes Jonathan 
Wilson, reflecting on press coverage of England’s Italia 90 campaign.
580
 The 
hopes that a platform had been provided which would allow England to become a 
major power in international football again quickly evaporated. This became very 
evident after England’s first match with the world champions, now representing a 
re-united Germany, a friendly at Wembley in September 1991, which the visitors 
won 1-0. In the pre-match coverage, much was made of an interview with 
Andreas Brehme who was very dismissive of England’s chances. 
 
‘Technically we are a much better side – and our individuals are 
better than the English. 
There will be nothing new from England. They will just play the 
long-ball game with great physical commitment … 
They have some new players, so do we, but we should win.’ 
 
Commenting on Brehme’s remarks, Jim Holden in the Daily Express observed 
that ‘German arrogance is definitely back in town, diluted only slightly by soft-
spoken coach Bertie Vogts’, who had been rather more diplomatic in his 
comments on the England team that new manager Graham Taylor had 
assembled.
581
 The Daily Mirror’s version of Brehme’s interview claimed that he 
had said that England were ‘boring and predictable’ and it seems likely that the 
less abrasive remarks attributed to Germany’s coach had been designed to achieve 
damage limitation. He stressed that England v Germany was ‘a classic’, recalled 
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that the two teams had produced ‘the best match’ in Italia 90, and made it clear 




Steve Curry’s match report for the Express also found cause to mention the 
negative characteristic for which Germans were often stereotyped in English 
newspapers. After Karl-Heinz Riedle had scored, ‘the Germans showed all their 
old arrogance and commanded much of the second half.’ Brehme may have been 
arrogant but the result suggested that he had been correct in his pre-match 
analysis. The principal consolation for Taylor was that he would have time to heal 
England’s wounds before getting down to ‘the serious business of European 
qualification next month.’ There was some consolation now in being able to 
discount international ‘friendlies’, no matter how prestigious the opposition. 
England had started the game with only three of the side that had played in Turin 
and Taylor’s response to the defeat was to point out that the German goalkeeper 
had been forced to make some excellent saves and to argue that England had lost 
owing to a minute’s lack of concentration. This prompted a vigorous response 
from James Lawton who poured scorn on England’s obsession with the long ball.  
 
‘’We can point to the brilliant reflexes of German goalkeeper 
Bodo Illgner and march on believing we really are serious 
contenders for the big prizes. 
Or we can say it will take a lot more than hope and hard running 
to remove an unpalatable fact exposed by Germany. We have to 
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re-think our football. We have to wipe away the years not the 
minute of madness.’ 
 
The headline assigned to Lawton’s article – ‘Just a minute, Taylor. We are years 
behind’ – signified the familiar story of relative decline and German superiority 
built on technical efficiency. Germany’s victory at Wembley suggested that the 
critics who had warned against reading too much into what had been achieved in 
Italy had been correct. It had been an aberration or, as Lawson put it, ‘a freakish 




This message was re-affirmed when England and Germany met again, in 
quite different conditions, indoors at the Pontiac Silverdrome in Detroit, in June 
1993.  In preparing for this encounter, the final match for both sides in a four-
team tournament designed to familiarize potential finalists with the kind of 
conditions they might meet in the World Cup finals to be held in the USA a year 
later, England – and especially manager Graham Taylor – were under more 
pressure than Germany. They had yet to qualify for the World Cup finals and 
recent performances had suggested that this was becoming increasingly unlikely. 
Having lost to both the USA and Brazil, a good performance against Bertie Vogt’s 
team was seen as critical. ‘Success against Germany would go a long way to re-
establishing lost credibility’, observed Steve Curry in the Daily Express, ‘It has 
never been more necessary.’
584
 It was as if Germany, already qualified for the 
World Cup finals as holders, now provided the standard against which England 
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teams were to be measured. If this was so, England fell short, as they had been 
doing consistently since 1966. England, for whom this was the seventh game 
without a win, the worst run of its kind since 1958 when Walter Winterbottom’s 
team had been coping with the aftermath of the Munich disaster and the loss of 
Edwards, Byrne and Tommy Taylor. They were not disgraced by losing 2-1 to the 
current world champions but ‘the technical gulf between Germans and 
Englishmen was there for all to see’, according to Rob Hughes in The Times, a 
view that was endorsed by other English reporters at the match.
585
 He went on to 
argue that the disappointing performances of England’s national football and 
cricket teams in international competition stemmed from the systematic failure of 
governments to invest in school sport. The DFB had approached the US 
tournament in a competitive spirit and a huge bonus was to be paid to the players 
if they won. Thus they were ‘out to win this tournament’, meaningless though it 
was, while Taylor was ‘again opting for experimentation.’ As Bertie Vogts 
explained, ‘We are at our best in competitive games and that is why this 
competition is so important to us.’
586
 Thus the sports pages again confirmed the 
view that Germany was better organized to succeed in a competitive modern 
world than England. This applied to football just as much as it did to industry. 
European Championship Semi-Final, 26 June 1996, Wembley 
It was fitting that England was able to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of 
winning the World Cup in 1966 by hosting a major international tournament, the 
European Nations Championship in 1996. It was also fitting, perhaps, that 
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England should play Germany at Wembley in the semi-finals, a match which went 
into extra time and then was decided by penalties. In the thirty years since 1966, 
much had changed, not least the extent of media coverage, both in the press and 
on television. Even more important, from the point of view of this thesis, was the 
change that made was most evident in the flags waved at Wembley whenever the 
England team played there. As Richard Weight has argued in his study of national 
identity in Britain in the second half of the twentieth century, the English 
patriotism generated by the national football team in 1966 – and even as late as 
1990 – was ‘contained within a British identity.’ By 1996 this was beginning to 
break down as a new sense of a separate English identity began to emerge. 
English fans in 1996 now waved the English flag (the red cross of St George) 
rather than the British flag (the Union Jack) that they had waved in 1966.  
 
‘Wembley was a sea of St George’s crosses and red-and-white 
painted faces. There is no more potent symbol of how the 
English shed their Britishness than the comparison between the 




Downing does not seek to explain it but observes that ‘the flag of St George was 
everywhere.’
588
 It helped to distinguish the English from the Scots, who had also 
reached the tournament finals, and making this distinction was increasingly 
important as the political cultures of the two largest countries in the United 
                                                 
587  Weight, R., Patriots: National identity in Britain 1940-2000 (London: Macmillan, 2002), 
709. 
 




Kingdom began to drift way from each other. The favoured anthem for the 
tournament was not ‘God save the Queen’ but the song ‘Football’s coming home’, 




These changes relating to national identity were important in providing a 
context for the press coverage relating to Euro 96 and Anglo-German football 
rivalry in particular. As we have seen, coverage of the World Cup in 1990 was 
relatively restrained in relation to Germany apart from in the Sun and the Star. In 
1996, the tone adopted towards Germany was generally much more aggressive. 
As Downing observes, ‘the infantile xenophobia which had marred the tabloids 
coverage of the 1990 World Cup was back in force.’
590
 It should be noted also that 
Euro 96 was staged at a time when Britain’s relationship with the European Union 
was especially difficult on account of the so-called ‘Beef War’ which had begun 
in March 1996 when the British government announced a possible link between 
BSE (‘Mad Cow Disease’) and CJD (Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease), a fatal brain 
condition in humans. This led to the European Union imposing a ban on exports 
of beef and beef products from Britain. John Major’s government responded to 
this move, which was seen as an over-reaction, by pursuing a policy of non-co-
operation, holding up the routine business of the European Union by blocking the 
decision-making machinery at Brussels. As an American observer noted: 
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‘It did not help from a British perspective that the arch-enemy in 
the whole drama was its old wartime foe, Germany. German 
politicians, quick to respond to the concerns of a health-
conscious public and the power of state governments to regulate 
health matters, fought the hardest to maintain the European 




Thus as the Beef War ran its course it fuelled Eurosceptic tendencies in the press. 
Even though an agreement was eventually reached a few days before the England-
Germany semi-final, relations between the two countries had been soured by the 
affair. The Daily Express made a very explicit link between these events and 
football, publishing a report by Ross Benson from Munich, the political base of 
Horst Seehofer, the German Health Minister: ‘a hardline right winger like most 
Bavarian politicians, he orchestrated a campaign against British beef which took 
no account of facts.’ In these circumstances, Benson reported, ‘there is nothing 
they (the Germans) would like more than to see England humbled.’ Unlike reports 
from the Federal Republic in earlier years which emphasized German prosperity 
and success, Benson reported that the ‘much-vaunted post-war “economic 
miracle” has slowed.’ The end of the Cold War and subsequent problems arising 
from reunification had ‘left the country sloughed in self-doubt.’ However, 
alluding to fears regarding the ambitions of the united Germany which had first 
surfaced at the end of the 1980s, Benson warned that football was less important 
than another game being played by Chancellor Kohl and his government: ‘… a 
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football match is over in an evening, Germany is also playing another, longer 
game. It is this one they are truly determined to win.’
592
 It was difficult for those 
who shared these anxieties to separate football from politics. On match day The 
Times gave Conservative Eurosceptic John Redwood space to remind readers that 
the German question had ‘bedevilled the 20th century’. The forthcoming semi-
final ‘stirred deep feelings’ and Redwood urged Britain to ‘stand up to Germany, 




In its matchday issue, the Express used a leading article in its editorial 
column to respond to eleven questions posed by Bild in response to the Daily 
Mirror which had emerged as Fleet Street’s principal tin soldier in a journalistic 
pantomime war against the Germans as the semi-final clash approached.
594
 Under 
the heading ‘The spirit of being English’, the Express answered such delicate 
questions as ‘Why do you drive on the wrong side of the road?’, ‘Why can’t you 
beat your former colonies at cricket?’ and ‘Why are you the only people who still 
think the Wembley goal went in?’ The Express acknowledged that Bild was trying 
to be funny, ‘displaying what actually appears to be a sense of humour. For 
Germans.’ It replied in the same fashion, treading clumsily through the minefield 
of Anglo-German relations. 
 
‘We drive on the wrong side to make it more difficult for our 
soldiers to invade other countries. We were never European 
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champions because we are an outward-looking nation that 
doesn’t think Europe is the centre of the universe; we were quite 
happy with the World Cup. 
We are sorry that you do not understand that proper beer is 
served warm: why don’t you wear proper trousers? We wear 
bathing trunks in the sauna, because we’re not a boastful people 
…  
At least our former colonies still want to play our national sport 
with us. Do any of your ex-colonies want to play yours with 
you? Come to think of it, what is your national sport? 
We won the 1990 semi-final in spirit. You just scored more 
penalties, that’s all … 










In 1996 it was the Daily Mirror that pursued this to a new level, prompting 
a barrage of criticism and complaints to the Press Complaints Commission. 
‘Reducing the noble art of journalism to a few rancid puns and clichés had paid 
off for the Sun, and for once the Mirror was determined not to be left behind,’ 
                                                 
595  Daily Express, 26 June 1996. 
 






   Editor Piers Morgan led from the front on 24 June, two 
days before the match, with an editorial that parodied the well-known words of 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s broadcast to the nation announcing the 
outbreak of war in 1939. 
 
‘I am writing to you from the Editor’s office at Canary Wharf, 
London. Last night the Daily Mirror’s ambassador in Berlin 
handed the German government a final note saying that unless 
we heard from them by 11 o’clock that they were prepared at 
once to withdraw their team from Wembley, a state of soccer 
war would exist between us. I have to tell you now that no such 
undertaking has been received and that consequently we are at 




Though this was in questionable taste and unlikely to improve the dismal state of 
Anglo-German relations with the Beef War controversy fresh in the minds of his 
readers, it could be defended as an example of the irreverence for which the 
Mirror had once been famous. However, Morgan’s editorial has to be seen in the 
context of the features that surrounded it, starting with the infamous front page 
carrying the headline ‘ACHTUNG! SURRENDER! FOR YOU FRITZ, ZE 1996 
EURO CHAMPIONSHIP IS OVER’ and pictures of England players Paul 
Gascoigne and Stuart Pearce wearing World War II army helmets. Pages 2 and 3 
carried a feature headed ‘The Mirror invades Berlin’ written by a reporter sent to 
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spy on the ‘filthy hun’; the Reichstag was described as burned out ‘a bit like the 
German soccer squad’. Pages 4 and 5 were ostensibly devoted to Jürgen 
Klinsmann and his injury, though the Mirror had ‘invaded’ the hotel where the 
German squad were staying and left towels and notes reading ‘Auf Wiedersehen’ 
on the sunbeds by the pool. These pages were framed by a repetitive mantra 
saying ‘Germany’s going home’ and ‘They’re going home’, parodying the 
England football anthem (‘Football’s coming home’). On page 6 a famous First 
World War recruiting poster is referenced with a small boy asking his father 
‘What did you do in 1996, Daddy?’ The broader context of current Anglo-German 
relations is then featured on page 7 with Prime Minister John Major criticized for 
failing to defend British beef; he had given in ‘without a fight’. Finally, Tony 
Parsons supplied an article praising ‘the new England’ which Euro 96 had 
awoken, which pointed out that ‘to be English is to feel nostalgic – be they on the 




Parsons concluded his article on the state of the English nation in 1996 by 
claiming that ‘Football couldn’t be coming home to a better place’, not least 
because it was a country where there was ‘no place for racism.’ However, the 
extensive use of racial stereotyping in the English tabloid press suggested that this 
assessment was too optimistic. As Hesse has pointed out, ‘Their prevalent usage 
of war imagery, to be found in tasteless headlines full of words, such as 
“Blitzkrieg”, and “Kraut” and “tanks”, at first deeply irritated the Germans.’
600
 On 
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this occasion, the Daily Mirror had taken the lead but it was not alone with 
headlines in the Sun (‘BRING ON THE KRAUTS’) and the Star (‘LET’S BLITZ 
FRITZ’) adding fuel to the flames.
601
 Piers Morgan was inundated with letters of 
protest and concerns were raised elsewhere in the press. On the day after the 
infamous ‘ACHTUNG!’ front page, letters to The Times included one from 
Sigmund Sternberg of London which conceded that the ‘joyous display of 
patriotism’ in relation to international sport was perfectly acceptable but that 
‘manifestations of xenophobia, racial hatred and the near incitement to violence’ 
which amounted to an attempt to ‘whip up anti-German fervour’ were not. 
Regretfully a major sporting event had been appropriated for ‘crude racial ends.’ 
Another letter from Mr. A.P. Millard, headmaster of Giggleswick School in North 
Yorkshire, expressed similar concerns about the use of ‘warlike terminology’, 





Morgan, who had embarked on this campaign of stunt journalism as part of 
a marketing strategy that was intended to outmanoeuvre the Sun and the Star, was 
forced to climb down. The Mirror’s management became very anxious about the 
negative publicity it was generating, especially when motor manufacturers 
Vauxhall announced that it was withdrawing its advertisements; it was important, 
according to the firm’s marketing communications director, Wolfgang Schubert, 
‘not to offend anyone’ and the Mirror and other newspapers had clearly gone too 
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 Moreover, it allowed other newspapers – even the Sun – to claim that they 
were more responsible than Morgan’s Mirror. It congratulated itself on 
maintaining ‘a jingoistic approach rather than a xenophobic one.’
604
 Morgan had 
an uncomfortable few days ‘worried   that there might be violence for which the 
Mirror could be blamed’, according to Ramsden.
605
 The Daily Express, anxious to 
put a respectable distance between itself and the redtop tabloids, recruited 
‘Britain’s leading philosophers’ to explain the significance of the England-
Germany match and the furore that it had aroused. Asked to ‘contemplate the true 
meaning of tonight’s result’, Dr Gordon Reddiford of the University of Bristol, 
pointed out that, ‘National hopes and stereotypes are centred on the game – and 
players have acquired a moral status as ambassadors for a nation’s view of itself.’ 
Professor Brenda Almond of Hull University addressed the issues raised by the 
tabloid’s hostility towards Germany more directly: ‘it is one thing to call on the 





According to Richard Weight, ‘The national football team had become 
steadily more important to the English since 1954’ and this was very evident in 
the extensive press coverage of Euro 96.
607
 Much of the journalism that prompted 
English embarrassment and German irritation appeared on the front pages and in 
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special features rather than on the sports pages where writers simply continued to 
use the style they had developed over many years, as we have seen. Germany’s 
footballers were to be admired, but also feared. After their first match against 
Czech Republic, Matt Dickinson, who covered Germany’s progress for the 
Express, claimed that Vogts’s team had ‘mugged the frail Czechs’ with 
‘intimidating force’ at Old Trafford in a performance that displayed their 
‘traditional Teutonic virtues of planning and precision’ but also a ‘frightening 
power.’ Germany, he observed, ‘do not even have to be at their peak to be too 
good for anyone else.’
608
 ‘Herr we go again!’ ran the headline in the Daily Mirror 
over the match report of the Germany-Croatia quarter final, a very physical 
encounter.
609
 Metaphors invoking battles and wars proved hard to resist. Steve 
Curry’s match-day preview was headlined ‘Ince sounds the battle cry’ and 
supported by allusions to trench warfare in which the England captain was said to 
excel.
610
 How much the climate of jingoism had poisoned the coverage became 
clear when Oliver Holt wrote in The Times of ‘a plot by the Germans’ who 
claimed that they were struggling to ensure that Jürgen Klinsmann would be fit to 
play. According to Holt, Klinsmann was ‘indulging in some intricate subterfuge’ 
and only pretending to have a torn calf muscle.
611
 The implication here was that 
the Germans could not be trusted, though in the end Klinsmann was unfit and did 
not play. 
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The Daily Mirror became less offensive to Germany as the match drew 
nearer, though Kevin Keegan, who had played in Germany and was quoted as 
predicting a victory for Germany, was advised that he was ‘Kraut of order.’ On its 
sports pages the emphasis was on football history rather than the First and Second 
World Wars. Inevitably this began with 1966 and an interview with Sir Alf 
Ramsey who compared his team with the team that Terry Venables was likely to 
field against England’s old rivals. He expected Paul Ince to ‘do a Nobby’ on 
Matthias Sammer. Kenneth Wolstenholme, the commentator whose words as 
Hurst scored England’s fourth goal in 1966 had become a kind of patriotic mantra, 
‘as well known as Churchill’s most famous speeches’, reminded readers that there 
was ‘no escaping the past.’
612
 England midfielder Paul Ince was quoted as saying 
that England had the necessary ‘battling qualities’ to overcome ‘the ghosts’ of 
1970, 1972 and 1990.
613
 Thus, as we have seen in relation to previous big matches 
between England and Germany, a historical framework relating to football was 
one of the devices employed to give the match meaning. Germans, as Hesse has 
noted, found this English obsession very strange: playing England was like 





The match itself was a stirring contest between two evenly-matched teams 
which Germany eventually won via a penalty shoot-out. The match was watched 
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by 26.2 million people, the highest-ever audience for a sports broadcast in Britain. 
‘Given that most of these people were English, that audience represents a 
significant proportion of England’s 49 million inhabitants’, Weight observes.
615
 
Coverage of the match and its aftermath in the Express captured the drama of the 
occasion and how much it meant to the home team and their supporters. ‘This was 
Turin revisited’, observed Steve Curry. Yet there were compensations, not least 
that England were now ‘a side that played in the modern way, far removed from 
domestic football.’ There were reasons, therefore, to be proud and hopeful. As for 
Germany: ‘They are not like anyone else in football.’ Vogts’s team was not 
especially outstanding but possessed ‘the old identity tags of technical ease and a 
composure which, at times, seems to belong to another world, such was their 
proficiency in the penalty shoot-out which finally brought down England.’
616
 
Meanwhile on its first three pages, the Express covered the public disorder that 
had broken out in London and elsewhere after the match. Reporting from 
Trafalgar Square it was claimed that, ‘Screaming “We hate Germans!” the thugs 
clambered over the square’s fountains and lions.’ It provided a sour footnote to 
the tournament and baffled German supporters who had gone to the West End 
hoping to celebrate peacefully.
617
 Despite the violence, Piers Morgan and the 
Mirror were not held to account. Once the initial embarrassment had passed 
Morgan seemed unrepentant, especially after the Press Complaints Commission 
had ruled that his attempts at humour were ‘part of a proud British tradition. It 
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was ‘a matter of taste’ and they refused to make a judgement.
618
 It seemed, as 
Ramsden observes, that Morgan believed that ‘the Germans were too stupid even 
to understand why others disliked them.’
619
 If this was so he had no excuse for, 
two days after the match, the Mirror had published a message it had received 
from the Express newspaper in Cologne: ‘Sorry, you dear English. Of course we 
were happy when Southgate missed [his penalty] but we felt for your players and 
fans.’ It praised England’s ‘magic’ performance and even had a kind word for the 
‘drunkard Gazza,’ by now an English folk hero, before signing off ‘See you at the 




After the disappointments and under-achievement of the 1970s England 
regained international credibility in the 1980s. Hopes raised by three wins in the 
first group stage in Spain in 1982 were not justified but Ron Greenwood’s team 
came home undefeated. England was unlucky to lose to Argentina in 1986 under 
controversial circumstances and to Germany in a penalty shoot-out in the semi-
final in 1990. West Germany continued to achieve at a very high level throughout, 
reaching three consecutive World Cup finals, losing in 1982 and 1986, and 
winning in 1990. Overall, in terms of Anglo-German football rivalry, the 1980s 
and 1990s were a continuation of a pattern that had been established in the 1970s. 
This helped to reinforce representations of England and West Germany in the 
English press that had been evident since at least 1966: the English were seen as 
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technically inferior to the Germans, relying heavily on traditional virtues of 
powerful running and team spirit; the Germans were highly skilled, well-
organized and efficient. The German capacity for outperforming the English 
became part of the national stereotype, as represented on the sports pages. This 
meant that they were often depicted as being arrogant, another convenient 
negative stereotype. 
 
Press coverage in the 1980s was shaped partly by what happened on the 
field, partly by the broader context of Anglo-German history and ongoing political 
and cultural relations. When there was negative comment – as, for example, in 
1982 – it tended to be prompted primarily by what happened on the field of play. 
Thus aspects of West Germany’s performances were heavily criticized – the 
cynical ‘fix’ in the match against Austria and the unpunished foul on Battiston 
against France though, as we shall see, these incidents were criticized in Germany 
itself as well as in England and elsewhere. For the most part, however, accounts 
of Anglo-German football in the English press were framed within the immediate 
context of football history, with England characteristically seen as seeking 
‘revenge’ for 1970 and 1972, and West Germany seeking to put right the 
perceived injustice of England’s third goal not having crossed the line at 
Wembley in 1966. There were sometimes allusions to the First and Second World 
Wars but for the most part the incidence of war metaphors did not exceed those 




However, a new context emerged at the end of the 1980s and into the early 
1990s as the prospect of German reunification and then its actual realization 
began to make an impact on British politics, where prevailing sentiment had 
moved sharply to the right after the Conservative Party, led by Mrs Thatcher, 
returned to power in 1979. Moreover, after victory in the Falklands War in 1982, 
there was a sense of restored national pride which nurtured British/English 
nationalism. This impacted negatively on relations with the European Union in 
general and Germany in particular. It did not help that Britain’s political leaders, 
especially Mrs Thatcher and her closest political allies, regarded Germany and the 
German people with distrust, perhaps because their formative political 
experiences had been within the context of the Second World War. The various 
experts called by Mrs Thatcher to Chequers in 1990 to advise her on ‘the German 
question’ formed the view that she was imprisoned by a view of history that led 
her to instinctively distrust the new Germany and its ambitions in Europe. 
Germans might be ‘disciplined and hard-working’ but they were also ‘dangerous 
by nature.’ Timothy Garton-Ash reported that various negative attributes (angst, 
aggressiveness and bullying among them) had been mentioned at the meeting as 




All this betrayed a high level of anxiety about Germany in 1990 which was 
confirmed when Trade and Industry Secretary Nicholas Ridley revealed strong 
animosity towards a united Germany during the course of an interview with the 
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Spectator magazine in June 1990. The idea that surrendering British sovereignty 
to the European Community would be tantamount to surrendering to Hitler 
seemed to find significant levels of support amongst the British public and 
encouraged a more hostile approach in the popular press when England played 
Germany at Italia 90. The Daily Express quoted Otto Graf Lambsdorff as saying 
that Ridley was either drunk or had not got over England’s defeat during the 
World Cup. Another German commentator, Klaus Daweke suggested that 
Ridley’s words amounted to a verbal declaration of war.
622
 Timothy Garton-Ash, 
however, was inclined to take a broader view of these events, making the 
observation that Anglo-German relations suffered a ‘little shake’ as a result.
623
 
Nevertheless, it did seem to have the effect of encouraging the Sun, famous for its 
‘GOTCHA!’ front page after the Argentinian warship Belgrano had been 
torpedoed by the British navy during the Falklands War, to push the boundaries of 
public taste still further in its football coverage with its references to ‘Huns’ and 




For Euro 96, press coverage was more extensive even than 1966, the last 
time that England had hosted a football tournament. Though Mrs Thatcher had 
resigned from office in 1990, a Conservative government remained in office, 
supported by a party with a strong Eurosceptic wing, and relations with the 
European Union and with Germany were still difficult. Just before the tournament 
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took place, exports of English beef had been banned with a view to preventing the 
spread of CJD, leading to the so-called ‘Beef War’ in which British and German 
interests were opposed. Thus, with England and Germany coming together in the 
semi-final, the conditions were very similar to those which had provoked the 
Sun’s outburst of anti-German hostility in 1990. On this occasion, however, the 
Daily Mirror, which had once dominated the market for tabloid newspapers but 
had by now been overtaken by the Sun, adopted a similar approach to its rival in 
an effort to win back readers. John Garland and Mike Rowe have argued that ‘the 
discourse of warfare now tends to inform popular representations of sport’ and 
this was very apparent in the Mirror’s now infamous ‘ACHTUNG! 
SURRENDER!’ edition of 24 June 1996.
625
 As Euro 96 coverage spread from the 
back pages to the front and the middle, it has been argued, it promoted ‘an agenda 
based on nostalgia and ethnic assertiveness/defensiveness on the part of the 





Though there had been strong indications that the nature of the coverage of 
Anglo-German football rivalry had been changing in 1990, the transformation, at 
least in the tabloids, was much more evident in 1996. Since the 1970s the English 
popular press tended to depict the Germans as having better players and a better 
team but with a tendency to histrionics. In 1996 this was replaced by jingoism that 
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bordered on xenophobia – especially in the mass-circulation tabloids. As Garland 
and Rowe have argued, ‘the xenophobia that was in abundant evidence cannot be 
understood in isolation from broader social and political trends.’
627
 A newly-
resurgent English nationalism was asserting itself against the team that had 
replaced Scotland as England’s major football rival, against the economic foe of 
the Beef War, and against the enemy of two world wars and one World Cup. The 
coverage also laid bare issues and attitudes that the English held and possibly still 
hold towards ‘Europe’ 
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CHAPTER FIVE: The German Response 
As the introduction to this thesis pointed out, comparative research in this 
area is conspicuous by its absence. The aim of this chapter is to provide a 
comparative perspective on press representations of Anglo-German football 
rivalry. Research focusing on sports journalism in Germany has expanded 
significantly over the past decade. This in itself recognizes that the news value 
attached to sport and the status attached to those who write about it have both 
been transformed. Writing in 1999 about sports journalism in the English-
speaking world, David Rowe observed that: 
 
‘… sports journalists do not have a standing in their professions 
which corresponds to the size of their readership or their pay 
packets, with the old saying (now reaching the status of a cliché) 
that sport is “the toy department of the media” still readily to 




At the time that Rowe was writing, sports journalists in Germany were subject to 
similar prejudices but research indicates their status has been transformed over the 
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A major factor underpinning this change was a change in attitude towards 
sport itself which has come to be regarded as a subject to be taken seriously. An 
anonymous Australian sports journalist had complained to Rowe that there was an 
assumption among fellow professionals ‘that it’s much easier than other forms of 
journalism, and because it’s sport, it’s a physical activity, that there’s nothing 
intellectual about it.’
630
 Similarly, Weischenberg contends that sports journalism 
was long considered ‘an unsound object of research’ in Germany, a view based on 
the idea that sport was less important than politics, economics or literature, 
resulting in a negative attitude prevailing amongst journalists with more ‘serious’ 
interests. It did not help that so many sports journalists were recruited from the 
ranks of former athletes or even fans so that they often had lower educational 
qualifications than their colleagues, little formal training in journalism and tended 
to lack objectivity.
631
 Schaffrath has argued that this situation has changed 
dramatically over the last forty years as sport has been seen as increasingly more 
important, a development that has resulted in wider coverage and more 
opportunities for sports journalists as their field of work has expanded.
632
 This 
chapter surveys the coverage of Anglo-German international football in German 
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newspapers in the thirty-year period from the 1966 World Cup final through to 
Euro ‘96. During this period not only did the status of football journalism begin to 
change but also German newspapers were able to discard some of the inhibitions 
which were a legacy of the immediate post-war years when effectively they 
operated under license and were subject to surveillance by the occupying powers. 
 
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of coverage of key England-
Germany internationals in the Bild, Die Welt and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
it is important to understand something of the cultural context in which the 
German press operated from the 1960s onwards. In West Germany, as elsewhere 
in Europe, the ‘Sixties’ are often associated with the idea of a cultural revolution 
and, while this should not be overstated, it has to be taken seriously. One year in 
particular, 1968, has been singled out in German historical writing as being of 
particular importance, though it was preceded by about ten years of growing 
unrest, especially among the youth of the country. Awareness of the importance of 
1968 has permeated accounts of German history post-1945 for many years and 
continues to do so.
633
 Norbert Frei has argued that it is still almost impossible to 
define ‘1968’. It is associated with student rebellion, social protest and 
generational conflict as well as the idea of a cultural revolution. In Germany, 
‘1968’ is often used to signify the social unrest and cultural change associated 
with the 1960s as a whole; to be a ‘68er’ means to talk about it relentlessly thus 
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questioning the results of everything said and done before 1968.
634
 In as far as it 
impacted on the German press, it was because the right-wing Springer newspapers 
(Bild, Die Welt) were solidly behind those elements in the Federal Republic that 
were determined to resist change and gave uncritical support to the forces of law 
and order, even when these became hard to defend. 
 
In Germany, the events of 1968 climaxed in the days after the attempted 
assassination of the radical student leader Rudi Dutschke when the headquarters 
of the Springer publishing group in West Berlin were set ablaze by protesters. 
Kruip has described Springer as an ‘ideological arsonist’, arguing that the editorial 
directives given to his newspapers effectively provoked this angry response.
635
 
Though, as in the revolution of 1848, the revolt of 1968 quickly lost momentum, 
it generated two factions that were to have a major impact on the FRG for many 
years. One, the more radical wing, was the RAF, the Rote Armee Fraktion, which 
was prepared to use violence to bring about revolutionary change. The other, more 
moderate wing of the 68 movement began what has been called ‘the long walk 
through the institutions’ that helped to shape Germany in the ensuing decades.
636
  
It might be argued that ‘1968’ impacted on football by initiating a more critical 
approach to ideas of what constituted culture, thus making it possible for sport, as 
a form of popular culture, to be discussed seriously though it was some years 
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before this development became evident. When West Germany played England at 
Wembley in July 1966, football journalists – and the sports media generally – 
lacked the status that they were later to achieve. Moreover, however popular 
football was with the German public, it did not carry the ‘serious’ news value that 
it later acquired. These factors have to be kept in mind when considering 




1966: ‘Welcome them like World Champions!’ 
The West German national team had performed creditably since winning the 
World Cup in 1954, reaching the quarter-finals in Sweden in 1958 and Chile in 
1962. Reaching the final in 1966, however, was widely regarded as a significant 
achievement that could be explained by the way in which the structures of the 
domestic game had been modernized in the intervening period and especially by 
the introduction of the Bundesliga for the 1963/64 season. For the first time in 
German football history, there was a unified league playing over a 9 or 10 month 
period to decide the national champions. There were some problems associated 
with this development. With the DFB remaining committed to the ideal of 
amateurism at this stage, the advent of the Bundesliga simply encouraged a 
shadow economy to develop based on under-the-counter payments. As Uli Hesse 
points out, ‘backhanders’ were the norm as ambitious clubs sought to establish 
competitive advantage.
637
 In 1965 Der Spiegel revealed that Hertha BSC had 
flouted the regulations by engaging in black market transfer deals and paying 
wages to its supposedly amateur players, and the club was punished by expulsion 
from the top tier. Hertha refused to accept the guilty verdict and accused other 
clubs of operating in the same way.
638
 Though this did not reflect well on the new 
league it was clear that internal competition had been enhanced and that this was 
underpinning improved performances in international competition. By 1966 this 
was especially evident in the newly-established European Cup-Winners Cup with 
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TSV 1860 Munich finishing runners-up to West Ham United in 1965 and 
Borussia Dortmund beating Liverpool to win the final in 1966. These 
performances and those of the national team against England in 1965 and 1966 
indicated that West German football was improving and suggested that there were 
good reasons to be optimistic about the World Cup finals in England. In these 
circumstances it was not surprising that interest in the competition was high and 
the German press responded accordingly. For Bild alone there were nine writers 
covering the event, including Fritz Walter, captain of the 1954 team, who ghosted 
a column. The other Springer-owned paper, Die Welt, had three writers at the 
tournament while the upmarket FAZ sent two journalists to England. 
 
As the day of the final approached German coverage was generally upbeat, 
taking a positive view of the national team’s chances. Fritz Wirth, writing for Die 
Welt’s middle-market readership, observed that ‘the football world will have a 
new king at 4:45pm on Saturday.’ Noting that the television audience in Britain 
was likely to exceed the record established by coverage of Sir Winston 
Churchill’s funeral in 1965, Wirth neatly observed that the final would in effect 
become another funeral broadcast if England should lose, though he also 
recognized that few in England believed that this would happen, especially after 
Germany’s unconvincing performance in the semi-final against the Soviet Union. 
Wirth reminded his readers that there would be an ‘uneven match’ at Wembley in 
that 12,000 German supporters would be outnumbered by 88,000 home fans but 
he maintained throughout his report that Helmut Schön’s team was capable of 
achieving a victory that would confound the expectations of the English press, or 
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at least a draw. England had not played well against Uruguay, Mexico or 
Argentina; moreover, the organizers had prudently printed tickets for a replay the 
following Tuesday. Though he avoided any references to the longer history of 
Anglo-German conflict in the twentieth century, Wirth could not resist reminding 
his readers of more recent events in economic history which reflected well on the 
FRG and badly on England. If Germany should win, he argued, the value of 
English football would ‘plummet deeper than pound sterling’, thus reminding his 
readers of the problems that Wilson’s government had encountered in defending 




Die Welt also carried an interview with Sepp Herberger, who had coached 
the West German team to success in 1954, which also provided some reasons to 
approach the match hopefully. Herberger dismissed the idea that an England 
victory was inevitable, explaining quite reasonably that ‘English confidence was a 
little exaggerated as their best match was against Portugal; their previous games 
were not convincing.’
640
 Even against Portugal, he had noticed weaknesses in 
their play: ‘they were not able to keep their high tempo for ninety minutes which 
allowed Portugal to come back.’ Herberger identified Bobby Charlton as the main 
threat; he was England’s outstanding player, the one ‘who cannot be replaced 
equally’; he was more dangerous than Eusebio because he possessed a ‘better 
motor activity’ and was difficult to stop once he was ‘running on full throttle.’ 
Someone, he added, would have ‘to stand on his feet, literally.’ The tone of this 
was realistic and professional; it gave German readers reasonable cause for 
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optimism while showing England – Charlton in particular – the respect due to 
opponents who were not without flaws but would be difficult to beat. Thus the 
pre-match coverage was relatively restrained when compared, for example, to Die 
Welt’s English middle-market equivalents, the Daily Express which had published 
negative comments on German ‘play-acting’, and the Daily Mail, with 
Mulchrone’s notorious match-day remarks implying that war was Germany’s 
‘national game’. 
 
In the upmarket FAZ the tone was characterised to an even greater degree by 
restraint. Karlheinz Vogel’s match preview seems to have been much influenced 
by Schön’s determination to leave England having made a good impression. It 
featured quotes from the German camp observing that there was much satisfaction 
to be gained from having already secured second place in the tournament. This led 
Vogel to ask rhetorically: ‘who is surrendering after five games when they were 
merely 90 minutes away from the ultimate prize?’ Like Wirth in Die Welt, Vogel 
pointed out that England’s performances on the road to the final had not always 
been convincing, though he balanced this by arguing that West Germany had 
enjoyed a fair share of luck in the tournament to date. For Vogel, England were 
favourites, not least because they were playing at Wembley, a talismanic venue 
for the home team where foreign opponents were usually defeated. Moreover, 
England’s record against Germany had to be taken into account. Germany had 
failed to secure a victory in the seven international matches played between the 
two countries since 1930, so history was on England’s side. He also contradicted 
Herberger by suggesting that Ramsey’s team did have the capacity to play at a 
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high tempo for ninety minutes. Overall, Vogel appeared to be satisfied with what 
had already been achieved, arguing that the German public should be content even 
if their team should lose. Though he claimed that he would be glad to see 
Germany win another world title, he tempered this statement by adding that he 




Vogel did make some comments that were critical of the way in which the 
tournament had been organized. Football-mad cities like Liverpool had been 
snubbed in favour of London where England had played all their matches at 
Wembley in front of a patriotic crowd which encouraged the team with chanting 
and flag-waving. The English press, he noted, had described Germany’s 
supporters as ‘a bawling and fanatical pack’ and even worse when they showed 
similar enthusiasm for their team. Nevertheless, having raised these issues, he 
adopted a conciliatory tone by implying that criticism in the English press relating 
to the number of opposition players who had been sent off playing against 
Germany had to be taken seriously. Schön, it should be remembered, had 
complained that these criticisms were unjustified and that they had poisoned the 
atmosphere in the days between the semi-final and the final. By indicating that the 
time had come for the German players to prove that the charges that had been 
levelled against them were unjustified Vogel suggested that he believed that there 
was some justification in what Fleet Street’s ‘tin soldiers’ had written. England, 
Vogel observed, played football that was hard, fast and courageous. It was 
Zweckfußball ‘where the end justified the means’. Thus winning was more 
                                                 




important than playing in an attractive style. This could hardly be described as a 
criticism of England and English football because Vogel made it clear that 




In contrast, Bild’s tone was both, less deferential and more populist. In the 
match previews there was much emphasis on the ‘human interest’ angle. Thus it 
was significant that Martin Peters and Wolfgang Overath would be lining up 
against each other just as they had done in a youth international seven years 
earlier. Master chef Hans-Georg Damker answered questions about what the team 
should eat at the post-match banquet: ‘Champions or not, the lads deserve a nice 
dinner.’ German hockey internationals Klaus Greinert and Christian Roder sent a 
telegram to Alf Ramsey in which they congratulated him in advance for finishing 
second and referred to the ‘arrogance of the English.’ It was reported that Cassius 
Clay, in England to prepare for his fight with Brian London, would be attending 
the match and that Jack Charlton’s wife was expected to give birth to their third 
child at any time. The uncommunicative Alf Ramsey was criticized by Karl 
Walther who suggested that ‘a walk in the woods was more useful and more 
interesting than a talk with this man’, a comment with which most English 
football journalists would probably have agreed. All this pointed in the direction 




So, too, did the use of ‘quotes’. Kurt Hamrin, scorer of a famous goal for 
Sweden against West Germany in the 1958 finals, explained that being favourites 
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may not be beneficial for the home team; he considered Germany’s defence to be 
‘smarter than the English.’ Mário Esteves Coluna, captain of the Portuguese side 
defeated by England in the semi-final claimed that if Germany ‘play like Borussia 
Dortmund’ they would win the match. The great Eusebio added that ‘we’ll cross 
our fingers for the Germans.’ Fritz Walter, captain of the team that had pulled off 
‘the miracle of Berne’ in 1954, offered his advice: ‘play your game and stick to 
it’; ‘play hard but play fair’; ‘ignore the “England, England” chants and imagine 
that the crowd are shouting “Deutschland, Deutschland”’; and finally, ‘play as a 
team – camaraderie can change the game.’ Whatever happened the German 
people were proud of the team’s success so far and would greet them thankfully 
and cheerfully.
644
 In the light of these routine platitudes it was not surprising that 
Bild reported the results of a survey indicating that 89 per cent of all Germans 
over the age of 16 believed that their team would win the final, with only seven 
per cent predicting an England victory.
645
 Bild’s sports pages exuded confidence 
and optimism. It was noted that hardly anyone in England shared this view though 
George Raynor, the Englishman who managed the Swedish team that reached the 
1958 final, was quoted as saying that Franz Beckenbauer could unlock defences 
‘like no other’ and that he ‘could not foresee anyone stopping him.’ This blended 
with assistant coach Dettmar Cramer’s view that the Germany’s players were 
technically and tactically superior and the best prepared of any in the competition. 
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Avoiding obvious war metaphors Jürgen Juckel and Horst Frese predicted in 
Bild that ‘[the] English will surge forward like a spring flood and it is the question 
if our dam holds.’
646
 However, Bild am Sonntag’s match report referred to 
goalkeeper Hans Tilkowski palming ‘Ball’s bomb’ over the crossbar and 
‘Charlton’s grenade’ hitting a post. In Beckenbauer, Germany had possessed a 
‘weapon’ capable of winning the match but by using him to thwart the threat of 
Bobby Charlton, they had effectively defeated themselves. This was later 
paralleled by the English press in explaining how England had lost to Germany in 
the 1970 quarter-final in Mexico. The main theme, however, was the controversy 
surrounding England’s third goal. The headline on Bild am Sonntag’s front page 
urged its readers to ‘Welcome them like world champions!’ This was followed by 
a sub-heading expressing the collective view of the team that ‘The third goal was 
no goal.’ The players were praised for their sporting behaviour which had been 
officially acknowledged by Federal President Heinrich Lübke who had announced 
that he would award the highest honours at his disposal to the team. It was noted 
in passing that the best team had won though home advantage had been critical. 
The front page of Welt am Sonntag echoed much of this: the German team had 
‘fought brilliantly’ and England’s third goal had been ‘‘highly disputable’, 
providing the ‘only discord in an otherwise splendid final’. It would prove to be ‘a 
point of discussion for years to come’, Welt am Sonntag predicted, rather an 
understatement as it transpired. Adjacent reports alluded to Britain’s economic 
problems – the government was considering a wage freeze and considering 
reducing the number of British troops in Germany if the FRG did not increase its 
                                                 









On the sports pages, however, Fritz Wirth’s match report developed an 
interesting theme in a way which allowed Germany to share England’s glory. 
These echoed the idea that some English newspapers had floated that the 1966 
competition represented some kind of triumph for the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ over the 
‘Latin’.
648
 Summing up his experience of the tournament, Wirth concluded: ‘At 
the end one felt as to have witnessed a revolution: ‘the game of the South 
Americans, the game of the jugglers and magicians experienced its darkest hour 
since 1954.’ He argued that England and Germany, having been among the 
leading football nations for decades had now modernized the game: the final, was 
a triumph for ‘calculated football artistry’ where teams ‘are drilled perfectly for 
success.’ Football has made a step forward from its ‘playful baroque past into the 
sober era of rocket science.’ The German team, often stereotyped simply as 
‘physical footballers’, deserved special praise for their part in this transition. For 
Wirth, the final had been ‘a battle’, contested even more fiercely than the final in 
1954. It had also provided drama and suspense which not even Alfred Hitchcock 
could have scripted and there was some credit to be derived from this. UEFA 
president Gustav Wiederkehr was quoted as saying that neither England nor West 
Germany were ‘wonder teams’, but ‘this was not necessary as the game was 
thrilling nonetheless.’ 
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The dispute over England’s third goal could not, of course, be ignored but 
even here there was some credit to be gained from the way in which Schön’s team 
had reacted. Hans Passlack, secretary-general of the DFB, opined that there would 
have been a lot more fuss, if not trouble, had a South American team been at the 
receiving end of such a decision.
649
 As we have already seen, the idea of leaving a 
good impression was very important to Schön and his squad.
650
 That they behaved 
as they did allowed them to share England’s moral victory over the South 
Americans. Wirth underlined this view in the next day’s edition of Die Welt where 
he noted that more than artistry was required to win World Cup finals. The 
Brazilians had demonstrated artistry but had been unsuccessful. Team spirit and 
physical and psychological strength – qualities which England and West Germany 
had in common – were also of critical importance. These were the qualities that 
Schön had cultivated as his team had progressed towards the final which had 
confirmed that West Germany possessed the physical prowess needed to be 




The upmarket FAZ headlined in the sports pages ‘After a great fight, an 
honourable defeat’. The World Cup has witnessed a ‘grand finale’, a contest in 
which ‘the English had to offer all their ability, all their power to win 4-2’. 
Karlheinz Vogel argued that England had deserved to win but could not explain 
exactly why this was so: ‘Was it their will to win? Their precise passing?’ Even 
though Vogel’s account of the match seemed to strive self-consciously to be 
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impartial, he could not avoid the controversial question of England’s third goal – 
there had been a moment of weakness on the part of the referee which led him to 
rely on his linesman – which had a crucial impact on the outcome of the match. It 
had taken ‘the wind out of Germany’s sails’, leaving them short of the mental and 
physical strength required to make a comeback. However, as Vogel also noted, 
England’s fourth goal had been scored after the Germans had pushed forward in 
search of an equalizer which seemed to contradict the idea that they were 
incapable of responding to the challenge. As far as the football itself was 
concerned, Vogel’s judgements seem a little eccentric. For example, he argued 
that Alan Ball had proved himself the rightful successor to Jimmy Greaves though 
these players had quite different roles in the England team. However, his 
comments were in line with those of Fritz Wirth in Bild when he noted that the 
final had been contested by ‘two excellent and athletic teams in the most modern 
style of football.’ He reminded his readers that no-one had expected West 
Germany to reach the final and for that reason the players deserved high praise for 
their efforts. Moreover, by their demeanour in defeat, the team had improved the 
image of German sport to a greater extent than they could have done if they had 




The tone of German newspaper reports in 1966 is clearly very different 
from that of their English counterparts. Whereas Desmond Hackett in the Daily 
Express, especially in the period between the semi-finals and the final, resorted to 
military metaphors that reminded readers of Germany’s part in two world wars, 
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German journalists were careful to avoid such language. The war was never 
mentioned or even referred to indirectly. For Schön’s team, it was leaving a good 
impression that mattered most. The German press coverage of the tournament 
appears to have been motivated by the same feelings. After the final, though there 
was disappointment and a sense that England had been fortunate to win by a 
disputed goal, one does not sense any serious anti-English animosity, despite the 
provocation by the ‘tin soldiers’ of Fleet Street, who were now falling over 
themselves to proclaim West Germany as honourable opponents, whereas in the 
build-up they had been critical of ‘play-acting’ and ‘histrionics’, effectively 
accusing them of cheating. 
 
Perhaps the key test of German attitudes lies in the way that England’s 
contentious third goal has been reported and discussed. It is clear that the German 
team at the time were convinced that the whole of the ball had not crossed the 
line. However, it seems that the players have mellowed over the years. Thirty 
years or so after the event, Uli Hesse interviewed them and concluded that they 
were generally relaxed in their attitude to the incident. ‘What is perhaps not so 
well understood’, he observed, ‘is that Germany did not hold a grudge about the 
outcome, and the controversial third goal in particular.’ Only goalkeeper Hans 
Tilkoswki, who was closest to the incident, maintained vehemently that the goal 
should not have been allowed. Explaining the way that the team had responded 
Wolfgang Overath explained: ‘England had a great side. We accepted this defeat, 
and I hope our conduct brought credit to the German team.’
653
 Inevitably, the 
                                                 




German press took up the case immediately after the final with Bild am Sonntag 
pointing out that most eye-witnesses were convinced that the ball had not crossed 
the line and arguing that the match had been lost on account of ‘the most 
discussed, and most universally contested goal in the history of football.’
654
 
Indeed, the goal itself was to become the subject of debate for years to come, 
perhaps surprisingly considering the success that the national team was to enjoy 
over the years. The discussion generated many rather unpleasant comments 
involving national stereotypes and xenophobia. However, as far as press comment 
in 1966 was concerned, this focused on the Swiss referee and the Russian 
linesman rather than on Hurst and the other English players. 
 
A short but nonetheless excellent little volume of writing on this topic, is 
Drin oder Linie? Alles übers dritte Tor, compiled by Gerhard Henschel and 
Günther Willen thirty years after the event in 1996. It comprises a collection of 
views from the German press, mostly dating from after 1966. One of the leading 
sports journalists of the 1970s, Ulfert Schröder, reminded his readers of ‘the 
injustice’ suffered by the German team in 1966 at the hands of a ‘cowardly 
postman’ (Dienst, the Swiss referee) and a ‘hapless physics teacher from Baku’ 
(Bakhramov, the Russian linesman) whom Schröder accused of being distracted 
by ‘all the nice things in England.’ Ludger Schulze, who later became sports 
editor at Süddeutsche Zeitung claimed that both, Dienst and Bakhramov had been 
‘gutless’. This view was echoed by Roland Eitel who argued that Dienst had 
‘shied away from taking responsibility.’ Some journalists, like Herbert Meisel and 
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Hans-J. Winkler, have attempted to put the decision into perspective by reminding 
readers that Germany’s late equalizer in the last minutes of normal time followed 
the award of a controversial free kick and urged Germans to accept ‘the flipside of 
the coin.’ For others, however, such as Peter Berger, the final would always be 
‘stained by this goal’. Significantly, the East German journalist, Günter Simon, 
was critical of his colleagues and the way that they constantly returned to this 





Though convinced that the ball had not crossed the line, the German press 
reaction in 1966 was muted, focusing on what Schön’s team had achieved and 
expressing pride in the sportsmanship that had been displayed. Even though some 
of the complaints in Germany about the attitude of the English press before the 
final were probably justified, coverage in German newspapers was relatively 
restrained, despite the injustice of England’s third goal. Rudi Michel, the match 
commentator for German television, was later asked to explain his reaction to 
West Germany’s first goal scored by Helmut Haller. He had exclaimed ‘Goal!’ 
but then had remained silent for half a minute. ‘We were the first post-war 
generation’, Michel observed. ‘We knew what radio reports have caused in the 
Third Reich. This was scaring us.’ It was considered inappropriate to celebrate 
excessively in and against England; any hint of Goebbelsschnauze was to be 
avoided. Thus, when Hurst scored his disputed goal, Michel simply observed: 
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‘There will be discussions about this.’
656
  Just like Schön and his players, German 
journalists covering the tournament in England were determined to behave well 
and this probably tempered their reactions. The reaction came later and, when it 
came, was directed exclusively at Dienst and Bakhramov rather than at the 
English whose players were never criticized. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the 
events of 1966 provided a way in which the German press could frame Anglo-
German football encounters thereafter. By 1970, when England and West 
Germany faced each other once again in a competitive match, the English record 
of victories had been broken in the friendly at Hanover in 1968. Welt am Sonntag, 
previewing the World Cup quarter-final match in Mexico, wrote of Germany 




The ‘miracle’ of León, 14 June 1970 
The 1970 World Cup was awarded to Mexico during the 1964 Olympic 
Games in Tokyo, Mexico City having previously won the contest to stage the 
1968 Olympics. The decision was controversial for a number of reasons. Firstly, it 
was clear that teams might experience problems in adjusting to the altitude and 
the heat; the final was to be played at noon in order to guarantee that television 
audiences in Europe could watch the match at prime time.
658
 Secondly, in relation 
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to both the Olympic Games and the World Cup, there was a good deal of 
stereotyping of Mexico in the American and European press that reflected 
negatively on its capacity to organize a major sporting event of global 
significance. The fact that a student protest had been brutally suppressed by the 
authorities only ten days before the start of the Olympics in 1968 did not help to 
reassure those who had expressed doubts about Mexico’s political stability.
659
 As 
it transpired these issues did not cause problems during the 1970 World Cup 
which was generally regarded as a great success on all levels. It seemed that the 
problems some had foreseen had been grossly exaggerated. Brazil, with an 
‘unambiguous record of adventure, attack and positive play’, won the tournament 
in a style guaranteed to please spectators and television viewers worldwide.
660
 
This was in contrast to England’s victory in 1966 which had not been universally 
acclaimed and had been much resented in South America especially. English 
journalist Brian Glanville recorded that the 1970 tournament ‘was gloriously won 




Unlike their English counterparts, the German football journalists present in 
Mexico were not affected by strike action at home where newspaper production 
was uninterrupted. The background to the tournament did provide an opportunity 
for the German press to depict England in a negative way, albeit indirectly. Martin 
Maier in Welt am Sonntag outlined the problems that England had experienced in 
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Guadalajara where they had played their group matches. Brazilian fans had played 
loud music at night outside England’s hotel and the crowd at the stadium had been 
against them. To some extent, however, they had brought these difficulties on 
themselves. Ramsey’s remarks in 1966, when he had labelled Argentina as 
‘animals’, had not been forgotten. Moreover, English insularity led to 
misunderstandings; they had even brought their own team bus with them. Geoff 
Hurst found this reassuring: ‘it smells like England. Like Leather and pipe 
tobacco’, but their Mexican hosts were less impressed. It seemed to suggest that 
Ramsey and his players did not trust them.
662
 Paul Palmert in Bild enlightened 
readers about Mexican ‘England-Hate’. It seemed that Mexicans believed that 
their team had not been treated well in 1966 and now were seeking revenge. An 
assistant in the press centre was quoted: ‘the English are unpopular almost 
everywhere’. Oswaldo Martinolli, groundsman at León, was reported as saying 
that the Mexicans had not been prejudiced against the reigning world champions 
but were offended by their attitude towards the locals; the England squad were 
‘arrogant and inaccessible.’
663
 Team manager Sir Alf Ramsey was especially 
disliked for being rude and stubborn, an assessment with which many English 
journalists would have agreed. Meanwhile Helmut Schön and his squad ‘were 
charming the pants off the locals’, as Downing put it, a slightly unfortunate turn of 
phrase. This meant that when the match took place Germany ‘would enjoy as 
much “home advantage” as England had enjoyed so decisively at Wembley four 
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 Gerhard Pietsch, writing in Bild a few days later, underlined the 
importance that the West German party attached to public relations, reporting a 
visit to a local village where Günter Netzer and other players gave footballs and 
toys to children and clothing to adults. ‘The contrast to living standards in Europe 
is staggering’, said Netzer. ‘They were so grateful.’
665
 Twenty-five years after the 
end of the war Schön’s football ambassadors were keen to make a good 
impression. The Times, as we have seen, noted the success of this strategy and the 




For the German press, 1966 provided the key point of reference in the match 
previews. Interviewed by Gerhard Seehase for Welt am Sonntag, Hans Tilkowski, 
the German goalkeeper from 1966, once more repeated that Hurst’s second goal 
should not have been allowed. He anticipated a German victory because he 
believed that they had concluded that Germany had the better players but 
recognized that England would be difficult to beat, even if they were not playing 
particularly well. His colleague Gerhard Krug offered his thoughts about possible 
tactical switches for the game against England and the influence of Jupp Derwall, 
the German assistant coach, on team selection and tactics. The contest between 
Franz Beckenbauer and Bobby Charlton was regarded as critical with Krug 
arguing that whereas Beckenbauer had followed Charlton around at Wembley, the 
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roles would be reversed in León.
667
 Once again, Wembley 1966 supplied the point 
of reference. It also informed pre-match coverage in the FAZ where Steffen 
Haffner’s article on the day of the match appeared under the headline ‘A strong 
wish to gain revenge for Wembley’ and, of course, mentioned England’s disputed 
third goal form 1966. Also in FAZ, Ulfert Schröder, though less impressed than 
Haffner by England’s performances in Mexico, argued that they were now a better 
side than they had been in 1966. Against Brazil, they had played ‘like Brazil’, a 
match they would have won ‘had their strikers kept their heads in front of goal.’ If 
England played in the same way in the quarter-final, no team would have a 
chance. Schröder believed that ‘time had left its mark on the World Champions’ 
but believed that ‘English bloody-mindedness’ allied to the team’s  experience 
and tactical awareness meant that they posed a real threat.
668
 Perhaps he had been 
influenced by an earlier interview with Bobby Charlton, another link with 
Wembley 1966, who had claimed that the English and the Germans responded 
similarly in critical situations. ‘When we need to win, we’ll find the necessary 





Quotes attributed to players were a prominent feature of the pre-match 
coverage in Bild where the emphasis was on personalities, especially the German 
forward Gerd Müller, though there was some attempt to balance English and 
German perspectives. Roman Köster, who claimed to be astounded by the level of 
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confidence in the English camp, reported that its defenders were determined not to 
be ‘Mullered’. Full-back Keith Newton promised that he would not be allowed 
any space. ‘We’re not Morocco, Bulgaria or Peru’, he pointed out, naming the 
teams that West Germany had beaten on the way to the quarter-final. ‘Anyone can 
score goals against them.’ Centre-back Brian Labone, the ‘policeman’ assigned 
the task of taming Muller, affirmed this view, arguing that England’s defence was 
more solid than it had been in 1966. In an article written from the German 
perspective Klaus Müller (no relation) interviewed Gerd who expressed 
confidence and claimed that ‘the Tommies were shivering more than the 
Germans.’ He had already played against Manchester United and scored twice 
despite being marked by the ‘poisonous dwarf’ Nobby Stiles, another name that 
would remind German readers of 1966. In many respects this was all routine pre-
match gossip but with Muller referring to the English as ‘Tommies’ and Bild 





Naturally, after Schön’s team had overturned England’s 2-0 lead to win 3-2 
after extra time, the German press celebrated a great victory. Bild devoted almost 
half of its front page to the headline ‘3-2 Lads, you are the greatest!’ followed by 
a short summary of the match, setting it within the framework of recent football 
history. ‘Memories of 1966’ had overshadowed the event as Uwe Seeler and 
Bobby Moore, the same team captains as in Wembley four years earlier, shook 
hands before kick-off. This, however, was where the similarities with 1966 ended: 
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there was ‘heat, thin air and a different continent’ to contend with – and, of 
course, a different result. Military metaphors were much in evidence. With 
England 2-0 up and apparently controlling the match from a defensive position 
there was no alternative for Germany but to begin ‘attacking England’s fortress 
relentlessly.’ It paid off as first Beckenbauer and then Seeler scored, the latter 
with a ‘wondergoal’ to make it 2-2 and once more taking the game into extra time, 
in which Müller scored the winner.
671
 Die Welt described a ‘sensational come 
back.’ After Peters had scored England’s second goal it asked, ‘who would give 
Germany a chance?’ 
672
 The German press tended to celebrate their team’s victory 
as if it was some kind of miracle, inevitably inviting comparisons with ‘the 
miracle of Berne’ in 1954. In the FAZ Steffen Haffner pointed directly to the 
similarities between the two events. On both occasions the Germans had 
recovered after falling behind and had gone on to win the match. However, while 
it had rained during the match against Hungary, in León the heat had been 
‘murderous.’ Moreover, the victory in 1954 might appear more miraculous than it 
actually was because Hungary had beaten a weakened German side 8-3 in a group 
match. Perhaps the triumph at León had the greater claim in that it was as if the 
German team had raised itself from the dead; Haffner wrote of ‘The Fallen’ 
continuing to fight despite the conditions. From this perspective ‘the turn from 
defeat to triumph appeared to be a wonder.’
673
 Even two days after the game, it 
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seemed that Gerhard Krug, writing in Die Welt, could hardly believe what he had 




There were, of course, other ways in which Germany’s victory – and 
England’s defeat – could be explained, as Krug himself knew. He resorted to 
military metaphors to describe the strength of England’s defence. ‘They erected a 
fortress around their own [penalty] area, armed with wires, mines, trenches and 
stones’, he explained colourfully. When Germany broke through the England 
defence had responded ‘with the calmness of a Russian customs officer’ and 
appeared likely to see the match through safely. Beckenbauer and his team were 
paralysed in awe and submissiveness; it seemed that Germany could play until 
July without scoring. Yet, Krug reminded his readers that usually it is mistakes 
that decide games. Like Ramsey’s critics in the English press he argued that it had 
been a mistake to bring Bell on for Charlton, thinking that the game was won. 
This substitution had liberated Beckenbauer; now ‘Franz was ruling.’
675
 Haffner 
in the FAZ had seen events in the same way. Ramsey’s substitution had changed 
the game in Germany’s favour. Bell did not know how to handle Beckenbauer 
who suddenly played as though ‘concrete blocks had been removed from his 
shoes.’
676
 This was very much in line with the analysis provided by West 
Germany’s assistant coach, Dettmar Cramer, for Bild. The 1970 tournament was 
the first in which two substitutions were allowed and coaches had to adapt 
                                                 
674  Die Welt, 14 June 1970. 
 
675  Die Welt, 16 June 1970. 
 




quickly, reading the game and learning how to use this rule effectively, as Schön 
had demonstrated when he had brought Grabowski on in the second half against 
Peru.
677
 The implication here was that Ramsey and England had made the wrong 
substitution, thus it could be argued once again that German management had 
adapted more successfully to modern conditions. That said, there was still 
something miraculous about Germany’s victory with Krug observing that it might 




Reflecting on how the result had been received in England the impression 
given was that of a nation in a state of shock. This was especially evident in Fritz 
Wirth’s lengthy report for Die Welt which appeared under the headline ‘30 
seconds that stunned the BBC.’ Apparently BBC match commentator, the 
talkative David Coleman, described as ‘a waterfall’ by Wirth, had been stunned 
into silence for 30 seconds when Müller had scored Germany’s winning goal. It 
was the biggest shock result since England had lost 1-0 to the United States in 
Brazil twenty years earlier.
679
 Before the match, Wirth reported, pubs had been 
empty and motorways were without traffic; there was more interest in the match 
than in the outcome of the general election due to take place in a few days and the 
Conservative and Labour campaigns had ground to a halt. ‘The fate of the nation 
was to be decided in León’, Wirth explained. TV pundit Pat Crerand, the 
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Manchester United and Scotland midfielder, had predicted before the game, ‘the 
Germans will win’ and at half-time ‘he was asked to eat his words’. At the end of 
the game he had been proved right and was declared a prophet by shocked 
colleagues in the studio. One of them, Malcolm Allison, the Manchester City 
coach, attacked Ramsey, the hero of 1966, claiming that he was ‘a good coach for 
weaker teams’ but ‘out of his depth with good teams.’ In 1966, Wirth concluded, 
England had ‘lost’ the World Cup but it had been retrieved by Pickles. The poor 
dog had now died so the rescue act could not be repeated. Instead ‘a truck load of 




However, just as the English press had praised West Germany after the final 
in 1966, there were some words of consolation for the defeated world champions. 
Krug noted that England looked sharp and seemed well prepared to cope with the 
problems posed by the altitude and the heat. ‘A great team returns home’, was his 
assessment.
681
 Haffner in the FAZ was especially enthusiastic about England. 
‘What an opponent!’ he declared, arguing that for most of the match they had 
been ‘superior in all departments.’ It had seemed like a game played by 
‘professionals against good natured amateurs.’ England’s defence was an 
impenetrable ‘super wall’ and for them it was ‘nothing more than a training 
game.’ The unanimous opinion after the game: ‘the English have even become 
better. They are real world champions.’ It was only after Beckenbauer’s goal that 
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 Thereafter roles were reversed.  Thus the English could 
have little to complain about regarding their treatment on the sports pages of the 
German press. 
 
Haffner concluded his report by describing the party in the central square at 
León where the team, fans and locals had joined together after the match to create 
an atmosphere resembling a mix of the ‘Oktoberfest and the Carnival’. In Mexico, 
it seemed that ‘all Germans are football brothers.’ Die Welt was very happy in the 
circumstances to quote reports from foreign press sources which indicated that 
Germany’s victory had been popular around the world. The English press were 
convinced that the team had been handicapped by the absence of first-choice 
Gordon Banks and that Ramsey had been wrong to bring on Bell for Charlton. 
However, there were reports that Ursula Banks, Gordon’s German wife, had 
assured her compatriots that Germany would have won even if her husband had 
played. The Daily Mail, which had been rather unfriendly in 1966, had apparently 
now conceded that, if anyone was to beat the English, it was glad that it was the 
Germans. There were favourable quotes culled from La Notte and Gazzetta dello 
Sport and the French sports daily L’Equipe described Germany’s victory as 
‘Fantastic! Unbelievable! Wonderful! Extra-ordinary!’
683
 According to Bild, even 
the Pope had been supporting Germany and Sophia Loren was predicting that 
Germany would beat Italy in the semi-final.
684
 Moreover, there was no doubt that 
the Germans were popular winners in Mexico; their charm offensive had paid off 
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and England had made little effort to make friends with their hosts. All the 
German match reports had noted that the crowd in the stadium had favoured their 
team, responding enthusiastically when Müller scored the winner. One Mexican 
newspaper had even reported the match under the headline ‘Blitzkrieg’.
685
 In 1966 
West Germany had left a good impression and had lost to England; in 1970, they 
had made a good impression and beaten England. FAZ quoted one (unnamed) 
player after the game as saying that he would like to go home now as ‘it could not 
get any better.’
686
 He was probably right, not least because the team’s 
achievement and the response to it suggested that Germany could now look the 
world in the face. 
 
The New Germany: Wembley 1972 
The win in León was the second in succession for Germany over England. The 
balance of power in the Anglo-German football relationship was beginning to 
shift, though not yet decisively. However, the short period before the two rivals 
were thrown together again in the two-leg quarter final of the European Nations 
Championship in the spring of 1972, proved to be immensely troubling. A few 
days after the ‘miracle of León’, Schön’s team had lost 4-3 to Italy in the World 
Cup semi-final in another match requiring extra time but they had returned from 
Mexico with much credit. At home they were regarded as ‘as unlucky losers, even 
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 It seemed that the advent of the highly-competitive 
Bundesliga had provided the platform for West Germany to consolidate its 
position as a major power in international football. This achievement was 
jeopardized in 1971 when it was discovered that leading Bundesliga clubs had 
been involved in a major bribery and match-fixing scandal involving around 50 
players as well as some coaches and managers. Reinhard Libuda and Klaus 
Fichtel, both of whom had played against England in León, were the most 
prominent players involved. Fortunately for Schön the players of Bayern Munich 
and Borussia Mönchengladbach – the two strongest Bundesliga clubs at the time – 
which provided the core of the national team, were not involved. It did not help 
either that his squad was ‘riven with disputes’. Sepp Maier had fallen out with 
Bayern team-mates Beckenbauer and Müller who blamed him for recent defeats. 
Five players had signed up with Puma and refused to honour the deal to wear 
Adidas boots like the rest of the squad.
688
 This was unsettling and made it 
unnecessarily difficult for Schön as he assembled his squad. Also, as the match 
approached, it did not help that Vogts, Overath, Weber and Schnellinger, four 
important players, were injured. Consequently, it was something of a makeshift 
squad that arrived to play England at Wembley in April 1972.
689
 ‘Under these 
circumstances no one could expect a victory’, was Die Welt’s pre-match 
assessment a few days before the match. It underlined this view on the day of the 
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match itself: ‘A narrow defeat would be a success, a draw a victory and a win 




Anxieties about foreign perceptions of Germany derived from recent history 
help to explain Schön’s obsessive concern with leaving a good impression in 1966 
and the determined ‘charm offensive’ in Mexico four years later. It seemed at the 
start of 1972 that the Federal Republic was making progress in this direction. 
Firstly, the first generation of Germans to be born since the end of the Second 
World War were now reaching adulthood. Secondly, preparations were well in 
hand for the Olympic Games due to take place in Munich during the summer. 
When the Games had been awarded to Munich in 1966 it was regarded as an 
important step forward because it signalled international recognition that 
Germany had shaken off the negative legacy of the Nazi period. The Germans 
could now be entrusted with the responsibility of staging a major international 
sporting event. It provided, in the words of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietric 
Genscher, speaking in April 1972, ‘an historical opportunity to convey a desirable 
image of this state and the society which sustains it … to hundreds of thousands 
of international guests as well as millions of TV viewers, radio listeners and 
newspaper readers.’
691
 Moreover, with the world economy yet to experience the 
downturn that began in 1973, there was no shortage of desirable images available 
for this purpose. ‘These were to be the “cheerful games” (heitere Spiele)’. 
Moreover, as Allen Guttmann observes: 
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‘The German organizers were rightly proud of the Olympic 
village, the futuristic stadium (which cost $45 million), and the 
other facilities constructed for the Games. Every visual detail, 
down to the choice of colors and the design of the logos for 
different sports, had been carefully planned by Otl Aicher. A 
new subway system [would whisk] athletes and spectators from 




In April 1972 all was set to celebrate what West Germany had achieved since the 
war and to showcase a modern, efficient, stylish and progressive nation state. A 
successful national football team could only add to this positive image. It has to 
be remembered that the troubles associated with the world economic crisis and 
Arab terrorism at the Olympics were in the future when West Germany played 
England. 
 
What becomes clear from reviewing the match previews in the German 
press is that the fixture with England was recognized as being of special 
significance for both sides. For German sports journalists the recent history of 
Anglo-German football matches provided the essential context, though Steffen 
Haffner in the FAZ went back further by recalling the fourteen England-Germany 
games since 1900 and pointing out that England had won ten of them. He also 
noted that England had been beaten at Wembley only by Hungary (1953), Sweden 
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(1959) and Austria (1965) and never by Germany.
693
 For England, the unhappy 
memory of León was likely to be a motivating factor; Haffner predicted that ‘Sir 
Alf Ramsey will play the León card.’
694
 Die Welt also looked at the match this 
way, claiming that ‘England have not forgotten the game in Mexico and were out 
for revenge.’
695
 Bild underlined this point by publishing an interview with Alan 
Ball in which he explained how badly the England team had been hurt by the 
defeat they had suffered in Mexico. Interviewed by Paul Palmert, Ball explained: 
 
 ‘… defeats are hard to take for me in football, but no tragedy. 
León was different. We were 2-0 up and still have lost. That has 
never happened to an England team before. The only souvenir 




However, as Haffner pointed out, Germany’s team could also draw on past 
experience for motivation. They had scores to settle from their previous two visits 
to Wembley, having been controversially denied a draw in February 1966 and 
suffered the injustice of ‘a goal that never was’ in the 1966 final.’ ‘The third goal 
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Though it was sensible to play down German expectations before the match 
– and in this the press was simply following the example sensibly set by Helmut 
Schön – justified pride was evident when reporting the respect with which English 
players now regarded their opponents. Die Welt, for example, quoted Bobby 
Charlton on his great rival Franz Beckenbauer: ‘Playing him in defence would 
certainly stabilize the German back four but it would be a waste of one of the 
greatest talents in football if Beckenbauer was not to play in midfield, where 
games are lost or won.’
698
 Though Die Welt wondered if Charlton’s remarks were 
designed to influence Schön’s team selection, it also made it clear that he rated 
Beckenbauer very highly. Bild reported Alan Ball’s remark that Bertie Vogts was 
‘the best defender in the world.’
699
 At one time, Haffner observed in FAZ, all that 
would have been at stake was by how many goals ‘the masters of football’ would 
defeat their ‘German pupils’. However, German football was now respected. It 
used to be that Germany were to be found ‘trembling ahead of the games against 
England’ but this no longer applied, especially after León. Haffner clearly sensed 
that the balance of power in the football relationship between England and 
Germany was changing. Had Germany ‘almost caught up?’ Or were they now 
‘level with England’? This would make the match a tense occasion.
700
 Yet 
Haffner still expected England to win on this occasion. 
 
There was little evidence of hostility towards the English in the German 
newspapers. Sir Alf Ramsey, however, provided an easy target. He was already 
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under pressure from critics for his ultra-cautious, defensive approach to the game. 
Malcolm Allison, the manager of Manchester City, had compared his attitude to 
that of ‘a savings bank manager’ and this was duly reported by Fritz Wirth in Die 
Welt on the morning of the match.
701
 Moreover, his lack of communication skills 
made him an easy target. Haffner, in FAZ, was irritated by his refusal to name his 
team on the day before the match, observing ironically that he expected Ramsey 
to release the details of his starting eleven ‘a day after the match, at the 
earliest.’
702
 Perhaps the most significance press comment, however, was Fritz 
Wirth’s review of the pre-match comment in the English newspapers where he 
detected some ‘sabre-rattling’ and noted the ‘Prussian element’ in 
characterizations of the German team. In the Daily Express, for example, the 
German defence was a ‘Siegfried Line’ and ‘Bomber’ Müller was a ‘V-weapon’. 
It was an indication of the importance with which the match was being viewed in 
England that the Evening Standard had published a 24-page special issue 
describing it as ‘a battle of giants.’ All this reflected well on West German 
football and showed that attitudes in England had ‘changed profoundly’, despite 
the tin soldiers in the Express.
703
 Bild, looking for a sensationalist angle, sent Paul 
Palmert to a ‘secret’ session in the England training camp where he uncovered no 
secrets, just ‘gymnastics and war talk.’ It provided, however, another opportunity 
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to make fun of the secretive and suspicious Alf Ramsey. Gordon Banks played 




Reports from the German camp made it clear that Schön and his players 
were respectful but not overawed. On the front page of Bild the manager promised 
that his players were ready to fight ‘until they drop’; the team had no intention of 
being ‘a sacrificial lamb for the English.’ At a time when pride in the Federal 
Republic and its post-war achievements was very evident, it was to be expected 
that players should reflect this sentiment in the context of the forthcoming match 
and Gerd Müller did not disappoint Bild’s readers back home. At Bayern Munich, 
he confessed, he was ‘earning good money’; when he played for his country he 
only received expenses. However, he gave three reasons why he was happy to 
play for his country without any reward. Firstly, the match was against England 
and ‘who doesn’t want to play against them?’ Secondly, it was ‘all about the 
European Championship’ and, thirdly, ‘England have not forgotten their defeat in 
León and thus it will be even harder for us.’
705
 He appeared to be proud, confident 
and eager to play his part in a serious international contest against Germany’s old 
rival. Schön could not have asked for more. 
 
It is possible that the post-match accounts of West Germany’s 3-1 win 
exaggerated their superiority over England on the night. Though the visitors 
scored first and held a 1-0 lead at half-time, England equalized in the second-half 
and the outcome of the match was only decided in the last ten minutes. Under the 
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heading ‘Notes from Wembley’ FAZ supplied its readers with some basic facts. It 
was the third consecutive German win against England and the first in England 
after five defeats; it marked 100 victories for Germany in international matches 
since 1945, 200 in total; Gerd Müller equalled Uwe Seeler’s record of 43 goals in 
internationals. England had won 14 corners in the match; Germany only four; 
England had conceded eight free kicks and a penalty, Germany 18 free kicks; the 
average age of England’s starting line-up was 29 years, Germany’s 25.4 years.
706
 
However, statistics do not tell the whole story. The victory may not have been as 
convincing as has sometimes been claimed but it was achieved in a style that 
ensured that Schön’s team were admired both at home and abroad, even in 
England. As Uli Hesse observes: ‘So thick came the showers of praise that one 
could be forgiven for thinking that those plaudits must have been aimed at a 
football side representing Brazil rather than Germany.’
707
 For the English press it 
was especially perplexing to have seen the national side outclassed in this way by 
a team that traditionally played in the physical, hard-running English style. What 





To be fair, the German press, though clearly delighted with the result and 
the performance, seemed equally surprised by what had been achieved. It was, as 
many of the post-match quotes from players observed, simply ‘unbelievable’ or 
‘incomprehensible’ that Germany had played so well. ‘Was this victory a 
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wonder?’, asked Gerhard Seehase in Die Welt, before answering his own question, 
‘not at all.’ Over ninety minutes, he argued, West Germany had proved that a 
‘fighting and hard-working team’ could be beaten by a more technically proficient 
and more intelligent team, even when playing at home and with the pre-match 
odds in their favour.
709
 In FAZ, Stefan Haffner reverted to the by now well-worn 
metaphor of ‘the miracle’, one with which his readers would be familiar. The 
‘miracle of Berne’ and the ‘miracle of León’ were already part of modern German 
folklore. The ‘miracle of Wembley’ was now added to the list.
710
 All this fitted 
very nicely into a pattern for a country which was well-known for having 
experienced an ‘economic miracle’ in the years since the Second World War. 
Haffner reminded readers that Schön’s team had arrived in England while German 
football was still struggling with the Bundesliga match-fixing scandal; morale had 
been low and there was a long list of injured players. Yet, despite these 
‘symptoms of sickness’, the performance and the result proved that German 
football ‘bristled with health.’
711
 The patient had showed remarkable resilience 
and made a recovery that could be described as a miracle. 
 
However, the miracle had to be explained and in this the match reports in 
Bild, Die Welt and FAZ followed a similar pattern. Indeed, they followed a pattern 
similar to that which was found in the post-match analysis in the English press as 
described in Chapter Three. England, according to Seehase in Die Welt, had been 
‘pugnacious and passionate’ at the start but were ‘pugnacious, passionate and 
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depressing’ by the end. Seehase repeated questions about the state of the English 
game that he had been asked by English counterparts while in the press box at 
Wembley, such as ‘Is English football out-dated?’ At the time he had replied 
diplomatically that Ramsey had simply picked the wrong team but he made it 
clear that whereas West Germany had adapted and advanced since 1966, showing 
intelligence and a willingness to learn from others, the development of English 
football had been frozen in 1966 with disastrous consequences. It was partly a 
problem with management. Ramsey had been too loyal to the players who had 
brought him success six years ago and now had paid the price. He described 
England striker Martin Chivers as a Landsturmmann, a reservist in the Prussian 
and Imperial military, implying that he had been left behind by the march of 
progress. Chivers thus signified outdated methods and practice. It was necessary 
to learn, to be open to new ideas. This was how German football superiority over 




This analysis was effectively endorsed by his colleague Fritz Wirth who 
argued that the manner of England’s ‘necessary’ defeat indicated that a period of 
reflection and radical change was required, similar to that which had followed the 
6-3 home defeat by Hungary in 1953, an event described by Jeffrey Hill as ‘”a 
moment of modernity” from the neglected realm of sport.’
713
 England’s defeat 
was ‘not just a shock’, as in 1970, it ‘demanded internal analysis and self-
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 Haffner drew all these strands together in FAZ. Football had 
developed since 1966 but England had been ‘by-passed’ and its players pressed 
into ‘a tactical straight-jacket’ by Ramsey which meant that they were unable to 
‘express their individual abilities’. Alan Ball, at the time England’s most 
expensive footballer, had been exposed as ‘limited as a playmaker’ in midfield 
and was here compared unfavourably to Günter Netzer who had been allowed to 
express himself. England had ground to a halt in their football development. 
Ramsey’s loyalty to the heroes of 1966, especially Bobby Moore who had ‘lost 
form and become immobile’ and Geoff Hurst who had been outclassed by Horst-
Dieter Höttges, was clearly misplaced and wrong-headed. Only when relative 
newcomer Rodney Marsh was brought on in place of Hurst had England 
improved. There were lessons to be learned here. West Germany had made 
‘fantastic’ progress but, with a backward glance at the scandal that had recently 
embarrassed the Bundesliga,  he warned that it could all go wrong if German 




Both FAZ and Bild were delighted to make their readers aware of how West 
Germany’s triumph had been reported in other countries. There was a need still to 
reassure them regarding Germany’s position in the world. Though critical of the 
performance of their own team, English newspapers were generally warm in 
praising the Germans. The Sunday People had declared that Wembley was now 
‘but a shadow of a proud English fortress’ and argued that Germany’s superior 
performance had consigned England to the third division of international football. 
                                                 
714  Die Welt, 1 May 1972. 




The News of the World relied on old stereotypes to get its message across, 
pointing out that ‘a disciplined and efficient German machine’ had ‘made England 
look like a ‘team of Lilliputians.’ This was no doubt gratifying to some German 
newspaper readers even if it seemed to understate the creative influence of 
Beckenbauer and Netzer.
716
 Gerhard Pietsch’s analysis in Bild praised the 
discipline of Schön’s team, singling out Jürgen Grabowski who had abandoned 
his distinctive dribbling game in the interests of the team. The German 
Mannschaft, he claimed, ‘played for Germany, not for themselves’; in comparison 
English players cared only about their bank accounts.
717
 FAZ was on safer ground 
in relying on informed opinion from abroad rather than nationalistic stereotyping 
to explain the miracle of Wembley. Quotes from the Italian press proved 
especially useful in this respect, especially as both Corriere dello Sport and 
Gazetta dello Sport had pointed out that the historical teacher-pupil analogy 
which had once been used to characterize the Anglo-German football relationship 
now no longer applied. Giorno had praised Germany’s ‘textbook football.’ It 
wrote of an ‘illusion that has collapsed and another that has begun with Germany 
the teacher.’
718
 In the context of 1972 it was important to note that newspapers in 
other countries, especially those in a significant football power like Italy, looked 
up to the West German national team. Effectively it endorsed the views expressed 
by Gerhard Pietsch in Bild that England, by adhering to a ‘physical style of 
football that they had played for a hundred years’ and failing to follow Germany’s 
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example and improving their technique, had fallen behind. German football was 




In its obsessive search for the personal or human angle that would appeal to 
the widest possible number of readers Bild’s Paul Palmert and Werner Bremser 
had drawn attention to an incident involving Horst Höttges and Geoff Hurst. 
Höttges (‘Mr Iron Foot’) admitted that he had suffered from a ‘Hurst complex’ 
since the 1966 final when he had been assigned to mark the England forward but 
had failed to prevent him scoring a hat-trick. Six years later the German defender 
had clearly had the better of the duel and Hurst had been substituted after 58 
minutes but he had refused to swap shirts. Bild alleged that Höttges had accused 
him of being ‘a bad loser.’
720
 This may or may not have been so but England’s 
performance in the second leg of the quarter-final, played in Berlin on 13 May 
1972, which Hurst missed, tended to underline the impression that it was not just 
that they had forgotten how to win, but that they had forgotten how to lose as 
well. The English press urged Ramsey to approach the second leg in an 
adventurous spirit in order to make up the two-goal lead which Germany had 
taken home from Wembley but he disappointed them by picking ball-winners 
rather than ball-players and seemed more anxious to avoid another embarrassing 
defeat than to take risks in pursuit of an admittedly unlikely victory. With 
Germany content to defend their lead and England ill-equipped to do anything but 
defend, the match degenerated and England were much criticized for ‘having 
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kicked their way to a goalless draw.’
721
 Bobby Moore argued that ‘England have 
won back some respect with this result’ which, as Haffner observed, was a sign of 
how modest England’s ambitions had become. The match radiated only ‘cold light 
while all the world was waiting for blazing flames.’
722
 It was best forgotten but it 
was the impression left by Germany at Wembley that counted. In the year of the 
Munich Olympic Games and only two years before Germany was due to host the 
FIFA World Cup, its national team had projected a positive image. ‘Surely, a 





‘Rummenigge and ten robots’: World Cup 1982 
Though England and West Germany played two friendly matches between 
1972 and 1982, each side winning at home, they did not engage competitively 
until the 1982 World Cup finals in Spain. This was the first tournament to involve 
24 finalists, a concession made by Joao Havelange after he became president of 
FIFA in 1974 in order to meet the demand for more representation from Africa. 
For Glanville, the 1982 tournament was ‘beset by heat and by displeasing 
incidents’ and was ‘ill-organized by the hosts.’ There were no strong pre-
tournament favourites ‘though West Germany looked good.’
724
 England, managed 
by Ron Greenwood, had failed to qualify for the finals in both 1974 and 1978 and 
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was not considered a potent threat. This situation changed almost as soon as the 
tournament got underway when West Germany, World Cup winners in 1974, 
were beaten 2-1 by Algeria while England had looked enterprising in their 3-1 
victory over France and went on to win their remaining two Stage One group 
matches. Moreover, West Germany, by the time that they met England in Madrid 
in the second group stage, had already lost much of whatever goodwill they were 
entitled to after qualifying from the group at Algeria’s expense via a 1-0 win 
against Austria which many observers saw as a cynical exercise in match-fixing, 
Austria having already qualified. A Spanish newspaper labelled this match El 
Anschluss and manager Jupp Derwall and his squad were heavily criticized by the 
German media and fans. It did not help that the style which had won them 
admiration at Wembley ten years earlier seemed to have been lost somewhere on 
the way to Spain. Pelé famously described them as ‘Rummenigge plus ten 
robots.’
725
 Despite reaching the final, where they were beaten by Italy, Derwall’s 
squad – though technically proficient – did not inspire much affection and the 
notorious match with Austria was too much for many. ‘This victory was worse 
than a defeat’, was the verdict of a World Cup book published by one newspaper, 
and worse was to follow for West Germany in the semi-final after Schumacher’s 




‘The 1982 World Cup made a large number of fans who were at an 
impressionable age at the time lose interest in the national team and concentrate 
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completely on club football,’ Hesse has argued.
727
 To some extent this may have 
been underpinned by the German press at the time which was so critical of 
Derwall and his players that he accused them of running a campaign against them 
that amounted to treason. At this time the German press was undergoing a period 
of rapid reconstruction characterized as the Zeitungssterben, the death of local 
newspapers. Whereas there had been 624 titles in 1954 this had been reduced to 
460 by 1971 and the process was continuing, resulting in a loss of plurality in the 
expression of public opinion. At the same time the number of colour magazines 
increased and this prompted some commentators to ask if the population could 
handle the resulting ‘reading stress.’
728
 The greater concentration of the German 
press combined with a growing negativity towards the national team and its 
players, often depicted as being only interested in money, helped to breed 
disaffection towards a team that never excelled or played exciting football but was 
noted for its functionality and stubbornness. There were, of course, other reasons 
why football in West Germany suffered such a bad press at the time. It was at the 
end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s that the authorities found themselves 
grappling with ‘an entrenched hooligan culture.’ This prompted the Ministry of 
the Interior to issue a report in 1982 entitled Sport und Gewalt (violence) and to 
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Hesse has discussed German football hooliganism in the wider socio-
political context of the period arguing that ‘the rise of hooliganism fitted the 
general mood of existential angst.’
730
 When this is considered along with the 
problems already surrounding Derwall and his team after the fiasco of a ‘match’ 
with Austria, it is not surprising that the sports journalists covering the West 
Germany-England match tended to concentrate largely on what was wrong with 
the German team and German football generally. Spain had already been beaten in 
the first match of the three-team group by the time that Germany faced England 
so, for Derwall’s team, it was enough to avoid defeat, not a situation likely to 
generate an exciting contest, given that Germany, even without Bernd Schuster, 
would normally have been expected to beat England by this time, especially as 
both Kevin Keegan and Trevor Brooking were injured. The German press, 
nevertheless, tried to generate some enthusiasm in its pre-match coverage and it 
followed a formula that was by now familiar, stressing the historic football rivalry 
between the two countries. ‘England vs. Germany is not a normal game of 
football but a piece of sports history’, declared Die Welt on the morning of the 
match. Over the long run, the German record against England was still negative: 
four victories and three draws stood against eleven defeats with a goal difference 
of 22:49.
731
 However, it was made clear that it was the relatively short run that 
mattered. Derwall, who had played in the team that had been beaten at Wembley 
in 1954, was said to be looking to avenge that defeat; both Ramsey and Schön 
would be watching the game on television at their homes; one would fondly recall 
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1966, the other 1970 and 1972; for Franz Beckenbauer those three games had 
been ‘the highlights of his career’; for Bobby Charlton they had been matches in 
which ‘even the loser could leave the pitch with their head held high.’ There was 
also reference to very recent history – Aston Villa’s victory over Bayern Munich 
in the European Cup Final a few months earlier. For West Germany there was 
some recent history to forget as well as to remember. Derwall had told his players 





The German press, as we have seen, tended to avoid references to the war 
and were relatively restrained in their coverage of the England team. FAZ noted 
that England manager Ron Greenwood thought that ‘Germany were overrated’, a 
view with which many of his readers would not have disagreed after the 
disappointments and scandals of the first group stage. Greenwood was portrayed 
as an intellectual; his coach, Don Howe, as a practical man, which summed up 
their respective qualities fairly. FAZ lurched into analogies with military rank to 
explain the division of labour within the English camp, betraying possibly a 
German fondness for order and uniforms. Thus Greenwood, with his ‘quiet 
authority’ was ‘the major’; Howe became ‘a sergeant when working with the 
substitutes’ and Geoff Hurst was ‘adjutant’ to them both. There was nothing here 
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Oskar Schmidt in FAZ followed what was by now a journalistic convention 
by suggesting that England were out for revenge for their defeat in Mexico 1970 
just like Germany were keen to win in 1970 as revenge for 1966. The most 
significant article to appear in FAZ in the build-up to the match, however, was a 
lengthy piece by Karl-Heinz Bohrer which indicated just how deeply the image of 
the national side had been damaged by its performance in the first group stage 
matches and by the ‘fix’ with Austria in particular. Using an appropriate Spanish 
metaphor he argued that the German national team now lacked emocion, a quality 
associated with bull-fighters. Something had been lost since the World Cup 
triumph of 1974. The team had become ‘mere administrators of results’; ‘boredom 
without the promise of technical efficiency … has taken hold of German football.’ 
He included club performances in the European Cup in his critique noting that 
German sides had not won any matches against English clubs since 1976, 
implying that the English, whatever their deficiencies, did play with passion 
(emocion). Professional footballers in Germany, he complained, had become 
simply interchangeable ‘spare parts’ in machines operated by ‘trainer-engineers’. 
Since the game had turned into work, ‘a golden age when football was not about 
money but about the emotion and the game’ has been lost. Its soul had been 
destroyed by ‘high payments for professional players’ and their aim to maximise 
gains with minimum effort. Bohrer invoked the ideal of Furor Teutonicus which 




                                                 




Bohrer’s colleague Oskar Schmidt previewed the match in a more 
conventional fashion, though it is clear that he shared many of his colleague’s 
doubts and reservations. He informed FAZ readers that English sports journalists 
thought that the German team was over-rated, had ‘no class’ and appeared to have 
‘money on their minds exclusively.’ Schmidt balanced this, however, by pointing 
out that England ‘lacked intelligence’ with long balls and headers as their ‘default 
position’. He conceded that in midfield Greenwood had ‘some players with skills 
and tactical understanding usually not associated with the English style of play’ 
but the defence was weak.
735
 In view of these deficiencies on both sides and 
mindful of the way the group was positioned before kick-off, the drab 0-0 draw 
was not surprising. It was a satisfactory result from Germany’s perspective as it 
left them at the top of the group with England required to beat Spain by at least 
two goals in their final match to qualify. This, however, did not earn Derwall’s 
team a good press. Peter Stutzer’s match report in Die Welt headed ‘Zero Growth’ 
was followed by a sub-heading which added ‘zero goals, zero courage and zero 
self-confidence.’ The match had been ‘abject’ and ‘did not offer any positives.’ It 
had simply confirmed the view that Germany now played ‘destructive football 
and were avoiding attacking football.’ Ron Greenwood had to cope with 
criticisms of England’s unenterprising performance but could justify himself by 
referring to the absence of two key players and pointing out that ‘two teams were 
necessary to make a game of football.’ Germany had thwarted an England team 
on a run of nine consecutive victories but Stutzer remained unconvinced. If they 
had wanted to win why had Pierre Littbarski only been brought on as a substitute? 
                                                 




Kevin Keegan, who knew about German football from the inside, was quoted as 




In 1982, the most important aspect of coverage in the German newspapers is 
what it tells us about attitudes towards their own team. Greenwood’s team 
attracted little attention but it is clear that English clubs, then enjoying more 
success than German clubs in European competition, were looked at positively, 
not least for the emocion or passion with which they played. Overall, the 1982 
World Cup finals was a negative experience for West Germany, despite reaching 
the finals. The defeat by Algeria, the ‘fix’ against Austria and the boring draw 
against England were followed by the image problem arising from what David 
Downing describes as ‘Schumacher’s criminal – and criminally unpunished – 
assault on Battiston’ and his attitude afterwards.
737
 Kurt Röttgen in Die Welt 
claimed that the team, which in the early 1970s had been so much admired for its 
desire to attack and its flair players, had left a very bad impression and had lost 
credibility. They were now seen as Spaßbremsen (killjoys).
738
 
World Cup Semi-Final 1990: ‘Dear Maggie …’ 
The broad context of Anglo-German football rivalry was changed by the 
dramatic events that followed the collapse of the East German state (GDR) in the 
late 1980s. For Germans, the new world order was symbolized by the dismantling 
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of the Berlin Wall, the most obvious physical legacy of the Cold War era. On 9 
November 1989 Hans-Joachim Friedrichs, news anchorman for television channel 
ARD, marked the event with these words: 
 
‘The handling of superlatives must be done with the greatest 
attention and care; they are used all too often. But tonight it is 
right to use them. This day, 9 November is a historical day: East 




On the same day VfB Stuttgart beat Bayern Munich in the German Cup but no 
one cared. Journalist Timothy Garton-Ash observed the revolution in Eastern 
Europe as an eye witness and was taken by surprise by the pace it gathered after 9 
November, noting how quickly, in East Berlin and Leipzig, for example, thoughts 
turned from liberation and reforming the GDR to unifying the two German 
states.
740
 This proved more difficult and more contentious than many anticipated 
in the euphoria of 9 November. 
 
There were problems in integrating East German and West German sport 
and football was not immune from these difficulties. On 15 November 1989, just 
six days after the Wall had come down, the GDR played an international match, a 
World Cup qualifier against Austria. Asked to explain the 3-0 defeat, coach 
Eduard Geyer reported that ‘the players were completely distracted, making 
                                                 
739  Der Tagesspiegel, 1 June 2013. 
 




telephone calls like crazy and in fact only worried about finding other clubs.’
741
 
Many East German athletes were contracted to clubs or directly to the organizing 
bodies for sport which were in the process of dissolving themselves or 
disappearing. There was little to prevent a mass exodus of sporting talent to the 
West.
742
 East German football clubs were easy prey for the managers and scouts 
of West Germany and soon the migration of players commenced, Andreas Thom 
being the first Oberliga player to move, switching from BFC Dynamo to Bayer 
Leverkusen in December 1989.
743
 Footballers transferring from East to West were 
part of an exodus that included ‘almost the entire [GDR] national cycling team, 
sixty amateur boxers, and the men’s national handball squad.’
744
 In December 
1990 Matthias Sammer and Andreas Thom became the first East Germans to play 
for a team representing re-unified Germany in a match against Switzerland but the 
one-way traffic in football talent and the resentment that it caused in the old GDR 
became one of the problems that German football had to deal with in the 1990s. 
 
Re-unification caused problems in other ways that impacted not just on 
German football but indirectly on the Anglo-German football relationship. It 
caused alarm among that section of political opinion in Britain who feared a 
revival of German ambitions to dominate Europe. As John Ramsden has 
observed, ‘Britain experienced in the 1980s and 1990s more open anti-German 
prejudice among her rulers than at any time since 1945.’ This was particularly 
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evident around 1989 to 1992 and was evident at the highest levels. Conservative 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, according to Ramsden, ‘never got over the 
experience of being a civilian threatened by the Luftwaffe’ and surrounded herself 
with advisers who shared her Anti-German prejudices. Reminded in 1989 of 
Germany’s major contribution to the European Union’s finances she argued that 
‘the Germans have been simply paying reparations for all the things they did 
during the war.’ This was not very reassuring from a German point of view and 
there was little comfort to be drawn from the assessment of one English journalist 
that Thatcher was not ‘subliminally anti-German’ but ‘typically English’ and 
‘subliminally anti-European.’
745
 As we have seen, the British press was not slow 
in taking its cue from Thatcher and this provoked a response in Germany. The Sun 
at times displayed overt anti-German sentiment in its pursuit of sales, often under 
the disguise of heavy-handed pantomime humour. A cartoon published before the 
semi-final in 1990 showed Adolf Hitler telling the German players that it was 




Much of the pre-match coverage in German newspapers of the meeting 
between Germany and England in the 1990 World Cup semi-final followed a 
predictable pattern. However, there was, from the start of the tournament in Italy, 
a more aggressive and hostile tone. This was especially evident in the tabloid Bild 
which seemed to be following the example now being set by the Sun and the 
Mirror in England. Germany, though its team had won few friends, had clearly 
outperformed England throughout the 1980s. Though England had reached the 
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quarter-finals of the 1986 World Cup in Mexico, West Germany had reached the 
final; more recently England had performed disastrously in UEFA 88, held in 
Germany, returning home with zero points after the group stage; West Germany 
had at least reached the semi-finals. Thus, when England, now managed by Bobby 
Robson, failed to impress in their opening match, a dull draw with Ireland, and 
complained that the German referee had failed to give them a penalty, it prompted 
a response in Bild in the form of an open letter supposedly written by Max 
Merkel, the recently retired coach of the Austrian national team, to Mrs Thatcher 
(‘Dear Maggie’), asking her to withdraw England (and Scotland) from the 
tournament. 
 
‘Your compatriots with the iron feet have killed two footballs. 
One has been raped by the Scots against Costa Rica. The other 
has been destroyed by Lineker’s goal against Ireland. Another 
ball was tormented by an England butcher with the name 
Butcher. Is he related to Frankenstein? The England–Ireland 
match was a pure horror show! Dear Maggie this World Cup has 
been so nice, until your gerkhins came! I’ve never asked you a 
favour but now I do. It is an emergency. Deploy an airplane to 
get your footballers back. They disturb this tournament! The 
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This was very much in the style that English readers had come to expect from the 
Sun and its ‘red top’ companion, the Daily Mirror. Throughout the tournament 
Bild appeared to monitor the English tabloids closely and some of its features 
were adapted from originals, especially in the Sun. For example, it copied a chart 
featured in the Sun which had compared Bobby Robson and Franz Beckenbauer, 
but reversed the results so that Germany’s coach came out on top. The campaign 
was still going strong on the morning of the match which featured a patriotic 
quote from Rudi Völler, ‘Good Bye, England.’ All this was justified in terms of 
retaliation. The Sun, Bild’s readers were reminded, had used the rallying cry: ‘We 




Elsewhere the coverage was more restrained in tone. Die Welt and FAZ took 
their lead from Beckenbauer who believed that his team would have to raise its 
game to a level they had not yet achieved in the tournament to beat England and 
reach the final. He was happy to meet England as ‘we know them very well’.
749
 
The only history that seemed to matter was recent football history with Die Welt 
reciting the by-now familiar dates – Wembley 1966, León 1970, Wembley 1972 
and now adding Madrid 1982. England versus Germany was ‘always a classic’, so 
there were good reasons to look forward to this semi-final.
750
 History, in the 
narrow football sense, was clearly important in providing once again the 
framework within which sports journalists could write about the match. On match 
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day, 4 July, Die Welt reminded its readers that on 4 July 1954 Germany had 
achieved its great victory over Hungary at Berne, an event that was securely 




Coverage in FAZ was also framed by football history. Hartmut Scherzer 
looked back and inevitably mentioned 1966 – the legendary match won by 
England in controversial circumstances – before moving on to 1970, 1972 and 
1982. Overall, England still held the lead in terms of matches won but recent 
history suggested that Germany were a lot better than England and that their 
football was regarded more positively. Beckenbauer, however, was wisely 
cautious; England had played well in the friendly at Düsseldorf in 1987 and were 
not to be underestimated; they were ‘strong enough for another classic match.’ To 
some extent these remarks were qualified elsewhere in FAZ by reminding readers 
that the shadow of 1966 was fading and that Germany’s team included players 
like Thomas Häßler who had not been born in 1966 and for whom England’s 
historical superiority and football tradition meant nothing. The old idea of 
England as the teachers and Germany as the pupils would never cross his mind. In 
short, Germany had reason to approach the semi-final with confidence and there 
was also a sense that pride in the national team had been restored. Roland Zom 
was pleased to repeat Beckenbauer’s observation that ‘this team has done more 
for German football in seven weeks than previous ones have done in sixteen years 
since 1974.’  However, there was no sense of underestimating the challenge that 
England now posed. German arrogance was nowhere in sight. 
                                                 




‘They know England but they are not sure if it’s useful. They 
talk as though about a well-known neighbour and have to ready 
themselves for new discoveries. They thoroughly list the 
strengths and weaknesses of the opponent and acknowledge the 




That said, Germany were expected to win. Moreover, according to Lothar 
Matthäus, quoted in Bild, they had a duty to win. One of the features of away 
matches played by West German national and club sides before 1989 had been the 
loyal support of fans from East Germany who had often travelled in great 
numbers to matches in Poland, Czechoslavakia and elsewhere. McDougall 
describes these as ‘pilgrimages to socialist countries.’
753
 Now it was time for the 
team to repay the debt owed to these pilgrims. ‘They’ve made the hard effort and 
travelled to our games in the Eastern bloc and often outnumbered West German 





Both English and German fans had earned a reputation for hooliganism in 
the 1980s and there was some violence around the stadium in Turin. One German 
fan was reported to have been severely injured and was in hospital. An English 
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fan replied to the attitude of the Italian police: ‘If you treat us like animals, we’ll 
behave like animals.’ Generally, however both German and English football 
emerged from this hard-fought match – a 1-1 draw after ninety minutes and extra 
time that was won by Germany after a penalty shoot-out – with honour intact and 
reputations raised. The sports pages of the German press were delighted that their 
team had reached the final but were also generous to England in defeat. 
Understandably, Bild was overjoyed, its headlines proclaiming ‘What a game! 
What a fight!’ Despite all the pre-match bluster it was conceded that the team 
once derided as ‘gherkins’ had played well, especially in the first half, and had 




In Die Welt Beckenbauer set the achievement of his team in a historical 
perspective. Since 1974, German football had presented a negative image. His 
team however, had taken only ‘8 weeks to alter the image of German football.’ In 
his own fashion, Beckenbauer cared as much about making a good impression as 
Helmut Schön. He may have been a little disappointed, therefore, in the foreign 
press ‘quotes’ collected by Die Welt. England had beaten Belgium on the way to 
the semi-final and Libre Belgique was disappointed with the outcome of the 
penalty shoot-out which had seen ‘the Germans running through the [back] door 
to the final.’ The view of the Italian newspaper Gazzetta dello Sport probably 
counted for more. ‘What a gigantic England team’, they concluded; over the 
course of the match they had played better than Germany. There was, however, 
satisfaction to be gained from it being recognized that Germany had been part of a 
                                                 




great match played in an excellent spirit. It had been ‘atomic football’, according 
to Politica (Yugoslavia); ‘a fight of the titans’, according to Sport (Barcelona). El 
Pais (Madrid) praised both teams and added that the result could be justified as 
‘Germany were the most consistent team at this World Cup.’
756
  
Given the bad press that West German national sides had received in the 
1980s, even in German newspapers, it was no doubt pleasing to find Roland Zorn 
in FAZ reflecting positively on the respect the teams had shown for each other and 
for sport. Germany had won but the real winner had been football.
757
 England had 
exceeded all expectations and could return home with heads held high. In the first 
thirty minutes they had subjected Germany to pressure that they had not 
experienced previously in the tournament. But Germany had come through. The 
‘quiet hero’ of the hour, according to Zom’s colleague Hartmut Scherzer, was the 
German goalkeeper Bodo Illgner who had not overly celebrated the win but 
merely threw his fist in the air. There was not a trace of arrogance. ‘True heroes 
celebrate in style.’
758
 Germany went on to win the final against Argentina and 
Beckenbauer was quoted as saying that ‘Germany will be undefeatable for years 
to come.’
759
 By the time that England and Germany met again at EURO 96 this 
seemed a prediction that was best forgotten. 
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Rettungsgriff zum Teekessel: EURO 96 Semi-Final, Wembley 
The finals of EURO 96 were to be played in England and provided an 
opportunity to measure how the English public would react to an extended stay in 
the country by their old football rivals. Having again failed to qualify for the 
World Cup finals in 1994 it was an eagerly anticipated event, despite some 
residual fears regarding hooliganism, which seemed to have receded since the 
disaster at Hillsborough in 1989 and the steps taken to modernize stadia and 
change the image of English football as ‘a slum sport, played in slum stadiums, 
and increasingly watched by slum people.’
760
 The mood was summed up by the 
popularity of the song entitled ‘Football’s Coming Home’, the very successful 
marketing slogan for the tournament, England’s unofficial anthem which reflected 
on the ‘thirty years of hurt’ since the hosts had won the World Cup in 1966.
761
 As 
Germany approached the tournament fans could take some consolation from the 
scientific research published by two Oxford University academics in 1995 which 
effectively proved that they had been correct in thinking that England’s third goal 
in 1966 had not crossed the line.
762
 This prompted considerable interest in 
Germany where television presenter Ulrich Wickert announced the findings on the 
late-night news with the words, ‘football history has to be rewritten.’ One 
newspaper demanded that the two scientists should be awarded professorships for 
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not allowing the love for their country to distort their scientific judgement.
763
 
Clearly history – even if it was only football history – still counted. 
 
Anglo-German political relations had not improved enormously since 1990 
despite the fact that ‘Maggie’ was no longer at Number 10 Downing Street. John 
Ramsden cites numerous instances of press hostility towards Germany in the 
1990s, not all of it confined to the tabloid Sun, Mirror and Daily Star. Even the 
Guardian joined in on occasions. ‘Such hostile images’, he notes ‘appeared in all 
the British papers, and were picked up and reprinted in German papers as 
evidence of British attitudes.’
764
 The extent to which this impacted on public 
opinion might be judged from the 1995 survey which indicated that only 10 per 
cent of those polled trusted Germany ‘a good deal’, while 35 per cent trusted 
Germany ‘not at all.’
765
 Coverage of EURO 96 in the tabloids, especially as the 
semi-final between England and Germany approached, is unlikely to have 
changed these attitudes despite the attempt to pass it off as an English joke which 
the Germans did not understand. Indeed it could be argued that the way in which 
the tabloids used EURO 96 as an excuse for war talk and crude stereotyping 
generated almost as much coverage in the German newspapers as anything that 
happened on the field. All the English tabloids were guilty to some extent. The 
Sun ran with ‘Let’s Blitz Fritz’; the Daily Star with ‘Herr we go – Bring on the 
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Krauts’. However, it was the Mirror, engaged in a circulation battle with the Sun, 
which attracted the most criticism, both in Germany and at home. Its brash young 
editor, Piers Morgan, was convinced that the way to beat the Sun was to copy it, 
relying on the Mirror’s  continuing attachment to Labour to provide the only real 
difference.’ Morgan later admitted that he had been wrong but, by then, the 
damage had been done.
766
 In outbreaks of violence that followed Germany’s 
victory on penalties after the scores were level at the end of extra time ‘foreigners 
were attacked on the pretext of being German.’
767
 Fortunately, Bernhard Heimrich 
of FAZ was on hand to put this in perspective for German readers. There was 
something ‘very British’ about the violent post-match reaction. But the huge 
power surge after the last penalty indicated that most English people who had 
watched the match on television went into the kitchen to put the kettle on – 




Much of the pre-match coverage in the German press proceeded on familiar 
lines with assessments of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two sides, 
their form in previous matches in the tournament and news of injured players. In 
this respect the approach of the German press was relatively low key. 
Expectations before the tournament were relatively low after an underwhelming 
performance by the national side in the 1994 World Cup. Germany had an 
experienced team without technical brilliance, though hopes were rising as 
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progress was made through the group matches against the Czech Republic (won 
2-0), Russia (won 3-0) and Italy (0-0) and the quarter-final against Croatia (won 
2-1). Berti Vogts, now coach of the national team, concentrated his efforts on 
building team morale, repeating his mantra, ‘There are no stars: the team is the 
star’. This proved very important in view of the injury crisis that beset his squad 
and appeared to give England an advantage as semi-final Saturday approached.
769
 
With Germany’s star striker out of the game Roland Zorn in FAZ summarized 
England’s expectations ahead of the semi-final: ‘Klinsmann goes, Germany are 
coming, England are happy.’
770
 But team spirit would see Germany through. 
 
Veteran FAZ journalist football writer Steffen Haffner  described how  it 
was possible to tell that an England versus Germany game was about to take 
place: ‘Suddenly there are German tanks re-appearing in English papers and 
Krauts are being bombed again.’ It was a fair observation, especially in the 
context of 1996. Haffner, however, preferred to adhere to the time-honoured 
framework of recent football history which had framed so many articles in the 
German and English press over the previous thirty years. His discussion centred 
on 1966, the third goal and the fact that British scientists had recently proved that 
it should not have been given. Yet, he reminded his readers that Germany had 
almost been beaten in normal time at Wembley in 1966 and had been rescued – 
albeit temporarily – by Weber’s equalizer only 15 seconds from time. Perhaps 
West Germany were not so unlucky after all? Generally, he rejoiced in the rich 
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history of Anglo-German international football, especially the ‘classic games’ of 
1966, 1970 and 1972. Germans should not forget 1990 when England had 
surprised everyone, including Germany who had to play their best game of the 
tournament to get past them in the semi-final, and then only on penalties. England, 
‘the cradle of modern football’, had come back impressively after failing to 
qualify for the 1994 World Cup finals and he predicted ‘a match full of tension – 
as usual.’
771
 For Zorn, Haffner’s FAZ colleague, writing on the same day, the odds 
were in England’s favour. He could not resist quoting a DFB spokesman who had 




What was especially remarkable about 1996 is the extent to which German 
newspaper coverage was concerned with the English tabloids, especially the Daily 
Mirror, rather than the match itself. Confronted by the Mirror’s notorious 
‘ACHTUNG! SURRENDER!’ front page, featuring mock-up photographs of Paul 
Gascoigne and Stuart Pearce in instantly-recognizable Second World War British 
army helmets, Bertie Vogts tried to make the best of it: 
 
‘We have always considered this kind of coverage as humour. 
Germans are used to being in the semi-final, therefore the 
emotions are running a bit high in the English media and among 
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the English players. For Germany this is a normal game like 




It was important not to concede the psychological advantage to England while 
remaining good-humoured despite this provocation. Roland Zorn was particularly 
outraged by the Mirror’s less than subtle comparison of Germany’s progress in 
the tournament with Nazi conquests in Europe in World War II: ‘Germany had 
already overrun three countries and the meeting with England was their last 
chance to leave the Island without further consequences.’ Gina Thomas, also in 
FAZ, argued that newspaper editors in England, notably Piers Morgan, had 
miscalculated the effect of their front pages and headlines. ‘When xenophobia is 
displayed in such a manner, the feelings and thoughts of the readers are 
misrepresented’, she argued.  Thomas noted that Morgan had attempted to deflect 
criticism by offering ‘‘peas in our time’, a feeble pun that had demonstrated that it 
was not just the Germans who lacked a sense of humour. Ironically, it was the 
right-wing Daily Mail that had complained about the Mirror’s campaign 
displaying the unacceptable face of patriotism.
774
 Thomas’s analysis was endorsed 
elsewhere in the German press. Der Spiegel, focusing on the Mirror’s main 
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This provocation was enough for the normally moderate Roland Zorn in 
FAZ to demand: ‘Jungs, haut sie weg!’ (‘Lads!, hammer them!’).
776
 Certainly the 
German press response was robust, notably from Bild, who replied to the Daily 
Mirror  (‘the Daily Terror ‘) in kind. The German tabloid’s answer to ‘Achtung! 
Surrender!’ was a list eleven questions designed to irritate the English. 
 
Why do you drive on the wrong side of the road? 
Why, as the birth place of football, were you never 
European champions? 
Why can’t you pull a decent pint of beer? 
Why do you wear bathing trunks in the sauna? 
Why do your electric locomotives still carry a fireman? 
Why do you eat your pork chops with peppermint sauce? 
Why can’t you beat your former colonies at cricket? 
Why do you look like freshly-boiled lobsters after a sunny 
day on the beach? 
Who won the World Cup semi-final in 1990, you or us? 
When did an Englishman last win Wimbledon? 
Why are you the only people who still think the Wembley 




Not all of these questions would have seemed sensible to an Englishman – mint 
sauce goes with lamb, not pork – but the last one was particularly important 
                                                 
776  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 June 1996. 




because it provided Bild with an opportunity to remind readers yet again of what 
was by now the oldest and most clichéd controversy arising from Anglo-German 
football encounters. Referee Dienst was quoted as saying, ‘I would do it again.’ 
Willi Schulz and Uwe Seeler, who admitted that he was still dreaming about it, 
claimed still to feel a sense of injustice.
778
 If, indeed, Schulz and Seeler were 
quoted correctly, this seems out of line with Hesse’s account of talking over the 
events of 1966 with Schön’s team in 1996 who, with the exception of Tilkowski, 
downplayed the controversy. ‘I talked to many members of the 1966 West 




To be fair, a very significant body of public opinion in England was highly 
embarrassed by the tabloid war on Germany. The Press Complaints Commission 
was ‘inundated with complaints’ though it took no action against the Mirror.
780
 
One effect of these complaints and a thousand letters of protest, as John Ramsden 
notes, was to persuade Morgan to call off various stunts he had planned, including 
sending a Spitfire to ‘bomb’ Germans when training and parking a tank outside 
the offices of Bild.
781
 England manager Terry Venables was anxious to distance 
himself and the team from Fleet Street’s ‘tin soldiers.’ ‘It’s disgusting what the 
press were doing’, he told Bild, ‘We respect Germany for their international 
achievements. And we’ll shake hands with them, before and after the game.’ 
Bobby Charlton, respected hero of the 1966 and 1970 matches added, ‘This is a 
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disgrace for sport and for the nation that gave birth to sport and the idea of fair 
play.’ Miraculously, English tabloid coverage ensured that even the French sports 
daily L’Equipe took the German side. It suggested that German fans should go to 
Wembley wearing three stars on their shirts, one for each World Cup win (1954, 
1974, 1990). This would remind the English of the facts.
782
 When it was all over, 
the fact was that Germany had won again, prompting Gary Lineker to produce his 
famous bon mot that football was a game played by twenty-two men that 
Germany always won. For England, observed Roland Zorn, ‘it could have been a 
midsummer night’s dream. But it wasn’t.’ The game had demanded character and 
the German team had shown enormous willpower to come through this match 
successfully. He concluded that ‘football history has once more been written at 
Wembley’, this time by Germany.
783
 Bild’s match report was headlined: ‘England, 
the party is over!’ It conceded that there was English grace in defeat; Terry 
Venables had said, ‘Berti has a great team. I wish him best of luck for the final.’ 
Yet, if the English were heartbroken, it was their own fault, Bild claimed, because 
the English media had hyped this game beyond reason and had represented it as a 





Of all the comment on the coverage of EURO 96 in English newspapers, the 
most important was delivered by Bernhard Heimrich in FAZ. He argued that much 
of the nationalistic hype could be explained by a British identity crisis arising 
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from the growing tensions within the United Kingdom between the English, the 
Scots and the Welsh which were then becoming apparent. Political evolution in 
the form of the Scottish parliament and the Welsh Assembly were only a few 
years away. As ideas of Britishness began to erode the English found themselves 
with a need to articulate a new identity and this was not always easy. Whereas 
Scotland and Wales each had an omnipresent patron saint, he argued, England had 
only the vague figure of St George but the appearance at Wembley of the English 
flag, the St George’s Cross rather than the Union Jack, suggested that football 
now provided a vehicle for ‘English super-nationalism’ which fed on Britain’s 
past glories. This was why press coverage of EURO 96 had often been about the 
Second World War rather than football. Heimrich blamed the Thatcher 
governments of 1979-1990 for this state of affairs. It was Thatcher who had taken 





While careful to retain a sense of perspective – the post-match violence had 
been only a small footnote – he indicted the popular press as a malign and 
irresponsible influence supplying a daily fix of vulgar journalism for over ten 
million readers daily. He suggested that the Daily Mirror should be relabelled the 
Achtung Mirror and the Daily Express as the Daily Excess. The English tabloids, 
he argued, represented the lowest form of journalism in Europe and campaigns 
like that which the Mirror had just run were examples of a dinosaur form of 
nationalism. The kind of aggression released by ‘the chauvinistic witch hunt’ of 
                                                 




1996 forced him to ask (and answer) some questions: ‘What has caused this 
stupidity among the youth?’ Was it the weekly war movie on television? Did 
parents force their children to watch goose-stepping Germans at home? Were the 
Sun and the Daily Mirror the only text books for history lessons?
786
 There was 
more in this argument than Heimrich may have realized at the time. One critic of 
History textbooks used by students in British schools after the Margaret 
Thatcher’s government had introduced the national curriculum in 1988 concluded 
that though there was ‘less unbridled patriotism … banal nationalism and 
xenophobia’ than had once been the case, they tended to underpin pride in being 





In 1990, Franz Beckenbauer remarked that in England ‘war correspondents 
get their say whenever their team plays us.’
788
 There seems to be some justice in 
this claim though the tendency was less overt in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s than 
it became in the 1990s, and especially in 1996. In Germany the reverse was 
generally true and there were good reasons why the German press sought to avoid 
allusions to the First and Second World Wars, notably that expressions of 
nationalist sentiment were officially frowned upon. The desire to make a good 
impression and to show that the new post-war Federal Republic could be trusted 
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to make its way peacefully in the world was paramount. It was important for the 
West German government, the German football team and the German press. We 
should bear in mind here Michael Billig’s concept of ‘banal nationalism’ in which 
the sports pages of the daily papers ‘flag’ the idea of the nation daily, celebrating 
‘our victories’ and mourning ‘our defeats’, all the time projecting an image of the 
nation to their readers.
789
 In the conditions prevailing for much of the period after 
1945 this involved projecting an image of the German state and its people that 
would not cause alarm in other European countries or raise the spectre of pre-war 
Germany and Nazi ambitions to dominate Europe. As John Ardagh, in a book 
surveying contemporary German society for a mainly British audience, has 
observed, that the celebrations following Germany’s World Cup win in 1990 were 
‘probably less fervent than they would have been in many countries, such as 
Britain.’
790
 This element of restraint in modern German national culture becomes 
clear in the respect shown for English football and English footballers, not only 
for the success and the superiority they enjoyed over Germany in terms of 
matches won in the period up to the 1970s, when the balance began to shift 
decisively, but also as the founders of the modern game who had first taught the 
Germans how to play it. 
 
However, though the burden of the past weighed heavily and influenced the 
writing of the German football journalists, they were not entirely submissive. 
There was much to be proud of in post-war West Germany and the national 
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recovery which was widely recognized at home and abroad as an ‘economic 
miracle’ was echoed on the sports pages in the ‘miracles’ of Berne and León and 
the celebration of German technical superiority in football that first became 
apparent at Wembley in 1972 and was reinforced by a succession of German 
victories thereafter which seemed to suggest that Germans were able to abandon 
old methods and pick up new ones in a way that the English could not. Once the 
English had taught the Germans but from the 1970s it was for the Germans to 
teach England, ‘the sick man of Europe’ in more ways than one, how to survive 
and prosper in international competition. The longevity of the controversy 
surrounding England’s third goal in the World Cup final of 1966, revived so often 
in the German press that it was a journalistic cliché, suggests that the Germans 
knew that they had established technical superiority even in the mid 1960s and 
could be used to underpin ideas of where Germany stood in relation to England in 
post-1945 history. It also suggests a need to explain away the defeat of 1966 as an 
aberration, an event which did not fit into the dominant narrative of post-war 
recovery and success, by scapegoating the Swiss referee and the Russian 
linesman. 
 
In the changed conditions after 1989-1990 the new re-unified Germany 
prompted a negative reaction in Britain and elsewhere that was reflected in the 
way that Germany and Germans were represented and this spread to the sports 
pages. It was naturally very evident at the time of the 1990 World Cup semi-final 
and the semi-final of EURO 1996 when England and Germany were thrown 
together in high profile international matches where national prestige was 
345 
 
perceived to be at stake. Whereas there had been fairly mild protestations in the 
German press about English ‘tin soldiers’ in 1966 there was a more robust 
response this time which reflected both the passing of time since 1945 and the 
surge of nationalistic sentiment following reunification in 1990. As the passing of 
time lifted the burden of war guilt from German shoulders, there was no longer 
any requirement to accept the negative stereotyping that featured so prominently 
in the Daily Mirror’s tasteless tabloid war on Germany. Bild, as we have seen, 
fought back using similar techniques. The more considered response by Bernhardt 
Heinrich in FAZ pointed to insularity and nostalgia as an explanation for the 
excesses of English newspapers, singling them out as the worst press in Europe, 
thus permitting even Bild to occupy the moral high ground. It was not just on the 
field of play that Germany could now claim superiority. 
 
In his essay ‘Sports Chatter’, written in 1986, Umberto Eco observed of the 
sports pages:  
 
‘This discussion is in the first place that of the sports press, but it 
generates in turn discussion on the sports press … The 
discussion on the sports press is discourse on a discourse about 




                                                 




Eco was criticizing a media apparatus that appeared to be obsessed with talking 
about itself. This could have been applied with justification to the German and 




It is now 13 years since I first encountered English humour or banter in 
connection with football. While finishing this thesis, Europe commemorates the 
centenary of the outbreak of the First World War with memorial services and 
exhibitions. I find myself talking to British and German colleagues about the war, 
its causes and culprits, its aftermath. Of course, football also features in many 
discussions at work and at home. There has been much interest in the informal 
Christmas Truce of 1914 when some troops met in ‘no-man’s land’ and, 
according to an Imperial War Museum historian, ‘some played impromptu games 
of football.’
792
 It reminds us that football has the capacity to bring people of 
different nations closer together as well as dividing them. The same might be said 
of the banter between fans that surrounds the global game. 
 
Since 2001 England and Germany have played against each other four 
times, once during the 2010 World Cup the South Africa, three times in 
international friendlies. The encounter in Bloemfontein became part of the Anglo-
German football history as England scored a goal when a shot from Frank 
Lampard certainly crossed the line, yet the goal was disallowed. Once more, a 
referee and his assistant made a critical error in a very high-profile match. In that 
sense, nothing much has changed since 1966 except that fortune, which favoured 
England then, seems to have turned against them 44 years later. Many England 
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supporters were remarkably philosophical in responding to this misfortune. ‘As 
regards to this ball over the line thing, the Germans will remember Geoff Hurst’s 
goal in 1966 and smile,’ wrote a correspondent signing himself ‘John Bull’, on 




However, it seems possible that some things have changed or are changing 
profoundly with regard to English attitudes to German football. The German 
national team and the style in which it plays now seems almost unrecognizable 
from previous incarnations of the Mannschaft and has many English admirers. So 
much so, that the Guardian headlined a feature ahead of the 2014 World Cup 
Final: ‘Whisper it softly: it’s OK to like Germany.’ According to journalist 
Stewart Wood, ‘something strange’ was happening. References to ‘Krauts’ and 
‘Panzers’, had been commonplace in English tabloids in 1996 and for a few years 
afterwards but were now few and far between. Instead, he observed, with a 
Germany versus Argentina final to come, he observed, ‘it seems pretty clear that, 
for many of us, Germany is the team we will be cheering.’ Wood added that it had 
been customary for the English to describe German teams by assigning to them 
the same ‘begrudging virtues: “efficient”, “clinical”, “ruthless”’ used to refer to 
‘well-functioning inanimate objects’, such as cars or dishwashers. Now, however, 
Wood argued, ‘Germany is not just a country to be admired. It is a country that 
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 And not just on account of its football. The Guardian article 
confirms my own impressions and experiences of living and working in Bath and 
Leicester over a period of five years.  Many people I have met liked Germany and 
had an opinion about its football but generally admired German efficiency in 
producing reliable cars. Quite incomprehensively, they all claimed that trains in 
Germany are on time, always. This aside, I cannot confirm from my own 





However, analysis of the way in which Anglo-German football rivalry has 
been represented in the English press over the period between 1954 and 1996 
suggests that this has not always been so. This is evident in the large narratives 
that are embedded in match reports and other items relating to international 
matches which were seen to reoccur over time. Principally, these were based on 
the history of Anglo-German military and political conflict in the twentieth 
century and on a developing story derived from what happened on the field of 
play in which, for the English, 1966 featured heavily; in other words ‘two world 
wars and one World Cup.’ Both narratives provided the setting for extensive 
stereotyping which could be used positively and/or negatively. Another important 
narrative that framed the way that stories were written, especially in the 1960s, 
1970s and early 1980s, was linked to what has been called ‘declinism’, the British 
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obsession with the problems – sometimes real, sometimes exaggerated – 
surrounding its economic performance which was manifestly inferior to that of the 
Federal Republic of Germany as it experienced its post-war ‘economic miracle’ 
and achieved growth rates higher than those achieved by Britain. This meant that 
sports page narratives also reflected a grudging admiration for the Germans and 
for German football at times. Thus the Germans might be described as ‘arrogant’, 
but they were also ‘efficient’ and ‘modern’ and superior in technique. The English 
were acknowledged to have big hearts and powerful legs but were hampered by 
their reluctance to abandon methods that had brought success in the past, resulting 
in them being overtaken by rivals in international competition. The story of 
Ramsey’s persistence for far too long with the players and the system that had 
won the World Cup in 1966 while West Germany moved on fits neatly into this 
pattern. 
 
However, the way in which these stories were told and especially the extent 
to which they carried an overtly hostile anti-German message which drew on 
negative experiences, folk memories and prejudices, varied over time. Thus the 
context of the Anglo-German political, economic and cultural relationship as it 
evolved over a period of forty years is very important in explaining the nature of 
representation at any particular time. Change in the way in which sports news was 
presented in the press is another contextual factor that has to be taken into 
account. For example, football coverage in 1954 was comparatively thin 
compared to 1996. In part, this can be explained simply by problems regarding the 
availability of paper (newsprint) which was subject to rationing until 1955. When 
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previewing England-West Germany in 1954 for the Daily Express, Desmond 
Hackett’s football story had to share the available space with other popular sports 
such as boxing, dog racing and cricket. The inclusion of a column entitled ‘Soccer 
on the Inside’ ensured that football dominated the sports section, but that 
dominance was not so evident as would be the case forty years later when it could 
be spread over several of the sports pages and even, as with the Daily Mirror in 
1996, take over the front pages too. Moreover, there were marked differences in 
style between newspapers which shaped the way in which matches were 
previewed, reported and analysed. In the Daily Express and the Daily Mirror the 
writers were expected to deliver sensationalist and highly opinionated reports. 
Their approach, what could be called as ‘we-coverage’, was generally quite 
different from that of The Times where the ‘Association Football Correspondent’ 
Geoffrey Green, was writing for a better educated, more literate audience. The 
headline given to a Times leading article, ‘Taking Stock of English Football,’ 




In general, press English coverage of Anglo-German football rivalry at 
international level suggests has been characterized by a persistent undercurrent of 
mistrust arising from the unhappy history of the twentieth century when the two 
nations found themselves engaged in two global military conflicts in which 
suffering was inflicted on and suffered by both sides. It is not uncommon for 
sports writers to use military terminology to describe team games based on attack 
and defence but the shared history of the First and Second World Wars means that 
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such references are capable of carrying powerful reminders of the past when 
reporting England versus Germany. For most of the period 1954 to 1996, 
however, there was an element of restraint in reporting. This was especially 
evident in the 1950s, when memories of the Second World War were fresh in 
people’s memories and English newspapers were looking to reassure readers that 
their country was still a major power but had to build a new relationship with the 
‘good Germans’ of the Federal Republic. In this context, it was reassuring to 
report that ‘we’ had beaten the new world champions at Wembley in 1954, even 
though the German side on the day was much changed from the one which had 
achieved ‘the miracle of Berne’ by beating Hungary a few months earlier. The 
honorary Englishman status accorded to Bert Trautmann and the positive publicity 
generated by the German doctors and nurses who cared for Manchester United 
players after the Munich air disaster meant that there were other positive stories to 
tell and overt hostility towards Germany and Germans was kept in check. 
 
This pattern continued to prevail after 1966 though it was briefly interrupted 
as Helmut Schön’s team made its way – or rather ‘marched’ as some English 
newspapers described their progress – to the World Cup final against England at 
Wembley in 1966. There was some justification for the German accusation that 
some English football writers became ‘tin soldiers’, especially in the interlude 
between the semi-final and the final when they hinted that West Germany had 
feigned injury and provoked opponents into acts of retaliation that had led to them 
being sent off. If West Germany had won at Wembley in 1966 it is likely that this 
kind of criticism would have become more evident. However, England won, 
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assisted by a dubious refereeing decision to which Schön and his team responded 
with good grace, being determined above all else, to leave a good impression. 
This allowed English newspapers to praise their performance – it reflected well on 
England to have beaten such a good side – and also their sportsmanship. The 
triumph of European, ‘Anglo-Saxon’ football over Latin and Latin American 
football at the 1966 tournament also provided something that could be celebrated 
with Germany, thus keeping negativity in the background amidst the post-match 
euphoria. 
  
It was not so easy for the English press to be so positive towards German 
football in the years that followed, the ‘thirty years of hurt’ which the Lightning 
Seeds, David Baddiel, Frank Skinner and thousands of England supporters were 
to sing about 1996.
797
 Though, in his own way, Ramsey with his ‘wingless 
wonders’, was tactically innovative, yet winning the World Cup in 1966 tended to 
reinforce conservatism in English football while West Germany and others proved 
more successful at modernization. The outlines of this story were shaped by the 
different trajectories taken by the British and West German economies. If 
anything, winning the Coupe Jules Rimet, like having first-mover advantage in 
industrialization, made it even more difficult for English football to move forward 
and open up to new ideas. It thus helped to explain the ensuing failures to renew 
and adapt to relative decline in terms of international competition. The 
circumstances in which West Germany defeated England at León in 1970 were 
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such that the press were able to tell a story of misfortune – Gordon Banks in goal 
would have made all the difference – ensuring that England returned home having 
performed creditably, though some were inclined to point the finger at a poor 
management decision, when Ramsey had decided to substitute Bobby Charlton, 
liberating Beckenbauer from his defensive duties. By this time, the fate of the 
English national football team had come to assume much more importance than it 
had at the start of our period, not least because of extensive live television 
coverage. Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who had claimed that ‘England always 
wins the World Cup under Labour’ was denied any positive impact that good 
news from Mexico would have provided and there were exaggerated claims that 
England’s defeat had cost Labour the 1970 general election. 
 
Though it was not evident immediately, the 1970 match marked a turning 
point in the Anglo-German football relationship with the balance thereafter being 
very much in Germany’s favour. The defeat in León marked the beginning of a 
decline which saw England fail to qualify for the World Cup finals in 1974 (when 
West Germany won) and 1978 (when West Germany reached the quarter-final). It 
was the 3-1 defeat in the European nations Cup quarter-final at Wembley in 1972 
– and the fluid style in which it was achieved that made it impossible to ignore 
how far West Germany had advanced and how far England had fallen behind. It 
was clear that the two countries had moved in diametrically opposite directions, 
an impression confirmed by Ramsey’s defensively-minded approach to the second 
leg in Berlin which seemed designed to ensure damage limitation and simply 
confirmed that England were now incapable of mounting a serious threat to a 
355 
 
technically-proficient and attractive German team. At a time when commentators 
were beginning to suggest that Britain was ‘the sick man of Europe’ and 
‘declinism’ had set in, there was an inevitable tendency for journalists to glance 
admiringly towards the successful West Germans before subjecting English 
football and those that ran it to severe criticism. Ken Jones in the Daily Mirror, 
for example, attacked ‘a system which permits a match of this importance to be 
played within a web of critical domestic contests.’
798
 The Germans, in contrast, 
had different priorities and were represented as having adjusted successfully to the 
new world of highly-competitive international football and would never have 
allowed this to happen. 
 
England’s performances improved in the 1980s, to some extent adding 
substance to the Thatcherite claim that victory in the Falklands War in 1982 and 
economic prosperity had reversed years of British decline. When England 
qualified for the World Cup finals in Spain in 1982, drawing 0-0 against West 
Germany in the second group stage, there was disappointment and much criticism 
of an opponent that no longer played with the flair associated with German teams 
of the 1970s.  The German capacity for organising teams that were hard to beat 
but unattractive to watch in this period meant that much of the coverage they were 
given in English newspapers was negative, though this could be excused by the 
fact that the West German press and public were, if anything, even more critical, 
especially after the element of cynicism that was exposed when the ‘arranged’ 1-0 
win over Austria   ensured progression at the expense of Algeria. With its club 
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sides banned from European competition after Heysel in 1985 and a persistent 
hooliganism problem ensuring a bad press for the game at home, the unexpected 
progress of the England team at the 1990 World Cup, where they met West 
Germany in the semi-final, generated enormous interest and enthusiasm. It could 
be argued that England benefited from being regarded now as the underdogs when 
they played Germany in that the role meant that there was less pressure on them 
from the press or the fans. 
 
Coverage of Italia 90 saw the appearance of a much more virulent anti-
Germany tone in the tabloid press, especially in the Sun and the Daily Star. There 
were more English journalists playing ‘tin soldiers’ than at any time since 1966. 
However, it is important to remember the political context when referring to this 
change of tone towards the ‘Krauts’, as the Sun liked to refer to Germans. It has to 
be set against the British reaction to German reunification which was regarded 
unfavourably by Prime Minister Thatcher and her closest political allies, 
especially Nicholas Ridley, her Trade and Industry Secretary whose overt hostility 
as revealed in an interview with the Spectator was so evident that it was no longer 
possible for him to remain in the government without causing embarrassment. 
Opinion poll evidence suggested that a large number of people shared his distrust 
of Germany and its alleged ambitions in Europe and that many still did remember 
the war, among them was Bobby Robson who opened his team-talk before the 
1990 semi-final with the words: ‘Don’t forget the war, lads.’
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For the England team, as they prepared to meet Germany in the semi-final, 
it was football history that mattered. Stuart Pearce, for example, ‘felt we owed 
them one for 1990’, when Germany had won on penalties. Paul Gascoigne – 
perhaps not the most reliable of sources – recalled in his ghosted memoirs that 
‘The gaffer (Terry Venables) was brilliant at encouraging us and building out 
confidence. There was never any of the “Remember the war” crap. It was all 
about how we were better than them, how we could beat them …’
800
 However, the 
match took place against the backdrop of continuing difficulties between Britain 
and the European Union during the period of Conservative government under 
John Major from 1990 to 1997, culminating in the so called ‘Beef War’ of 1996 in 
which Germany played a major part in securing a ban on British beef exports. 
This incident was very much at the forefront of the news agenda as Euro 96, the 
first major football tournament to be held in England since 1966, accompanied by 
massive exposure on television and in the press. ‘Football’s coming home’ was 
the slogan of Euro 96, yet foreign journalists and fans alike could only have been 
alarmed by the xenophobic tone of the English popular press which was hardly 
welcoming and took on warlike characteristics. 
 
In the tabloid press the kind of coverage that had characterised the period 
from 1966 up to the end of the 1980s was submerged by aggressive reporting that 
bordered on open racism. Ironically, it was the Daily Mirror, once the popular 
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newspaper most closely identified with the political left in England that led the 
way as it borrowed from the agenda set by its red-top rival the Sun in an attempt 
to win back readers with a sensationalist approach which exploited negative 
stereotyping at every opportunity. Piers Morgan, the Mirror’s editor, declared 
‘football war’ on Germany, prompting Bild to respond, which only made matters 
worse by providing an excuse to prolong the campaign still further. Christopher 
Young has suggested that much of the material that many Germans and some 
English people found embarrassing and offensive owed much to the pantomime 
tradition which required a villain, a ‘blacker-than-black baddie’ for the ‘humour’ 
to work. It was, he claims, aimed not just at Germany but at the ‘sanctimonious 
quality press’ who tended to look down on Morgan and the kind of journalism 
popularized by the Daily Mirror. The Germans, he notes, served this purpose, and 
as they could be negatively stereotyped so conveniently, were able to serve it 
again and again. ‘The baddie functions and is loved as a stereotype within a 




This may be so but it was not surprising that the Germans did not want to be 
reminded of some of the darker aspects of their past or to be confronted with 
stereotypes derived almost entirely from the era of Nazism and the Second World 
War as seen by the English. Though these developments in the 1990s took 
xenophobia and stereotyping to a new extreme, there had always been an 
undercurrent evident, often evident in the choice of language or metaphor in 
sports reporting, which suggested that the English had not – perhaps could not – 
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forget about the war. The German sports press covered the games in an entirely 
different way. The tone was less militaristic in the choice of words though a 
fondness for military uniforms and ranks sometimes broke through. The reasons 
for this more sober approach to Anglo-German football are purely historical in 
their origin. The press in the various German states and empires had never been 
free; instead it was strictly censored and controlled. Worst, between 1933 and 
1945, the press was used to serve the purposes of national socialism. It was only 
after 1945, therefore, that the press in the Federal Republic was free. However, the 
aftermath of the Nazi period was palpable. Though the papers were free by and 
large, they were inhibited by the legacy of the past and were less inclined to 
sensationalism and tended to avoid football-as-war metaphors, and focusing more 
closely on an agenda shaped by events in and around the matches that were 
played.  West German athletes were regarded as having an important part to play 
in rehabilitating Germany in the eyes of the post-war world. They were ‘diplomats 
in track suits.’
802
 Helmut Schön’s teams fitted this description and the German 
media also played its part, protesting only mildly about the ‘tin soldiers’ of Fleet 
Street in 1966 and responding only under extreme provocation in 1996. 
Meanwhile, for a time at least, the English press seemed to have shifted into new 
territory as the rival tabloids fought each other for a share of the market that was 
actually in decline. Coverage of the 2002 World Cup, Jon Garland has argued, 
saw many of the themes that had been noticeable in 1996 re-emerge, ‘such as the 
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This thesis has investigated an enormous amount of football coverage in the 
press in England and Germany between 1954 and 1996. Further, it has stopped 
short of England’s biggest success since 1966: beating Germany twice in 2000 
and 2001, the latter being the reference point for my relationship with England, 
English football and identity. Arguably, press reaction to England’s 5-1 victory in 
Munich in 2001 merits further attention and analysis given the outburst of 
patriotic euphoria that it caused in England and the soul-searching that went on in 
Germany. Moreover, the political context of Anglo-German relations within the 
wider European Union has continued to evolve. After 2006, matches between the 
two sides have mostly been regarded as amicable affairs as public opinion in 
England became more accustomed to reunified Germany, though anxieties 
recently prompted by the extent to which Germany drives EU economic policy 
and the rise of UKIP (the United Kingdom Independence Party) suggest that the 
Anglo-German relationship may be entering troubled waters yet again. If this is 
so, it is likely to be reflected on the sports pages as in other parts of the media. 
Any researcher taking this area of study further would have to take into account 
that the media since 1996 have changed dramatically and would need to 
investigate online news sites, blogs and social media as well as the conventional 
printed sources which have been the principal focus of this study. 
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Finally, it is important to reflect on the ways in which the account of media 
representations generated by Anglo-German football rivalry presented here differs 
from those already available to us. In any historical work, periodization is 
significant and there are certain advantages in taking a long view. Much of the 
academic interest in football-related representations of Germany and Germans 
dates from the mid to late 1990s and was clearly prompted by a perceived need to 
explain the nature of the coverage of EURO 96 and subsequent major tournaments 
in the English tabloid press. The work of Maguire, Poulton and Possamai (1999), 
Garland and Rowe (1999), Crolley and Hand (2002) and Garland (2004) might be 
bracketed together in this way. While these are insightful and informative in terms 
of media representations arising from EURO 96 and the 2002 World Cup, it could 
be argued that they focus quite narrowly on episodes when tabloid representations 
of Anglo-German football were manifesting themselves in forms that had not 
been seen before. It is important to be able to remind ourselves that what 
happened in 1996 was specific to 1996 and that, though there were some 
similarities, the Mirror’s pantomime warfare – and Bild’s response - was quite 
different from the kind of coverage typical of the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s. 
It also has to be said that the focus in much recent literature in this area has been 
largely on the mass-market tabloids. We have been careful here to pay as much 
attention to upmarket The Times and the middlemarket Daily Express as the 
downmarket Daily Mirror. If, to use Ramsden’s phrase, there was a persistent 
‘people to people’ problem between the English and the German people in the 
second half of the twentieth century, football writers did not always help, though 
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Peter Wilson and Desmond Hackett were more open to criticism than Geoffrey 
Green in this respect. 
 
The title of Garland’s 2004 article – ‘The same old story’ – implies that it is 
possible to read backwards from coverage of the 2002 World Cup, but 
investigating a longer series of representations dating back to the mid 1950s 
makes it clear that this could be misleading. Various histories have to be taken 
into account, notably the history of Anglo-German relations and the history of the 
mass media. The relationship between Britain and the FRG in the 1950s was quite 
different from that which existed between Britain and re-unified Germany in the 
1990s. The highly-segmented market for newspapers in Britain in the 1950s saw 
the Mirror without a serious rival in the popular mass circulation sector but by the 
1990s it was engaged in and losing a circulation battle with the Sun, conditions 
which prompted editor Piers Morgan to push boundaries of good taste and 
sensationalism in a way that would have occurred to his predecessors in the 
1950s, 1960s or 1970s. Young (2007) – with its emphasis on the ‘two World Wars 
and one World Cup’ meta-narrative and the Mirror’s invocation of traditional 
English pantomime humour – effectively underlined the importance of seeing 
particular representations in a longer historical perspective. Thus by investigating 
the history of football-related representations over a forty-year period it is 
possible to identify both a persistent undercurrent of hostility and mistrust and 
also the particular historical conditions which have caused this to vary in intensity 
and to manifest itself in different ways over the years. Looking back from 2002 to 
1996, it might be possible to read ‘the same old story’. But ‘the story’ of 1996 is 
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very different from that of 1972 or 1966 or 1954; moreover, it was told in quite 
different ways, depending on both the outcome of matches and the wider context. 
Thus victories for England in 1954 and 1966 could be used to tell a reassuring 
success story at a time when Britain’s role as a world power was diminishing; 
defeat for England in 1972 could be used to warn of the dangers of failing to 
modernize as rapidly as rival industrial nations, an issue with which the British 
media was increasingly preoccupied at the time. 
 
The other feature of this thesis that makes it distinctive in its field is that 
some attempt has been made to provide an account of representations of Anglo-
German football rivalry in the German press, enabling some tentative 
comparisons to be drawn.  As we have seen, the German press – whether 
upmarket FAZ, middlemarket Die Welt or the downmarket Bild - reported 
international football from a very different perspective. Any tendency to represent 
England and the English negatively was inhibited in the first instance by the need 
to draw a line under the Nazi past and a determination to avoid controversy. There 
was a greater anxiety than in England to show that German football was well-
regarded in other countries, most notably in Mexico in 1970. Moreover, the higher 
proportion of subscription as opposed to direct sales via newsagents and street 
vendors meant that the tendency towards sensationalism in journalism was kept in 
check. What is particularly interesting here is the increasing evidence of concern 
regarding the way in which Germany and German football were represented in 
England. When Fleet Street’s soldiers put their ‘tin hats’ on 1966 there was 
dismay, though mildly expressed. By the 1990s Germany’s own tabloid press was 
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inclined to respond directly to the campaigns waged by its counterparts in 
England with Bild trading national stereotypes and mock outrage with the Daily 
Mirror.  It is hoped that Chapter Five of this thesis will provide some kind of 







Primary Sources – Newspaper Articles 
 
Bild-Zeitung/Bild am Sonntag 
 
Bild am Sonntag: "Spielt wie Borussia!" 30 June 1966 
Bild am Sonntag: Einziger Makel: Das seltsame dritte Tor. 31 June 1966 
Bild am Sonntag: Fußballer sind Arbeiter und Künstler. 31 July 1966 
Bild am Sonntag: Haller narrte Torwart Banks. 31 July 1966 
Bild am Sonntag: Toll! Empfangt sie wie einen Weltmeister! Deutsche Spieler 
schwören: Das dritte Tor war nicht drin. 31 July 1966 
Bild am Sonntag: Auf diesen Tag wartete ich: Schön freut sich auf das England-
Spiel. 14 June 1970 
Bild am Sonntag: So oder so, wir feiern euch wie die Weltmeister! 14 June 1970 
Bild am Sonntag: Wir werden Euch wie Sieger feiern. Telegramm an unser Team. 
14 June 1970 
Bild am Sonntag: Kein Spiel ohne Gespenst. 30 April 1972 
Bild am Sonntag: Rummel und Ruhm - das ist Bobbys Leben. 30 April 1972 
 
Bild: Alles klar! die beste Elf spielt. 30 July 1966 
Bild: Terror-Aktion gegen Zeitungs-Filialen. Justizsenator: "Das sind 
faschistische Methoden". 3 February 1968 
Bild: Ihr "England-Haß" ist vier Jahre alt. 13 June 1970 
Bild: Müller. England hat keine Angst vor dem Bomber. Der Bomber hat keine 
Angst vor England. 13 June 1970 
Bild: 3:2 Jungs, ihr seid die Größten! Müller schoß das Siegestor. 15 June 1970 
Bild: "Wir haben viel Freude geschenkt". 15 June 1970 
Bild: Alemania Bumm! Bumm! Bumm! 16 June 1970 
Bild: Wir stehen nicht mit dem Rücken an der Wand. 27 April 1972 
Bild: So bremse ich Englands Bomber. 28 April 1972 
Bild: Im Wembley-Stadion kämpfen wir bis zum Umfallen. 29 April 1972 
Bild: Das Geheimnis unseres Sieges in Wembley. 2 May 1972 
Bild: Engländer spotten: Deutsche schlagen wir leicht. 28 June 1982 
Bild: Bobby Charlton: So stark sind meine Engländer. Bild Zeitung, 29 June 1982 
Bild: Derwall: Nur 5 Spieler gut! Wie gut war Derwall? 1 July 1982 
Bild: Maggie, hol' Deine Gurken zurück - alle sind sauer. 13 June 1990 
Bild: Englands Mauer-Hit: Belgien platt, Deutschland gewarnt. 28 June 1990 
Bild: Robson: Man wünscht uns zum Teufel - das macht uns stark. 3 July 1990 
Bild: Good Bye, England! 4 July 1990 
Bild: Hurra Finale! Elfer-Drama Bodo, der Held. 5 July 1990 
Bild: Es wird das größte Spiel dieser EM. 24 June 1996 
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Bild: Was Soll das? England erklärt uns den Fußballkrieg! Schießt die Krauts in 
Fetzen! Häme und Spott für die Deutschen. 25 June 1996 
Bild: England schämt sich für Fußball-Hetze. 26 June1996 
Bild: Auf zum nächsten Tanz. 28 June 1996 
Bild: Engländer zeigen Ballack neben Hitler. 28 January 2010. Online 
http://www.bild.de/sport/fussball-wm-2010-suedafrika/wm/englaender-zeigen-
ballack-neben-hitler-11276502.bild.html 






Daily Express: Behind the Score. Give Allen the England penalties. 29 November 
1954 
Daily Express: F.A. play Finney on left wing. 29 November 1954 
Daily Express: Germans try switch Trick. Sepp gambles on new winger. 29 
November 1954 
Daily Express: 'No More Training' says German Boss. Slater (I'm fit again) is last 
England arrival. 30 November 1954 
Daily Express: Key-Man Allen must bang them in. It's England to win. Germans 
fear five. 1 December 1954 
Daily Express: England win 3-1. But it should have been 9-1. Daily Express, 2 
December 1954 
Daily Express: Matthews…What a Man! Shack finishes the Germans. 2 December 
1954 
Daily Express: The same Stan does it again. 2 December 1954 
Daily Express: Desmond Hackett's Column. Mr. Rising Price. 3 December 1954 
Daily Express: FA Players find Pools Paradise. Wright's Men Keep on Training. 
23 May 1956 
Daily Express: Taylor scores practice six. Injured, but Jeff Hall stands for Berlin. 
24 May 1956 
Daily Express: One-Arm German Picked. 25 May 1956 
Daily Express: Hall and Taylor pass tough tests. 'Unfit' Rumours Anger 
Winterbottom. 26 May 1956 
Daily Express: Be Proud of England and our new Boys. Then the Troops start 
cheering. 28 May 1956 
Daily Express: How World Has Raced Ahead. 10 May 1965 
Daily Express: Moore Masters the Slavs. 10 May 1965 
Daily Express: Alf's babes await call-up. 12 May 1965 
Daily Express: Thumps Up, Ramsey. 13 May 1965 
Daily Express: The Queen’s train for Germany. 14 May 1965 
Daily Express: The Queen dazzles them. 19 May 1965 
Daily Express: Seeler misses Wembley test. 21 February 1966 
Daily Express: Connelly regrets. He's unable to play for England - he has to look 
after the babies. 22 February 1966 
Daily Express: Ramsey Gamble - Stiles No. 9. 23 February 1966 
367 
 
Daily Express: Flagged Out! Glum Germans go down to Stiles. 24 February 1966 
Daily Express: Let them earn it first, Alf. 25 February 1966 
Daily Express: World Cup Diary. Schoen has no fears. 26 February 1966 
Daily Express: Your view on sport. 26 February 2014 
Daily Express: Five Gems. 13 July 1966 
Daily Express: Bravo Fans. 13 July 1966 
Daily Express: Now for the Argentine. 21 July 1966 
Daily Express: This German agony act is a winner. 25 July 1966 
Daily Express: Mighty Moore. 25 July 1966 
Daily Express: Fiasco – and exit Russia. 26 July 1966 
Daily Express: World Cup rap for Ramsey. 26 July 1966 
Daily Express: Wembley Wonders! 27 July 1966 
Daily Express: Lamb Franz plays. 28 July 1966 
Daily Express: Attack on Britain by U.S. diplomats. 29 July 1966 
Daily Express: Setting the record straight. 29 July 1966 
Daily Express: Hunt is a key man. 30 July 1966 
Daily Express: Moore Bid. He's chasing that big Wembley hat-trick. 30 July 1966 
Daily Express: Show 'Em England on this Red Letter Day. 30 July 1966 
Daily Express: Team Spirit to clinch it. 30 July 1966 
Daily Express: This man Ramsey, pt. 2. Daily Express, 30 July 1966 
Daily Express: This man Ramsey… and his record since he took over the England 
job in 1963. 30 July 1966 
Daily Express: Watch out for Emma. 30 July 1966 
Daily Express: Achtung, Achtung, Bobby Charlton. 31 July 1966 
Daily Express: England - Champions of the World. 31 July 1966 
Daily Express: England Champions of the World. World Cup Victory. The day it 
happened. Souvenir Edition. 31 July 1966 
Daily Express: It's Jubilation Night. England team mobbed - biggest cheer of all 
is for Alf Ramsey. 31 July 1966 
Daily Express: Now I must pay tribute to Alf Ramsey. 31 July 1966 
Daily Express: 5000GBP reward for Alf Ramsey. 1 August 1966 
Daily Express: Lose? We just didn't know how. 1 August 1966 
Daily Express: The Greatest. And they had to win it twice. 1 August 1966 
Daily Express: Wow did I do that? Hurst gasps. 1 August 1966 
Daily Express: The Professional. 1 August 1966 
Daily Express: Wembley Wonders! 1 August 1966 
Daily Express: World Salute. 1 August 1966 
Daily Express: Cash share-out proves it…England are the greatest TEAM. 1000 a 
man they say. 2 August 1966 
Daily Express: Germany Next, Lads! Into Europe Again. 31 May 1968 
Daily Express: Alf rests Cup aces and calls in Bell. 1 May 1968 
Daily Express: England's Surrender. 3 June 1968 
Daily Express: Nick’s “kids” seek revenge. 3 June 1968 
Daily Express: England team attacked. 4 June 1968 
Daily Express: Mexicans jeer at Union Jack. 1 June 1970 
Daily Express: Off – to a shocker. 1 June 1970 
Daily Express: Gay Germans march on. 6 June 1970 
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Daily Express: Don’t knock Alf. 16 June 1970 
Daily Express: Beckenbauer out as Germans bid for third prize. 20 June 1970 
Daily Express: It's up to Lee and Chiv. 28 June 1972 
Daily Express: Hurst: He will play. 28 April 1972 
Daily Express: Schoen's pledge: We're not Retreating. 28 June 1972 
Daily Express: Rodney's standing by to strike. England face Germany again … 
Looking for a revenge victory. 29 June 1972 
Daily Express: Go for Broke, England. 1 May 1972 
Daily Express: Make England's team No. 1 priority. 3 May 1972 
Daily Express: Alf: I won’t take risks. 3 May 1972 
Daily Express: Sir Alf picks up the pieces. 3 May 1972 
Daily Express: Farewell, Hurst. And Mullery says: I quit. 4 May 1972 
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